Full Text
4687 GI/202 6 (1)
EXTRAORDINARY
PART I —Section 1
PUBLISHED BY AUTHORITY
No. 174] NEW DELHI, WEDNES DAY, JUNE 2 4, 2026/ASHADHA 3, 1948
CG-DL-E-16072026-274543
2020 -21, 2021 -22, 2022 -23 िाजमल हैं।
75% C aCO₃ से कम A
75-85% CaCO ₃ B
75% CaCO ₂ से कम A
75-85% CaCO ₂ B
06/17/2019 -
01-01-2020 से 30-06-2022 17%
01-07-2022 से 30-06-2023 20%
01-07-2023 से 30-06-2024 25%
01-07-2024 से आगे 30%
(“यूरोप् ला स्ट् ट”) *** *** 0-10 *** *** 0-10 *** *** 0-10 *** *** 0-
10 *** *** 0-10
(“येिर्बाई ”) *** *** 0-10 *** *** 0-10 *** *** 0-10 *** *** 0-
10 *** *** 0-10
कंपिी (“न्घे”) *** *** 0-10 *** *** 0-10 *** *** 0-10 *** *** 0-
10 *** *** 0-10
िाता है) *** *** 0-10 *** *** 0-10 *** *** 0-10 *** *** 0-
10 *** *** 0-10
डस ल् यू औसत *** *** 0-10 *** *** 0-10 *** *** 0-10 *** *** 0-
10 *** *** 0-10
5 एडीसी *** *** 0-10 *** *** 0-10 *** *** 0-10 *** *** 0- *** *** 0-10
कंपिी *** *** 0-10 *** *** 0-10 *** *** 0-10 *** *** 0-
10 *** *** 0-10
(जवटाप्लास ) *** *** 0-10 *** *** 0-10 *** *** 0-10 *** *** 0-
10 *** *** 0-10
कंपिी *** *** 0-10 *** *** 0-10 *** *** 0-10 *** *** 0-
10 *** *** 0-10
कंपिी *** *** 0-10 *** *** 0-10 *** *** 0-10 *** *** 0-
10 *** *** 0-10
येि िांच *** *** 0-10 *** *** 0-10 *** *** 0-10 *** *** 0-
10 *** *** 0-10
िाता है) *** *** 0-10 *** *** 0-10 *** *** 0-10 *** *** 0-
10 *** *** 0-10
11 अन् य *** *** 10-
20 *** *** 0-10 *** *** 0-10 *** *** 0-10 *** *** 20-
5 भारतीय मांग मी.टि 6,30,830 7,21,645 7,65,372 8,75,988
3 भारतीय मांग मी.टि 6,30,830 7,21,645 7,65,372 8,75,988
21 2021 -
22 2022 -
ई (A)
% 0.00
% 0.13
% 0.65%
USD/MT USD/MT USD/MT % Range %
1.
2.
("येिर्बाई ") *** *** *** *** 20-30
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
क ं पिी *** *** *** *** 10-20
11 अन्य *** *** *** *** 60-70
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
MINISTRY OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY
(Depa rtment of Com merce)
(DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF TRADE REMEDIES )
FINAL FINDINGS
New Delhi , the 24 th June, 2026
Case N o. – CVD(OI) – 03/20 24
Subject: Countervailing duty investigation concerning imports of “Calcium Carbonate
Fille r Masterbatch” originating in or exported from Vietnam.
F. No. 6/39/2024 - DGTR .— Having regard to the Customs Tariff Act , 1975 as
amended fro m time to time (here inafter referred to as “the Act” ) and the Customs Tariff
(Identification, Assessment and Collection of Countervailing Duty on Subsidized Articles and
for Determination of Injury) Rules, 1995 , as amended from time to time (hereinafter re ferred as
the “CVD R ules” or “the Rules”);
1. Compounds and Masterbatch Manufacturers Association of India (hereinafter referred to
as “CMMAI”) and Masterbatch Manufacturers Association (hereinafter referred to as
“MMA”) (hereinafter collectively referred to as the “petitioner s” or “applicant s”) on
behalf of the domestic producers in India filed an application, before the Designated
Authority (hereinafter also referred to as the “ Authority ”) in accordance with the Act
and the CVD Rules for initiation of a counterva iling duty investigation concerning
imports of Calcium Carbonate Filler Masterbatch (hereinafter also referred to as the
“product under consideration” or the “subject goods” or “PUC” ) originating in or
exported from Vietnam (hereinafter also referred to as the “subj ect country”) .
2. The domestic industry in the present case is fragmented and consists of a large number
of domestic producers located across India, hence the application for countervailing duty
investigation was filed by two associations , namely CMMAI and MMA on behalf of
their member entities . All the relevant information in the prescribed format as required
under Trade Notice No. 09/2021 dated 29th July 2021 as amended vide Trade Notice
No. 11/2021 dated 18 th November 2021 (collectively, “ Trade Notice 9/2021” ) was
provided.
3. The following t welve (12) applicant domestic producers (hereinafter referred to as the
“applicants ”) of subject goods filed the required information as per Annexure -I to Trade
Notice 9/2021 for fragmented industries :
i. Kandui I ndustries Priv ate Limited
ii. Sonali Polyplast Private Limited
iii. Blend Colors Private Limited
iv. Bajaj Masterbatches Private Limited
v. Bajaj S uperpack India Limited
vi. Bajaj Plast Private Limited
vii. Bajaj Polyblends Private Limited
viii. Siddh Chemiplast Private Limited
ix. Shri Am bica Polyfill
x. Soltex Petro Products Limited
xi. Alok Industries
xii. Alok Masterbatches Private Limited
4. Further , the following twenty -one (21) domestic producers supported the application and
provided the required data in the prescribed format :
i. Sonali Polym ers Pv t. Ltd.
ii. Maste rplast India Pvt. Ltd.
iii. Sri Maniram Synthetics Pvt. Ltd.
iv. S.P. Polymer
v. 365 Plastium Pvt. Ltd.
vi. N.P. Agro (India) Industries Pvt. Ltd.
vii. Satya Polyalloys LLP
viii. Adex Ployblend Pvt. Ltd.
ix. Rama Vyapaar Pvt. Ltd.
x. Bhagyashree Colors Pvt. Ltd.
xi. Swas tik Plastoallo ys
xii. Manan Polymers Pvt. Ltd.
xiii. Aditya Polyspin Pvt. Ltd.
xiv. J K Paras Ploycoats Ltd.
xv. Speciality Ma sterbatches LLP
xvi. Sachdeva Polycolor Pvt. Ltd.
xvii. Everplus Plastics Pvt. Ltd.
xviii. Manhar Polymers Pvt. Ltd.
xix. Dolphin Polyfill
xx. JJ Plastalloy
xxi. Prabhu Pol ycolor
5. In vie w of the duly substantiated application filed by the petitioners, the Authority
issued a public notice vide Notification F. No. 6/39/2024 -DGTR, dated 27th December
2024, published in the Gazette of India, initiating countervailing duty invest igation into
imports of the product under consideration from the subject country in accordance with
Rule 6 of the CVD Rules to determine the existence, degree and effect of any alleged
subsidization of the subject goods and to recommend the amount of count ervailing duty ,
which , if levied, would be adequate to remove the alleged injury to the domestic
industry.
B. PROCEDURE
6. The procedure described below has been followed with regard to the present
investigation :
i. The Authority notified the Embassy of t he sub ject countr y in India about the receipt of
the present countervailing duty application before proceeding to initiate the investigation
in accordance with Rul e 6 of the CVD Rules.
ii. The Authority invited the Government of Vietnam for consultation with t he aim of
clarifying the situation and arriving at a mutually agreed solution in accordance with
Article 13 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. The
consultations were held on 03.12.2024 with the Government of Vietnam, through video
confere ncing. The con sultations were attended by the representatives of the Gover nment
of Vietnam.
iii. The Authority issued a public notice dated 27th December 2024, published in the Gazette
of India, Extraordinary, initiating countervailing duty investigation concer ning imports o f
subject goods from the subject countr y.
iv. The Authority sent a copy of the initiation notification to the Government of the subject
country, through its Embassy in India, known producers and exporters from the subject
country, known imp orters / users as we ll as other interested parties, as per the addresses
made available by the petitioner and requested them to make their views known in writing
within the prescribed time limit.
v. The Authority also provided a copy of the no n-confidential versio n of the appli cation to
the known producers/exporters and to the Government of the subject countr y, through
their Embass y in India, in accordance with Rule 7(3) of the CVD Rules. A copy of the
non-confidential version of the application was made avai lable to other inter ested
parties, wherever requested. Further, the non -confidential version of the application was
also uploaded on the website of the Authority.
vi. The embassy of the subject country in India was requested to advise the
exporters/producers t o subm it their respo nses to the questionnaire within the prescribed
time limit. A copy of the letter and questionnaire sent to the known producers/exporters
was also sent to them along with the names and addresses of the known
producers/exporters from the subjec t country.
vii. The Authority sent the exporters ’ questionnaire to the following known producers/
exporters in the subject countr y in accordance with Rule 7(4) of the CVD Rules.
S. NO. PRODUCER/EXPORTER
1. PMJ JOINT STOCK COMPANY
2. CPI VIET NAM PLAST IC LIM ITED
3. UB M ASTERBATCH JOINT STOCK COMPANY
4. MEGA PLAST JOINT STOCK COMPANY
5. ADC PLASTIC JSC
6. HP CHEMICALS JOINT STOCK COMPANY
7. POLYFILL JOINT STOCK COMPANY
8. PHU LAM TRADE COMPANY LIMITED
9. EUROPEAN PLASTICS JOINT STOCK COMPAN Y
10. SUN PLASTIKS COMPANY LIMITED
11. HUU NGHI PLASTIC COMPOUNDSJSC
12. THANH XUAN STONE MINERALS JSC
13. FIVE CONTINENTS PLASTICS JSC
14. VSV GROUP CORPORATION
15. VINARES VIETNAM JOINT STOCK COMPANY
16. FILLPLAS COMPANY LIMITED
17. BAO L AI MAR BLE ONE MERMER CO LTD
18. PLASTEX JOINT STOCK COMPANY
19. MASKA GLOBAL COMPANY LIMITED
20. VINA PLASTIC COMPANY LIMITED
21. SUNSHINE PLASTIC COMPANY LIMITED
22. CAPOT VIETNAM COMPANY LIMITED
23. PHA LE PLASTIC MANUFACTURING AND TECHNOLOGY
24. VIET TRUNG PL ASTIC CHEMICAL JOINT STOCK COMPANY
25. PLASTIC HA NOI TRADING JOINT STOCK
26. FILTER MASTER BATCH JOINT STOCK COMPANY
27. BEENPLAST COMPANY LIMITED
28. VIETNAM COLOR TRADING AND MANUFACTURING BEEN A AND T
COMPANY LIMITED
29. GLOBAL MINERALS JSC
30. ANBIO JOINT STOCK COMPANY
31. TLD VIETNAM JOINT STOCK COMPANY
32. AN THANH BICSOL JOINT STOCK COMPANY
33. MINH KHANG CHEMICAL TRADING JOINT STOCK COMPANY
34. US MASTERBATCH JOINT STOCK COMPANY
35. HOANG GIA MINERAL GROUP JSC
36. DAI A INDU STRAY JOINT STOCK COMPANY
37. VIETNAM HANOTECH JOINT STOCK C
38. AN TIEN INDUSTRIES JOINT STOCK COMPANY
39. VITAPLUS JOINT STOCK COMPANY
40. RAINFOREST EXPORT GOODS WHOLESALERS L L C
41. ASIA PLASTICS INDUSTRY JOINT STOCK COMP ANY
42. VIETNAM IN DUSTRIAL MINERAL INTERNATIONAL
43. US MASTERBATCH JOINT STOCK COMPANY -HUNG YEN US
MASTERBATCH JSC
44. CONG TY TNHH MINH HIEN LS DAPLAST JOINT STOCK COMPANY
45. GCC MINERALS JOINT STOCK COMPANY
46. NO MMA PLASTIC COMPANY LIMITED
47. DUC PHONG MATE RIALS CO LTD
48. FILLER MASTERBATCH JOINT STOCK COMPANY
49. POLY PLOY JSC SONG MINH IMPORT EXPORT COMPANY
viii. In response to the initiation notification, the following producers/exporters from the subject
countr y registered themselves as interested parti es in the investigation :
S. NO. PRODUCER/EXPORTER
1. NGHE AN EUROPEAN PLASTIC ONE MEMBER LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANY
2. YEN BAI EUROPEAN PLASTIC JOINT STOCK COMPANY
3. EUROPEAN PLASTIC JOINT STOCK COMPANY
4. POLYFILL JOINT STOCK CO MPANY
5. AN TIEN IN DUSTRIES JOINT STOCK COMPANY
6. A DONG PLASTIC JOINT STOCK COMPANY
7. VITAPLAS JOINT STOCK COMPANY
8. VIETNAM INDUSTRIAL MINERALS INTERNATIONAL JOINT STOCK
COMPANY
9. GCC MINERALS JSC
10. VIET TRUNG PLASTIC CHEMICAL JSC
11. US MAS TERBAT CH JOINT STOCK COMPANY
12. FILLER MASTERBATCH JOINT STOCK COMPANY
13. MEGAPLAST JOINT STOCK COMPANY
ix. Pursuant to the initiation notification, apart from the above producers/ exporters from the
subject country, the Government of Vietnam also filed the re levant informa tion through the
Trade Remedies Authority of Vietnam.
x. The Authority sent Importer’s / User’s Questionnaire to the following known importers of
the subject goods in India calling for necessary informat ion in accordance with Rule 7(4) o f
the CVD Rules.
S.
NO. NAME OF IMPORTER S.
NO. NAME OF IMPORTER
1 ASIAN TRADELINKS PRIVATE
LIMITED 136 SHRI DAKSHINESHWARI MAA
POLYFABS LIMITED
2 DVM PROTECH 137 SRIJA POLYMERS
3 PARIKH PACKAGING PRIVATE
LIMITED 138 MVS ACMEI TECHNOLOGIES
PRIVATE LIMIT ED
4 PREMIER POLYME RS 139 SDR POLYMERS PRIVATE LIMITED
5 SPINPACK INDUSTRIES CO 140 RATHI ENTERPRISES
6 NEELAMEGAM GANAPATHI
RAM 141 SHIVAM AGRI PIPES
7 PADMA POLYMERS 142 BINA PLASTICS
8 EUPHORIA PACKAGING LLP 143 BOHRA SALES SERVICES LIMITED
9 RAWP LAST I MPEX 144 SUPER PACKWELL PRIVATE
LIMITED
10 JUMBO BAG LIMITED 145 JUPAX VANIJYA PRIVATE LIMITED
11 GSV POLYMERS PVT LTD 146 RUCHAK CHEMICALS
12 DOLLAR SENSE 147 MEGAPLAST INDIA PRIVATE
LIMITED
13 SOUTHERN BIO -TECH POLY
INDUSTRY 148 SRI SHYAM ADDIT IVES P RIVATE
LIMITED
14 MITHILA PLYWOOD PRIVATE
LIMITED 149 MOHAN KUMAR AGARWAL
15 INDO CHEMICALS PVT LTD 150 POLYSPIN EXPORTS LIMITED
16 PARASHNATH POLYPACK PVT
LTD 151 GOVIND AGARWAL HUF
17 PRAGATI POLYPLAST INDIA
PRIVATE LIMITED 152 RUSHABH PLASTIC
18 NIRMAL PLASTIC I NDUSTRIES 153 NATIONAL PLASTO CONTAINERS
PRIVATE LIMITED
19 GOTHI IMPEX 154 RAJESH COLOUR COMPANY
20 PRIME AGENCIES 155 BHAGYASHREE COLOURS PVT LTD
21 VIRGO POLYMERS I LTD 156 SUN ENTERPRISE
22 A M TRADERS 157 ORACLE POLYPLAST
23 ATULYA FABRICS LLP 158 KAVERI GLOBAL
24 PUJA SALES 159 N K IMPORTS
25 TOPSACK PACKAGING PRIVATE
LIMITED 160 PARK SHELDRAKE
26 RAJSHREE POLYPACK LIMITED 161 PYARE LAL FOAMS PVT LTD
27 VISHWAA PACKWEL PRIVATE 162 SRIVARI INDUSTRIES
S.
NO. NAME OF IMPORTER S.
NO. NAME OF IMPORTER
LIMITED
28 SRI LAKOSHA POLYM ER
PRIVATE LIM ITED 163 INDAUTO FILTERS
29 RGK POLYCHEM INDIA
PRIVATE LIMITED 164 AJAY LOGISTICS PVT LTD
30 SHREE ADITYA POLYMERS 165 KAVERI IMPEX
31 SHIV INTERNATIONAL LTD 166 NAGINDAS HIRALAL BHAYANI
32 AERO PLAST LTD 167 JAKHOTIA POLYCHEM PVT L TD
33 J VASANTH EXP ORTS 168 VGR FOODTECH AGRO PRIVATE
LIMITED
34 SERVO PACKAGING LTD 169 MARUTI ENTERPRISE
35 GAGAN POLYMERS 170 EVEREST POLYFILLERS PRIVATE
LIMITED
36 TEXBOND NONWOVENS 171 ALPINE FIBC PRIVATE LIMITED
37 PIYUSH POLYTEX INDUSTRIES
PVT LTD 172 VAIBHAV MINE RALS CHEMICALS
38 DELTA IRRIGATION INDIA LLP 173 MAHASHAKTI POLYCOAT
39 BULK LIQUID SOLUTIONS PVT
LTD 174 SHREE KRISHNA SALES AGENCY
40 NIRMAL FIBRES PRIVATE
LIMITED 175 NAV - DIV INDUSTRIES
41 TIRUMALAI AGENCY 176 PLASTENE INDIA LI MITED
42 ALLWIN PIP ES 177 RANASARIA POLY PACK PVT LTD
43 BROCADE INDIA POLYTEX
LIMITED 178 KONKAN SPECIALITY
POLYPRODUCTS PRIVATE LIMITED
44 H AND H POLYMERS 179 THANIGAI INTERNATIONAL
45 AARCH NONWOVEN 180 ALPS POLYTEX
46 GIRIVARYA NON WOVEN
FABRICS PVT LT D 181 SINGLA P LASTIC UDYOG
47 VIRAT IMPEX 182 ZEEL PACKAGING
48 SAI KANDAN AGENCY 183 OMYA INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED
49 PRATAP SYNTHETICS LIMITED 184 PRAGATI PAPER ENTERPRISES
50 KRISHNA LAMICOAT PRIVATE
LIMITED 185 SHREEJI POLYMIX INDUSTRIES
51 ULT RA NON WOVEN 186 VIBG YOR POLYADDITIVES PVT
LTD
52 A-ONE TEX TECH PRIVATE
LIMITED 187 KIK PLASTICS PRIVATE LIMITED
53 RAJSHREE FABRICS 188 ORIANA GLOBAL TRADE LLP
54 MATRIX IMPEX 189 NEOTEX POLYMER PACKAGING
PRIVATE LIMITED
55 PRIMO INDUSTRIES 190 K K PO LYCOLO R ASIA LIMITED
56 SHRI MAA POLYFABS LIMITED 191 MADHU PLASTICS PRIVATE
LIMITED
57 PRAKRIT IMPEX PRIVATE
LIMITED 192 BALAJI POLY UDYOG
58 BIG BAGS INTERNATIONAL PVT
LTD 193 CRESCENT ORGANICS PVT LTD
59 PEEKAY AGENCIES PVT LTD 194 SARAF FABTRADE PR IVATE
S.
NO. NAME OF IMPORTER S.
NO. NAME OF IMPORTER
LIMITED
60 PROTON POLYMER 195 FORMOSA SYNTHETICS PVT LTD
61 A P POLYPLAST PVT LTD 196 BANGLORE POLYCOTTERS
PRIVATE LIMITED
62 SIGNODE INDIA LIMITED 197 MEHUL COLOURS
MASTERBATCHES PVT LTD
63 AGARWAL TECHNOPLAST PVT
LTD 198 KASHYAP UNITEX CORPORAT ION
64 NAAD NONWOVE N PRIVATE
LIMITED 199 SURAJ LOGISTIX PRIVATE LIMITED
65 BHOOMI PLASTIC 200 SURAJ JAISWAL
66 ELECTRO POLYCHEM LIMITED 201 H J INDUSTRIES INDIA PRIVATE
LIMITED
67 MILI EXPORTS 202 K C SONS
68 SURYA LAXMI INDUSTRIES 203 MASTER EXTRUSIO NS
69 VARNA BAGS 204 PINNACLE POLYMERS
70 CAPSTONE POLYWEAVE
PRIVATE LIMITED 205 JHUNSONS CHEMICALS
71 JEMINI IMPEX SOLUTIONS 206 SEYYON HI -TECH POLY FABS
PRIVATE LIMITED
72 SUVARNA EXPORTERS 207 ABIS EXPORTS INDIA PRIVATE
LIMITED
73 HARIOM POLYPACKS LIMITE D 208 SAI INDU STRIES PVT LTD
74 DNS POLYFAB PVT LTD 209 AYUSHMAN MERCHANT PRIVATE
LIMITED
75 LINGAM POLYMERS 210 TRIMURTI POLYCHEM PRIVATE
LIMITED
76 GIRDHAR ROLL WRAP PVT LTD 211 ADISHA MOULDS
77 RAJGURU INDUSTRIES 212 OSWAL INDUSTRIES
78 SKP E NTERPR ISES 213 SIDWI N FABRIC PRIVATE LIMITED
79 COVAI POLYMER TRADERS 214 DARSHAN PLASTIC
80 PREET FLEX 215 GLOBECHEM IMPORTS
81 AMCO ENTERPRISES 216 SUVJAY INDUSTRIES INDIA LLP
82 BLOW PACKAGING I PVT LTD 217 STANDARD PACKAGING
83 AVI ADDITIVES PRIVA TE
LIMITED 218 ESQUIRE MULTIPLAST PRIVATE
LIMITED
84 D B POLYMERS 219 BHIM POLYFAB INDUSTRIES
85 POLSTAR 220 BHUYAN ASSOCIATES PVT LTD
86 SKILL DYE CHEM P LTD 221 ANJANI INTERWEAVE
87 VIDVAR COMPANY 222 FASTRAX POLYPLAST PRIVATE
LIMITED
88 MANSAROVAR AGRO S ACKS
PVT LTD 223 SHYAM CHEMICAL AND MINERALS
89 VARDHAMAN POLYPACKS 224 MERIT POLYMERS
90 SAMRUDDHI INDUSTRIES LTD 225 ISHOM PACKAGING PRIVATE
LIMITED
91 SUNIL FIBRES PVT LTD 226 MANIKA MOULDS PVT LTD
92 R L COMMERCIAL PRIVATE 227 CHURIWA L TECH NOPACK PV T LTD
S.
NO. NAME OF IMPORTER S.
NO. NAME OF IMPORTER
LIMETED
93 FLEXIBLE BAGS 228 SUPRABHA PROTECTIVE
PRODUCTS PVT LTD
94 TOTAL PACKAGING SERVICES 229 KNK OVERSEAS
95 MARIS ASSOCIATES PVT LTD 230 POLYSQUARE LLP
96 SERVO PLASTICS PVT LTD 231 MICO PLAST INDUSTRIES PRIVATE
LIMITED
97 MITTAL TE CHNOPA CK PVT LT D 232 VIJAY POLYMERS
98 NEXXA COMPOUNDS PRIVATE
LIMITED 233 TIRUPATHI HYDROCARBON
PRIVATE LIMITED
99 BUILDMET FIBRES PRIVATE
LIMITED 234 MALLINATH TEXTILE MILLS
100 POLIVEX OVERSEAS 235 DAMAN POLYFABS
101 SAI SURFACTANTS PVT LTD 236 TIBR IWAL P LASTICS P VT LTD
102 BHAGIRATHI PACKAGING PVT
LTD 237 BARODA PACKAGING
103 SIMANDHAR IMPEX 238 PRIYADARSHINI POLYSACKS LTD
104 RACHANA POLYMERS PRIVATE
LIMITED 239 VISHAL SYNTHETICS
105 BULKPACK EXPORTS LIMITED 240 PATCO POLYPACK PRIVATE
LIMITED
106 DURA PLASTS OLUTIONS LLP 241 RISHI FIBC SOLUTIONS PVT LTD
107 FINE TECH INDUSTRIES 242 MICO POLY PACK
108 SYNTHETIC PACKERS PVT LTD 243 SUN MASTERBATCH PVT LTD
109 COLORPLAS POLYADDITIVES
LLP 244 BHAVANI PLASTICS
110 GAUTAM SINGHAL 245 K B UDYOG
111 PLAS MIX PVT L TD 246 SUN TEX MILLS
112 M D P TRADEING 247 AASTHA PLASTICON
113 HOOGHLY EXTRUSIONS
LIMITED 248 ANANYA IMPEX
114 DEEPEE CHEM INDUSTRIES 249 AL-SA AD ENTERPRISES
115 PEKON ELECTRONICS LIMITED 250 VIJAYNEHA POLYMERS PVT
LIMITED
116 GIRIRA J POLY PACK 251 NAVKAR PACKAGING
117 SARAF FINCOM PRIVATE
LIMITED 252 KANDOI FABRICS PRIVATE
LIMITED
118 KT PYROCHEM 253 SHANKAR PACKAGINGS LIMITED
119 RDB RASAYANS LIMITED 254 SNG MICRONS PRIVATE LIMITED
120 DHWANI POLYPRINTS PVT LTD 255 SHREE SALASAR TRADIN G
COMPANY
121 MANHAR POLYMERS PRIVATE
LIMITED 256 VIBRANT POLYMERS LLP
122 CHANDRA POLYMER PRIVATE
LIMITED 257 SEALION WORLD TRADE PVT LTD
123 SAVITRIDEVI POLYFABRICS
INDIA PVT LTD 258 SRI RAM POLYMERS
124 POLYZEN TRADING CO 259 AMIT OIL PRODUCTS PRIVA TE
LIMITE D
S.
NO. NAME OF IMPORTER S.
NO. NAME OF IMPORTER
125 NS FABRICS 260 S G POLYMERS
126 KULODAY PLASTOMERS PVT
LTD 261 V M POLYTEX LIMITED
127 PEARL POLYFILM
MANUFACTURERS 262 CONSOLIDATED SHIPPING LINE
INDIA PVT LTD
128 PARIVARTAN MERCANTILES
PRIVATE LIMITED 263 CREATIVE POLY PACKS P L TD
129 AMORA P ROPERTIES PRIVATE
LIMITED 264 VEN PACK
130 PARADISE ENTERPRISES 265 VR FIBC JAMBO BAG INDUSTRIES
131 BARODA RAPIDS 266 SAKTHI POLY CHEM
132 SHREE ANGIRA ENTERPRISES 267 DEEP POLYMERS LIMITED
133 PIONEER ENTERPRISES I PVT
LTD 268 MEHRASON S COAT INGS PVT LTD
134 VIVA PETROCHEMICAL LLP 269 LINCON POLYMERS PVT LTD
135 RAJENDRA CHEMICALS 270 BAJAJ POLYBLENDS PRIVATE
LIMITED
271 PADMAJA POLY PACKS PRIVATE
LIMITED
xi. In response to the initiation notification , the following importers/users re gister ed
themse lves as interested parties:
S.
NO. IMPORTER/USER
1 RISHABH COLOURS PVT. LTD.
xii. A copy of the initiation notification and a non -confidential version of the application were
sent to the known associations.
xiii. In response to the initiation notif icatio n, none o f the known associations have registered
themselves as interested parties.
xiv. Exporters, foreign producers and other interested parties who have failed to respond to, or
supply, relevant information to this investigation, have been treated as n on-cooperating.
xv. The Authority issued an Economic Interest Questionnaire to all the known producers and
exporters, importers, and the applicant. The economic interest questionnaire was also
shared with the administrative line ministry.
xvi. The period of invest igatio n (“perio d of investigation” or “POI”) for the purpose of the
present investigation is 1st April 2023 to 30th June 2024 (15 months). The injury period
covers the period of investigatio n and the three preceding financial years 2020 -21, 2021 -
22, 2022 -23.
xvii. The Directo rate General of Systems (DG Systems) was requested to provide transaction -
wise details of the imports of the subject goods for the injury investigation period. The said
data w ere received by the Authority and considered for the subject inves tigati on. For t he
purpose of the present final findings , the Authority has relied upon the DG Systems import
data.
xviii. The Authority decided the PCN Methodology in the recently concluded anti -dumping
investigation concerning imports of Calcium Carbonate Filler Maste rbatch fr om Vietnam
bearing file number F. No. 06/38/2024 – DGTR in Case No. AD(OI) -36/2024 through
notification dated 4th December 2024. Since the scope of the product under considera tion
in the anti -dumping investigation and present CVD investigati on is the same, the Authority
considered it appropriate to adopt the same PCN methodology in the present CVD
investigation as that decided in the anti -dumping investigation Case No. AD (OI) -36/2024.
xix. A list of all the interested parties was uploaded on the DGTR w ebsite al ong with the
request to all interested parties to email the non -confidential version of their submissions to
all the other interested parties.
xx. In accordance with Paragraph 7 of the Trade Notice No. 09/2021, the Authority limited the
detailed exami nation of applicant domestic producers for determining injury margin . Using
statistically valid techniques, the Authority selected the following entitie s as part of the
sample :
a. Soltex Petro Products Ltd.
b. Alok Masterbatches Pvt. Ltd.
c. Alok Industries
d. Kand ui Indust ries Pvt. Ltd.
xxi. The submissions made by the interested parties during the course of this investigation, to
the extent supported with evidence and considered relevant to the present investigation,
have been appropriately considered by the Authorit y, in thi s final findings .
xxii. The Authority sought further information to the extent deemed necessary. The on-site
verification of the data provided by the domestic industry was conducted to the extent
considered necessary for the purpose of the present inves tigation. The Authority has
considered t he verified data of the domestic industry in its analysis in the present case .
xxiii. The Authority sought further information from the other interested parties to the extent
deemed necessary . The verification of the data p rovided b y the other interested parties was
conducted to the extent considered necessary for the purpose of the present investigation.
xxiv. The non -injurious price (NIP) has been determined based on the actual data/information
furnished by the domestic in dustry . The NIP , based on the optimum cost of production and
the cost to make and sell the subject goods in India, has been worked out on the basis of the
information furnished by the domestic industry and in accordance with the Generally
Accepted Accounti ng Pri nciples ( GAAP) and the CVD Rules, so as to ascertain whether
countervailing duty lower than the subsidy margin would be sufficient to remove injury to
the domestic industry.
xxv. In accordance with Rule 7(6) of the CVD Rules, the Authority provided an op portun ity to
the interested parties to pres ent their views orally in a public hearing held on 8th December
2025. The parties that presented their views in the oral hearing, were requested to file
written submissions of the views expressed orally, followed by rej oinder su bmissions, if
any. The inter ested parties were further directed to share the non -confidential version of the
submissions submitted by them with the other interested parties.
xxvi. The disclosure statement was issued on 20.03.2026. Subsequently, in the p ost discl osure
comments , the i nterest ed parties raised issues on several aspects of the investigation
including countervailability of the schemes, benchmarks considered for different schemes,
specificity, injury, causal link, rejection of the questio nnaire response etc. The Authority
has exam ined these submissions and considered it appropriate to incorporate them in the
disclosure of all relevant facts pertaining to this investigation. Therefore, in supersession of
the disclosure statement issued earl ier on 20.03.20 26, the Authority issue d a
revised/additional disclosure statement dated 16.06.2026, in the larger public interest in
accordance with Rule 18 of the Customs Tariff (Identification, Assessment and Collection
of Countervailing Duty on Subsidiz ed Art icles and for Determination of Injury) Rules,
1995, as amended, disclosing the essential fact s under consideration in the matter relating
to th is investigation. Thereafter, the post disclosure comments, to the disclosure statement
dated 16.06.2026, s ubmitt ed by the domestic industry and other interested parties have been
incorporated in these fina l findings.
xxvii. Information provided by the interested parties on a confidential basis was examined with
regard to sufficiency of the confidentiality claim. On being satisfied , the Authority has
accepted the confidentiality claims wherever warranted and such information has been
treated as confidential and not disclosed to other interested parties. Wherever possible,
parties providing information on a confidentia l basi s were di rected to provide a sufficient
non-confidential version of the information filed on a confidential basis.
xxviii. Wherever an interested party has refused access to or has otherwise not provided necessary
information during the present investigation , or h as signif icantly impeded the investigation,
the Authority has considered such parties as non -cooperative and recorded the
views/observations on the basis of the facts available.
xxix. The Authority has considered all the arguments raised and information p rovide d by all the
interested parties at this stage, to the extent that they are supported with evidence and
considered relevant to the present investigation.
xxx. “***” in th ese final findings represents information furnished by an interested party on a
confid ential basis an d so considered by the Authority under the Rules.
xxxi. The exchange rate adopted by th e Authority for the subject investigation is 1 US$ = Rs
83.82.
C. PRODUCT UNDER CONSIDERATION AND LIKE ARTICLE
7. At the stage of initiation, the product under cons iderat ion was d efined as under:
“3. The product under consideration in the present investigation is "Calcium Carbonate
Filler Masterbatch" which is also known as "Filler Masterbatch" or "Calcium
Carbonate Compound” wherein calcium carbonate (CaCO3) is th e majo r constit uent,
i.e., more th an 50% by volume."
4. Calcium Carbonate Filler Masterbatch is a mix of calcium carbonate (a mineral), base
plastic materials like polypropylene or polyethylene, and other additives. The said
mixture is extruded at a cert ain te mperature to produce the Calc ium Carbonate Filler
Masterbatch in compound granules form. The PUC majorly constitutes calcium
carbonate, with the rest being plastics and other additives.
5. Calcium Carbonate Filler Masterbatch is a special material used i n the pla stic
industry for enh ancement of properties of plastic items. Its primary function is to act as
a cost -effective and eco -friendly filler imparting specific physical and chemical
properties.
6. Many industries use Calcium Carbonate Filler Ma sterba tch, such as packaging,
construction, automotive and consumer goods. When added to plastics, Calcium
Carbonate Filler Masterbatch can make them stronger, less likely to break, better at
keeping their shape, and less likely to shrink.
7. Calcium Car bonate Filler M asterbatch can also change how plastic feels on the
surface, how it handles heat, and how easy it is to work with. It is often used to make
plastic films, sheets, pipes, shaped items, and othe r plastic goods.
8. The product under considera tion i s classif iable under tariff item 3824 99 00 of the first
Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act, 1975. Major imports are cleared under tariff item
3824 99 00. The customs classification is indicative only a nd is not binding on the
scope of the product un der co nsiderati on in the present investigation.
9. The applicants have proposed that the Product Control Numbers (PCNs) for the
present investigation may be considered as already adopted in the ongoing anti -
dumping investigation concerning imports of Cal cium C arbonate Filler Masterbatch
from Vietnam bearing file number F. No. 06/38/2024 – DGTR in Case No. AD(OI) -
36/2024. The Authority has decided on the PCN Methodology in the above -mentioned
anti-dumping inve stigation vide notification dated 4th December 2024. Since the scope
of the product under consideration in the anti -dumping investigation and present
investigation is same, the Authority considers it appropriate to adopt the same PCN
methodology in the pre sent investigation, i.e., on the basis of calci um car bonate
content with the following three categories:
Criteria PCN Code
Less than 75% CaCO3 A
75-85% CaCO3 B
More than 85% CaCO3 C
C.1. Submissions by other interested parties
8. The other interested parties have not made a ny sub missions or comments concerning the
scope of the product under consideration or the PCN methodology in the present
countervailing duty investigation.
C.2. Submissions made by the domestic industry
9. The domestic industry has made the following submis sions regarding the product under
consideration and the PCN Methodology :
i. The domestic industry submitted that the scope of the product under consideration
(PUC) and the PCN methodology in the present investigation should remain identical
to that finalized by th e Authori ty in the recently concluded anti -dumping investigation
concerning imports of the same product from Vietnam. The anti -dumping investigation
involved the same p roduct description and the same subject country. The
determinations made therein a re dir ectly rel evant to the present investigation.
ii. The domestic industry submitted that the issue of scope of the PUC and the PCN
methodology has already attained finality in the anti -dumping investigation after
detailed examination by the Authority.
iii. In th e anti -dumping investigation, the Authority examined extensive submissions from
all interested parties, including exporters, importers, users and the domestic industry.
Multi ple rounds of written submissions were filed and a dedicated meeting on PUC and
PCN was held befo re the Authority reached its determination.
iv. The domestic industry submitted that the present countervailing duty investigation
should not be used to re -open or re-litigate issues relating to the scope of the PUC and
the PCN methodology which have already b een examined and settled after full
participation of all interested parties in a prior investigation.
v. With respect to the PCN methodology, the domestic industr y submitted that the
Authority , in the anti -dumping investigation, had examined an d reje cted prop osals for
PCN classification based on base polymer type, end -use application and production
technology.
vi. The Authority accepted PCN classification based solely on calcium carbonate content,
as this parameter reflects cost and price difference s in t he market . This conclusion was
reached after examination of cost data and submissions placed on record by all
interested parties.
vii. In view of the above, the domestic ind ustry requested that the scope of the PUC and the
PCN methodology, as finalized by the A uthority in the anti -dumping investigation, be
adopted without modification in the present countervailing duty investigation.
C.3 Examination by the Authority
10. The submissions made by the interested parties and the domestic industry with regard to t he
PUC and PCN methodology have been examined as under:
11. The Authority notes that the scope of the PUC and the PCN methodology were examined in
detail and finalized in the anti -dumping investigation concerning imports of Calcium
Carbonate Filler Masterbatc h from Vietnam bearing file number F. No. 06/38/2024 – DGTR
in Case No. AD(OI) -36/2024 through notification dated 4th December 2024.
12. The Authority further notes that the said anti -dumping investigation (Case No. AD(OI) -
36/2024) involved the same product d escrip tion from the same subject country. The
determinati on on scope of PUC and PCN in that investigation is therefore directly relevant
and applicable to the present investigation. The Authority also notes that no comments have
been made by other interest ed par ties seek ing any modification to the scope of PUC o r the
PCN methodology.
13. In view of the above, the Authority retain s the same scope of the PUC and the same PCN
methodology as adopted in the anti -dumping investigation for the purpose of the present
counte rvailing duty investigation. The scope of the PUC i s determined as follows:
“The product under consideration in the present investigation is "Calcium Carbonate
Filler Masterbatch" which is also known as "Filler Masterbatch" or "Calcium
Carbonate Com pound” wherein calcium carbonate (CaCO3) is the major con stituent,
i.e., more than 50% by volume.”
14. The product under consideration is classifiable under tariff item 3824 99 00 of the First
Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act, 1975. Major imports are clear ed und er tariff item
382499 00. The customs classification is indicative only and is not binding on the scope
of the product under consideration in the present investigation.
15. Further, the Authority holds that it is appropriate to retain the same PCNs in t he pre sent
investigation as that decided vide Notification dated 04th December 2024 in the anti -
dumping investigation (Case No. AD(OI) -36/2024), which was based on calcium
carbonate content with the follow ing three categories:
Criteria PCN
Less than 75% CaCO₃ A
75-85% CaCO₃ B
More than 85% CaCO₃ C
D. DOMESTIC INDUSTRY STANDING & SAMPLING PROCESS
D.1 Submissions made by other interested parties :
16. The other interested parties have made the following submissions with regard to the scope
of domestic indus try an d standin g:
i. The initiation of the countervailing duty investigation is based on insufficient
grounds, as the petition does not disclose producer -wise production volumes of the
domestic producers. In the absence of such information, interested partie s are unable
to verify whether the applicant producers satisfy the statutory standing requirements
under the Customs Tariff Act, 1975.
ii. Where multiple domestic manufacturers exist, the domestic industry is required to
establish its standing with reliable an d veri fiable ev idence. The petition does not
provide individual production data of each producer, thereby preventing verification
of whether the applicant producers constitute a major share of total domestic
production of the subject goods in India.
iii. The de finiti on of “do mestic industry” under the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 requires
that producers collectively account for a major proportion of total domestic
production of the like article. The petition provides no evidence to demonstrate that
this requirement is sat isfied.
iv. While the petition includes support letters from certain producers, it does not establish
whether the applicant producers and supporting producers together constitute a major
proportion of total domestic production. Claims of excessive confid ential ity were
stated to have been used to withhold essential information.
v. The information provided by the twenty -one supporting producers is seriously
deficient. The supporting producers h ave filed only brief, single -page statements
without meaningful dat a on p roduction , capacity, sales, or financial performance.
vi. The non -confidential versions of the supporting producers’ submissions are almost
entirely redacted, with no indexed, summarized, or trend -based data. As a result,
interested parties cannot assess produ ction vol umes, sales trends, cost structures, or
profitability of the supporting producers.
vii. This is inconsistent with Trade Notice No. 05/2021, which requires supporting
producers to provide installed capacity with evidence, production quantity, and sales
volume an d value of the subject goods, separately for domestic sales, exports, and
captive consumption.
viii. The complete absence of indexed or summarized non -confidential data also violat es
Trade Notice No. 14/2018, which mandates that confidentiality cl aims m ust be
accompanied by meaningful non -confidential summaries sufficient to permit
reasonable understanding of the information submitted.
ix. In the absence of compliant and verifiable data from the twenty -one supporting
producers, their support cannot be relied upon for determining domestic industry
standing. This defeat s principles of transparency and natural justice.
x. The Authority has not independently verified domestic industry standing by seeking
information from non -participating domestic producers or relev ant line ministries, as
has been the consistent practice of the Authority in past investigations.
xi. Reference was made to past investigations where such independent verification was
undertaken. The absence of a similar exercise create s a risk of distor ted da ta being
relied upon.
xii. Reliance was also placed on WTO jurisprudence to submit that the Authority is under
an obligation to ensure that the definition of domestic i ndustry does not introduce a
material risk of skewing economic data and distorting inju ry ana lysis.
xiii. Given the existence of a large number of domestic producers in both organised and
unorganised sectors, the “major proportion” test is not a purely mathematical exercise
and must reflect both quantitative and qualitative aspects.
xiv. Even if the ap plican ts are as sumed to meet the major proportion test, the Authority
cannot ignore the situation of other domestic producers unless they are legally
ineligible to be considered as part of the domestic industry.
xv. Injury analysis must objectively examine the indus try as a whole and cannot be
limited to only certain parts of the industry.
xvi. With respect to sampling , the other interested parties submitted that they are unable to
comment on the appropriateness of the sampling methodology due to the non -
disclosure of pro ducer -wise data for the applicant companies for the POI, as required
under Trade Notice No. 09/2021.
xvii. It was submitted that, despite sampling having been undertaken and four domestic
producers having been selected as sampled companies, the domestic in dustry has
failed to provide non -confidential versions of the mandatory injury formats (Formats
VI-1 to VI -5).
xviii. The circulation of only a consolidated non -confidential NIP does not satisfy the
requirements of Trade Notice No. 09/2021, as the obligation exte nds to disclosu re of
the injury formats themselves.
xix. Without access to the non -confidential injury formats, interested parties cannot
meaningfully examine or verify key elements such as cost of production, raw material
consumption norms, working capital, ca pacity utilisat ion, plant -wise optimum
production, and adjustments applied.
xx. Reliance on alleged pa st practice or the absence of a requirement for a separate
sampling notification cannot override the mandatory disclosure obligations prescribed
under Trade N otice No. 09/20 21.
xxi. The Authority has not disclosed the percentage of total domestic production
represented by the sampled producers, which is necessary to assess whether the
sample is representative.
xxii. The cumulative effect of non -disclosure of injury format s and non-discl osure of the
production share of the sample causes serious prejudice to their right s of defense and
violates principles of natural justice.
xxiii. The Authority was requested to disregard deficient supporter data for the purpose of
determining stan ding, direct th e domestic industry to file meaningful non -confidential
versions of Formats VI -1 to VI-5 for the sampled producers, disclose the production
share represented by the sample, and independently examine and pass a reasoned
order on domestic indu stry s tanding a nd the sampling methodology.
xxiv. The Petitioners have failed to discharge their burden of establishing standing through
verifiable evidence, the present application does not meet the requirements of Rule
6(3) of the CVD Rules and Article 11.4 of the S CM Agreem ent, and ought not to be
permitted to proceed.
D.2 Submissions made by the domestic industry
17. The submissions of the petitioner with regard to the scope of domestic industry and
standing are as follows:
i. The domestic industry submitted that standi ng for in itiation of a countervailing duty
investigation is governed by Article 11.4 of the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) and the corresponding threshold test under
Rule 6 of the CVD Rules.
ii. The domestic industry s ubmitt ed that t he standing test has two conditions: first, domestic
producers whose collective output represents more than 25% of the total production of
the like product in India; and second, where support and opposition exist, the supporting
producers mu st rep resent mo re than 50% of the total production of those producers
expressi ng either support or opposition.
iii. The application for initiation of countervailing duty investigation was filed by two
associations namely, CMMAI and MMA on behalf of their member s who are domes tic
producers of PUC in India.
iv. Based on the information available with the CMMAI and MMA, their member
companies/entities constitute more than 90% of the total Indian production of PUC in
India. CMMAI and MMA are the only two associations r eprese nting dom estic producers
of the PUC in India.
v. The petitioner has provided the list of members of CMMAI and MMA along with their
production volumes of the PUC for the injury period including the POI. Additionally , it
also provides the status of each s uch pr oducer (i .e., whether supporter, opposer or
neutral). The petitioner has also provided consolidated details of Statement of Indian
Production including the estimated production of unknown non -member
companies/en tities of CMMAI and MMA in the country.
vi. Follo wing twelve applicant domestic producers filed the required information in
Annexure -I to Trade Notice 9/2021 compris ing more than 35% of the total domestic
production of PUC in India during the POI.
S.
No. Particulars Share in Total Indian
Producti on
1. Soltex Petro Products Ltd. ***%
2. Alok Masterbatches Pvt. Ltd. ***%
3. Kandui Industries Pvt. Ltd. ***%
4. Sonali Polyplast Private Limited ***%
5. Bajaj Polyblends Pvt. Ltd. ***%
6. Bajaj Plast Pvt. L td. ***%
7. Alok Industries ***%
8. Bajaj Masterbatches Private Limited ***%
9. Siddh Chemiplast Pvt. Ltd. ***%
10. Bajaj Superpack India Ltd. ***%
11. Blend Colors Private Limited ***%
12. Shri Ambica Polyfill ***%
vii. Addition ally, following twenty -one entities expressly supported the application.
S.
No. Particulars Share in Total Indian
Production
1. Sonali Polymers Pvt. Ltd. ***%
2. Masterplast India Pvt. Ltd. ***%
3. Sri Maniram Synthetics Pvt . Ltd. ***%
4. S.P. Polymer ***%
5. 365 Plastium Pvt. Ltd. ***%
6. N.P. Agro (India) Industries Pvt. Ltd. ***%
7. Satya Polyalloys LLP ***%
8. Adex Ployblend Pvt. Ltd. ***%
9. Rama Vyapaar Pvt. Ltd. ***%
10. Bhagyashree Colors Pvt. Ltd. ***%
11. Swastik Plastoalloys ***%
12. Manan Polymers Pvt. Ltd. ***%
13. Aditya Polyspin Pvt. Ltd. ***%
14. J K Paras Ploycoats Ltd. ***%
15. Speciality Masterbatches LLP ***%
16. Sachdeva Polycolor Pvt. L td. ***%
17. Everplus Plastics Pvt. Ltd. ***%
18. Manhar Polymers Pvt. Ltd. ***%
19. Dolphin Polyfill ***%
20. JJ Plastalloy ***%
21. Prabhu Polycolor ***%
viii. The domestic industry submitted that twelve (12) applicant domestic pro ducers filed th e
required information in Annexure -I to Trade Notice No. 09/2021 and that these twelve
applicants constitute more than 35% of the total domestic production of PUC in Indi a
during the POI. The domestic industry submitted that twenty -one (21) entiti es expres sly
supported the application and provided the required data in the supporters’ format.
ix. The domestic industry submitted that the twelve applicant producers constitute mor e
than 35% of total domestic production, while the applicant producers togeth er with t he
twenty -one supporting producers constitute more than 55%; accordingly, the statutory
standing requirement is satisfied. The domestic industry further submitted that no
member company/entity of CMMAI and MMA, and no other domestic producer of
PUC, has op posed the petition; hence, the 50% test under the explanation to Rule 6(3) is
also satisfied.
x. The term “domestic industry” under Rule 2(b) of the CVD Rules includes eithe r all
domestic producers of the like article, or those whose collective outpu t constit utes a
“major proportion ” of total domestic production. It submitted that the applicants and
supporters collectively account for a major proportion of total domestic prod uction and
therefore satisfy Rule 2(b) .
xi. The domestic industry submitted that a stateme nt depicting the share of production of
the applicants, supporters, and other Indian producers in total Indian production has been
submitted. Further , the domestic indust ry submitted the following production and share
figures for the POI:
Partic ulars % share in total
Indian production Production in
POI (A)
Twelve applicant domestic producers 35 2,50,893 MT
Twenty -one supporting domestic producers 20 1,43,525 MT
Other Indian Producers 45 3,21,306 MT
Total 100 7,15,724 MT
xii. The determinat ion on standing in the present CVD investigation should be the same as
the determination already made by the Authority in the recently concluded anti -dumping
investigation concerning imports of the same product from the same country .
xiii. Standing was examined and de cided aft er consideration of submissions by exporters,
importers, users and the domestic industry in the anti -dumping investigation. In the Final
Findings F. No. 06/38/2024 –DGTR in Case No. AD(OI) -36/2024, the Authority
recorded that the domestic ind ustry satisfied both the 25% standing threshold and the
“major proportion” test.
xiv. The legal tests for standing in a CVD investigation are materially the same as those
applied in an anti -dumping investigation. It was reiterated that, under Artic le 11.4 of th e
SCM Agreement read with Rule 6(3) of the CVD Rules, standing requires (i) at least
25% support of total production; and (ii) where support and opposition exist, more than
50% support among those expressing support or opposition, and submitte d that these
princi ples were already applied and confirmed in the concluded anti -dumping
investigation .
xv. There has been no change in the domestic production base, no change in the identity of
the applicant producers and supporting producers, and no change i n the verifie d stan ding
comp utation already accepted by the Authority in the anti -dumping investigation.
xvi. The POI in the present investigation is largely the same, with the addition of three
months compared with the anti -dumping investigation.
xvii. Since the fa ctual foundat ion an d legal t ests remain the same, the standing determination
in the present CVD investigation should follow the concluded standing determination in
the anti -dumping investigation, and that attempts to reopen the standing issue should not
be entertained.
xviii. On sa mpling, the domestic industry submitted that sampling of domestic producers was
undertaken in accordance with Paragraph 7 of Trade Notice No. 09/2021, which permits
the Authority to limit detailed examination of applicant domestic producers to a limi ted
number for injury margin determination. The Trade Notice requires statistically valid
sampling methods but does not prescribe issuance of a separate public notification for
sampling .
xix. The four sampled producers selected for detailed examination are amon g the largest
producers of PUC in India, making them representative for costing and sales
verification, and that they together represent a significant share of total domestic
applicants.
xx. The four sampled producers are geographically and operationally diver se, an d that
diversity ensures the sample is reflective of the broader domestic industry.
xxi. There is no legal requirement under the CVD Rules or the SCM Agreement to issue a
separate notification for selection of the sampled domestic industry. For transparen cy,
the domesti c industry filed a submission providing updated information in the prescribed
formats and that this submission was circulated to all interested parties in line with the
procedure and practice of the Authority.
xxii. The Authority in numerous past invest igations has selected a representative group of
domestic producers without issuing a separate sampling notification, and that the
emphasis is on completeness , verifiability, and representativeness of data rather than the
form of announcement.
xxiii. The submissio ns opposi ng the sampling do not establish any procedural lapse or legal
infirmity in the sampling adopted by the Authority.
xxiv. The domestic industry argued that it complied with Trade Notice No. 09/2021, stating
that non -confidential disclosure is meant to allow a rea sonable understanding of injury
claims, not to reveal sensitive plant‑wise cost data. Circulating a consolidated non -
confidential NIP, instead of disclosing company -wise confidential formats, satisfies this
requirement.
xxv. Formats VI -1 to VI -5 contai n sensiti ve information including cost of production, raw
material consumption norms, working capital, capacity utilisation, and plant -wise
optimum production, and that disclosure at a granular level would reveal business -
sensiti ve information of ind ividua l produce rs and cause irreparable damage.
xxvi. The NIP is computed from confidential data on cost of production, capacity utilisation,
raw material consumption, utilities, working capital, and reasonable return, and that this
complete data is available to and verified by the Authority. Confidentiality of underlying
formats does not affect the correctness or verifiability of the NIP .
xxvii. The interested parties are not prejudiced because they have been provided non -
confidential injury inform ation for the twelve applic ant domes tic producers reflecting
trends in production, capacity utilisation, sales, profitability and other injury parameters.
On this basis, interested parties can make submissions on injury and causation, including
whether inj ury, if any, is attri butabl e to subs idized imports .
xxviii. The CVD Rules do not provide interested parties with a right to access confidential
costing or production data of domestic producers, and that the domestic industry’s
obligation is to place complete data before the Authority, which has been complied with.
Principles of natural justice are safeguarded through the Authority’s examination and
verification and through disclosure of meaningful non -confidential summaries.
xxix. The Trade Notice does not require the Au thority to disclose t he cri teria or detailed
rationale for sampling or to disclose the precise production share represented by sampled
producers. It submitted that representativeness is assessed by the Authority on the basis
of confidential data, and the a bsence of public disc losure does not vitiate the sampling
exercise.
xxx. The domestic industry denied the allegation that sampling was driven by the petitioner’s
discretion and submitted that sampling is undertaken by the Authority in accordance
with Paragraph 7 of Trade Notice No. 09/20 21, and t he domestic industry does not have
authority to select the sample.
xxxi. The allegations of non -compliance with Trade Notice No. 09/2021 are without legal or
factual basis; that sampling has been undertaken by the Authority in accordance with the
Trade Notice an d established practice; that disclosure obligations under the CVD Rules
have been complied with; and that the requests made by interest ed parties seek
disclosure of confidential business information and should be rejected.
D.3 Examination b y the Authority
18. The application was filed by the Compounds and Masterbatch Manufacturers
Association of India (hereinafter referred to as “CMMAI”) and the Masterbatch
Manufacturers Association (hereinafter referred to as “MMA”) on behalf of the
domestic p roduce rs in Ind ia.
19. The Authority notes that the PUC industry in India is fragmented and consists of an
excessively large number of domestic producers located across India, hence the
applicati on for countervailing duty investigation was filed by two assoc iation s, namely
CMMAI and MMA, on behalf of their member entities. All the relevant information in
the prescribed format as required under Trade Notice No. 09/2021 dated 29th July 2021
as amend ed vide Trade Notice No. 11/2021 dated 18th November 2021 was f iled b y the
following twelve (12) applicant domestic producers:
i. Kandui Industries Private Limited
ii. Sonali Polyplast Private Limited
iii. Blend Colors Private Limited
iv. Bajaj Masterbatches Private Limit ed
v. Bajaj Superpack India Limited
vi. Bajaj Plast Private Limited
vii. Bajaj Po lyblends Private Limited
viii. Siddh Chemiplast Private Limited
ix. Shri Ambica Polyfill
x. Soltex Petro Products Limited
xi. Alok Industries
xii. Alok Masterbatches Private Limited
20. Further , the following twenty -one (21) domestic producers supported the application:
i. Sonali Po lymers Pv t. Ltd.
ii. Masterplast India Pvt. Ltd.
iii. Sri Maniram Synthetics Pvt. Ltd.
iv. S.P. Polymer
v. 365 Plastium Pvt. Ltd.
vi. N.P. Agro (India) Industries Pvt. Ltd.
vii. Satya Polyalloys LLP
viii. Adex Ployblend Pvt. Ltd.
ix. Rama Vyapaar Pvt. Ltd.
x. Bhagyashree Colors Pvt. L td.
xi. Swas tik Plastoalloys
xii. Manan Polymers Pvt. Ltd.
xiii. Aditya Polyspin Pvt. Ltd.
xiv. J K Paras Ploycoats Ltd.
xv. Speciality Masterbatches LLP
xvi. Sachdeva Polycolor Pvt. Ltd.
xvii. Everplus Plastics Pvt. Ltd.
xviii. Manhar Polymers Pvt. Ltd.
xix. Dolphin Polyfill
xx. JJ Plastal loy
xxi. Prabhu Pol ycolor
21. The issues raised by the other interested parties and the domestic industry with respect to
the domestic industry’s standing have been examined below:
22. The Authority notes that the standing requirement for initiation of a countervai ling d uty
inves tigation is governed by Article 11.4 of the SCM Agreement read with Rule 6(3) of
the CVD Rules. Rule 6(3) of the CVD Rules requires that domestic producers expressly
supporting the application account for more than 25% of total production of the l ike
article by the domestic industry. Additionally, where domestic producers expressly
oppose the application, such opposition should not account for more than 50% of total
production by domestic producers who have expressed either support or opposit ion to the
application . The relevant extract is reproduced below:
“(3) The designated authority shall not initiate an investigation pursuant to an
application m ade under sub -rule (1) unless –
(a) it determines, on the basis of an examination of the degre e of s upport fo r, or
opposition to the application expressed by domestic producers of the like article,
that the application has been made by or on behalf of the domestic industry :
Provided that no investigation shall be initiated if domestic producers ex pressl y
support ing the application account for less than twenty -five per cent of the total
production of the like product by the domestic industry, and
(b) it ex amines the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence provided in the
application and satisfies itse lf tha t there i s sufficient evidence regarding –
(i) subsidy,
(ii) injury, where applicable; and
(iii) where applicable, a causal link between such subsidized imports and the
alleged injury, to justify the initiation of an investigation.
Explanation. - For the purpo se of this rule, the application shall be considered to
have been made "by or on behalf of domestic industry" if it is supported by those
domestic producers whose collective output constitutes more than fifty per cent of
the total production of the like ar ticle produced by that portion of the domestic
industry expressing either support for or opposition as the case may be, to the
application. ”
23. The Authority further notes that Rule 2(b) of the CVD Rules defines “domestic
industry” as domestic produ cers as a whole, or those domestic producers whose
collective output constitutes a major proportion of total domestic production of the like
article. The r elevant extract is reproduced below:
(b) "domestic industry" means the domestic producers as a whole engaged in the
manufacture of the like article or those whose collective output of the said article
constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production of that article,
except when such producers are related to the exporters or importers of the alleged
subsidised article, or like article from other countries or are themselves importers
thereof, the term "domestic industry" may be interpreted as referring to the rest of
the producers .
24. The Authority notes the contention of certain interest ed par ties that the petition does not
disclose producer -wise production volumes and market shares of domestic producers and
therefore does not allow verification of standing. The Authority notes that standing
determination under Rule 6(3) requires examinat ion of the degr ee of support for, or
opposition to, the application expressed by domestic producers of the like article. The
Authority conducts such examination on the basis of information placed on record in the
application and subsequent responses, inclu ding c onfidenti al information submitted by
applicants and supporters, along with non -confidential summaries as per the applicable
rules.
25. The Authority notes the production and share information placed on record by the
domestic industry for the POI:
Part icular s % share in total
Indian production Production in
POI (A)
Twelve applicant domestic producers 35 2,50,893 MT
Twenty -one supporting domestic producers 20 1,43,525 MT
Other Indian Producers 45 3,21,306 MT
Total 100 7,15,724 MT
26. In the Final Findi ngs of the anti -dumping investigation, it was expressly recorded that the
twelve applicant domestic producers along with twenty -one supporting producers
constituted more than 55% of total domestic production of the product under
consideration in India. The Autho rity furt her recorded that both the 25% threshold
requirement and the “major proportion” test were satisfied on the basis of verified
information on record.
27. The Authority notes that the legal tests for standing under Article 11.4 of the SCM
Agreemen t read with Rul e 6(3) of the CVD Rules are materially identical to the standing
tests applied in the anti -dumping investi gation. The Authority further notes that there has
been no material change in the identity of applicant producers, supporting producers , or
the domest ic production base since the conclusion of the anti -dumping investigation.
28. The Authority also notes that the period of investigation in the present countervailing
duty investigation substantially overlaps with the period examined in the ant i-dump ing
inves tigation, with the addition of only three months. On examination of the information
placed on record in th e present investigation, the Authority finds no basis to depart from
the standing determination already reached after detailed examinat ion in the earl ier
proceeding.
29. The Authority therefore considers that the issue of domestic industry standing, having
been examined in detail and conclusively determined in the anti -dumping investigation
after full participation of all interested parties, is a settled i ssue. In the absence of any
material change in facts or legal framework, the Authority considers it appropriate to
maintain consistency and rely on the standing determination already reached.
30. The Authority notes that several objections rais ed by intereste d parties under the present
heading primarily relate to issues of confidentiality, adequacy of no n-confidential
summaries, and transparency of information placed on record by applicant and supporting
producers.
31. The Authority considers that issues relating to confidentiality claims, compliance with
Trade Notices, and adequacy of non -confidential discl osures are procedural matters
governed by Rule 8 of the CVD Rules and the relevant Trade Notices. Such issues do not,
by themselves, negate sati sfacti on of the standing thresholds under Rule 6(3) or the
definition of domestic industry under Rule 2(b).
32. The submissions concerning alleged excessive confidentiality, adequacy of non -
confidential summaries, and transparency of disclosures have been exa mined separatel y
and are addressed in the relevant subsequent sections of the se final findings dealing with
confidentiality and disclosure obligations.
33. The Authority does not consider that the absence of a separate exercise of seeking
information from non -participating producers, by itself, renders the standing
determination invalid where the standing thresholds an d domestic industry criteria are
satisfied on the basis of information on record and examined by the Authority.
34. On sampling, the Authority note s that Paragrap h 7 of Trade Notice No. 09/2021 permits
the Authority to limit detailed examination to a sample o f domestic producers for injury
margin determination and requires the sample to be selected using statistically valid
sampling techniques. The T rade N otice doe s not prescribe issuance of a separate public
notification setting out detailed sampling rational e.
35. The Authority notes that four domestic producers were selected for detailed examination.
The sampled producers are among the larger producer s of t he PUC and they are
geographically and operationally diverse. Representativeness is assessed by the Authority
on the basis of the information on record, including confidential information, and the
Authority does not find that the sampling undertaken is vit iated mer ely because a separate
formal notification explaining sampling rationale was not issued.
36. The Authori ty notes that sampling and representativeness are assessed by the Authority
on the basis of the record, and that disclosure of precise produ cer-wise produc tion shares
may involve confidential information of individual producers. The Authority considers
that due process is ensured through circulation of non -confidential information to the
extent permissible and the opportunity to file submissio ns.
37. The Author ity considers that the ability of interested parties to comment on injury and
causal link is preserved through access to consolidated non-confidential trend
information, while protecting confidential business information of individual produc ers.
The Author ity also notes that the detailed cost data and injury formats remain available
for scrutiny and verification by the Authority.
38. The Authority , on the basis of examination, available on record, therefore holds that the
initiation and continu ation of the in vestigation are not vitiated on grounds of domestic
industry standing or the sampling process, as the standing thresholds under Rule 6(3) /
Article 11.4 are satisfied, the domestic industry requirement under Rule 2(b) is met on the
basis of the p roduction structure examined, and sampling has been undertaken in
accordance with Paragraph 7 of Trade Notice No. 09/2021 and examined by the Authority
on the basis of the investigation record.
39. Thus, the following twelve (12) applicant domestic produ cers constitute domestic
industry as per Annexure -I to Trade Notice 9/2021 for fragmented industries:
i. Kandui Industries Private Limited
ii. Sonali Polyplast Private Limited
iii. Blend Colors Private Limited
iv. Bajaj Masterbatches Private Limited
v. Bajaj Superpack India Limite d
vi. Bajaj P last Private Limited
vii. Bajaj Polyblends Private Limited
viii. Siddh Chemiplast Private Limited
ix. Shri Ambica Polyfill
x. Soltex Petro Products Limited
xi. Alok Industries
xii. Alok Masterbatches Private Limited
40. Further, the following twenty -one (21) domestic pr oducer s support ed the application and
provided the required data in the prescribed format:
i. Sonali Polymers Pvt. Ltd.
ii. Masterplast India Pvt. Ltd.
iii. Sri Maniram Synthetics Pvt. Ltd.
iv. S.P. Polymer
v. 365 Plastiu m Pvt. Ltd.
vi. N.P. Agro (India) Industries Pvt. Ltd .
vii. Satya Polyal loys LLP
viii. Adex Ployblend Pvt. Ltd.
ix. Rama Vyapaar Pvt. Ltd.
x. Bhagyashree Colors Pvt. Ltd.
xi. Swastik Plastoalloys
xii. Manan Polymers Pvt. Ltd.
xiii. Aditya Polyspin Pvt. Ltd.
xiv. J K Paras Ploycoats Ltd.
xv. Speciality Masterbatches LLP
xvi. Sachdeva Polycolor P vt. Lt d.
xvii. Everp lus Plastics Pvt. Ltd.
xviii. Manhar Polymers Pvt. Ltd.
xix. Dolphin Polyfill
xx. JJ Plastalloy
xxi. Prabhu Polycolor
CONFIDENTIALITY & OTHER MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES
E.1 Submissions by other interested parties
41. The following submissions have been made by the other intereste d parties with regard to
confidentiality and other miscellaneous issues :
i. The initiation notification and subsequent proceedings are bad in law as the investigatio n
was initiated with an impermissibly extended POI of 18 months, allegedly in viola tion of
Explanation (ii) to Rule 6 of the CVD Rules.
ii. Explanation (ii) mandates a default POI of twelve months, and permits deviation to a
minimum of six months or maximum o f eighteen months only “for the reasons to be
recorded in writing” by the Designate d Authori ty.
iii. The requirement to “record reasons in writing” is mandatory, as evident from the term
“shall”. This requirement serves purposes such as consistency in injury analysis, like -
for-like comparisons, and procedural fairness, and therefore requires an indepe ndent,
reasoned justification demonstrating application of mind by the Authority.
iv. The initiation notification merely reproduces the petitioner’s statement and does not
contain the Authority’s independent evaluation.
v. The initiation notification doe s not rec ord whether the Authority verified or accepted the
petitioner’s claims regarding MSME status or resource constraints; does not explain why
the stated pract ical difficulties constitute exceptional circumstances warranting deviation
from the 12 -mont h norm; a nd does not address whether reasons for deviation can be
supplied after initiation.
vi. Petitioner convenience or administrative hardship cannot substitute for the Authority’s
statutory obligation to record its own reasons, and that mechanically endor sing the
petitioner’s averment would render the “reasons to be recorded in writing” requirement
meaningless.
vii. The petition is defective for non -complia nce with Trade Notice No. 14/2018, which
obliges petitioners to furnish detailed non -confidential supporte r data to permit
meaningful verification and rebuttal.
viii. Supporters’ submissions comprise blank formats with substantive information redacted
under blan ket confidentiality claims, making the data unusable and preventing
assessment of volume, market share, in jury, and standing claims.
ix. In the absence of compliant non -confidential supporter data, the Authority should
disregard the supporters’ contributions e ntirely and treat the petition as lacking support.
The initiation should fail for want of demonstrated sup port and that the proceedings
should be dismissed/terminated at the threshold.
x. Trade Notices are binding on the Authority and parties. Reliance was pl aced on the
Supreme Court decision in Steel Authority of India v. Collector of Customs, Bombay
(Civil Appe al No. 66 00 of 1985) to submit that a trade notice binds customs authorities
and, if erroneous, must be withdrawn or amended .
xi. The applicant industry f ailed to provide complete and updated data corresponding to the
POI adopted in the initiation notification . The app lication was originally filed on the
basis of April 2023 –March 2024 data, whereas the Authority initiated the investigation
for 1 April 2023 –30 June 2024.
xii. Once the Authority adopted the extended POI, the applicant was obligated to align its
applic ation wit h the notified POI by furnishing a complete updated set of information
and revised injury analysis covering the entire notified period, rather than relying on
data only up to March 2024.
xiii. The applicants did not file a complete updated application a nd, inste ad, filed only a
single -page “updated” Proforma IV -A consolidating information of all applicant
producers.
xiv. This does not cure th e deficiency because the applicant did not provide company -wise
information for the updated POI for all individual appl icant com panies, as mandated
under Trade Notice No. 09/2021, and did not file revised injury tables, trends, or
narrative analysis for th e notified POI.
xv. This piecemeal updating impedes the rights of interested parties to defend their interests,
deprives pa rties and the Authority of a coherent understanding of injury parameters, and
results in the investigation proceeding on an application a nd injury analysis not
corresponding to the POI, thereby undermining the prima facie injury and causation
assessment.
xvi. The applic ant has not discharged its burden to substantiate injury over the POI adopted
by the Authority .
xvii. The absence of certifications/u ndertakings/declarations/authorizations for the complete
POI renders the proceedings illegal. The application was filed with the POI as 1 April
2023 –31 March 2024, but the Authority initiated the investigation with 1 April 2023 –30
June 2024, and the applic ant did not provide certifications corresponding to the POI
considered by the Authority in the initiation notification.
xviii. The Auth ority ought to have sought certifications for the POI adopted in the initiation
notification, including certifications regarding relationship with importers/exporters and
self-imports, to assess whether the applicant qualifies as domestic industry under Ru le
2(b), and that this should have been done prior to issuance of the initiation notification
as a pre -condition.
xix. The initiation notification was published without ascertaining pre -conditions under Rule
2(b) and therefore the proceedings are bad i n law, in cluding for violation of Rule 5 and
Rule 6(3), which provides that the Authority shall not initiate unless pre -conditions are
met. Since the defect occurred prior to initiation, it cannot be cured later by providing
certifications at the current s tage and is a fatal jurisdictional error.
xx. Even the subsequently filed updated injury information for the updated POI does not
contain mandatory certifications/undert akings/declarations or authorizations for the
updated period. Decisions on eligibility to f ile the a pplication and prima facie
satisfaction as to subsidization, injury, and causal link have been taken without complete
POI data and without certifications, c asting doubt on the correctness of the data.
xxi. The applicant industry claimed excessive confi dentialit y on several key economic
parameters in the petition, impairing respondents’ ability to examine injury parameters
and defend their interests. The applicant neither established good cause for
confidentiality nor provided adequate non -confidential s ummaries sufficient for
reasonable understanding.
xxii. Where a party claims information is not susceptible to summarization, CVD Rules
require a statement of reasons expl aining why summarization is not possible, and a bald
assertion that summarization is not po ssible do es not satisfy this requirement.
xxiii. In terms of the CVD Rules and Trade Notice, the non -confidential version of the petition
must provide indexed and summarize d data in sufficient detail to permit reasonable
understanding, and that Trade Notice provi des that submissions without meaningful
non-confidential versions should not be taken on record.
xxiv. Proper non-confidential versions of the petition should be provided and that meaningful
non-confidential summaries be made available to enable effective defens e.
xxv. Contrary to Trade Notice No. 10/2018, the petition provides trends for sales value, PBIT
per unit, total PBIT, domestic sales interest/finance cost, and deprecia tion/amortization
expenses, whereas aggregated actual numbers were required, and that this undermine s
transparency.
xxvi. Reference was made to the domestic industry’s position that Trade Notice No. 10/2018
is guideline -based and permits deviation case -by-case upon showing good cause, and
that confidentiality has been claimed accordingly. Interested p arties su bmitted that such
reliance is misp laced because deviation is permissible only upon demonstrating good
cause, which has not been substantiated in the present case.
xxvii. Disclosure of aggregated actual figures for multiple producers does not reveal indiv idual
company information and therefore doe s not prejudice commercial interests. According
to interested parties, the domestic industry has not shown why such aggregated
disclosure cannot be made, and therefore no good cause exists for providing only trend s.
xxviii. Trade notices are binding and that the domestic industry’s justification that
similar disclosure was not required in earlier cases is not a valid basis to disregard Trade
Notice requirements. The Authority was requested to direct the domestic industry t o
provide aggregated actual figures in the non -confidential version to ensure transparency
and compliance.
xxix. Supporting producers filed only minimal statements with substantive information
blacked out, with no indexed or trend -based data, preventing assessme nt of pro duction,
sales, cost trends, profitability, and the extent of support. Domestic industry did not
comply with Trade Notice No. 05/2021 and Trade Notice No. 14/2018, and such
deficient support be disregarded.
xxx. The import data relied upon by the petit ioner is from unreliable secondary/private
sources and is not authentic or reliable. The Authority should call for and rely upon
DGCI&S import data for examination of imports, as the Authority has relied upon
DGCI&S data in past cases.
xxxi. The petitioner claim ed excess ive confidentiality by not disclosing even the name of the
source of the import data used as a basis for initiation, without citing reasons for such
confidentiality. The import data pertains to exporters and therefore cannot be claimed
confidentia l from re sponding exporters.
xxxii. A distinction must be maintained between calcium carbonate filler masterbatch (the
PUC) and color masterbatch ( NPUC ). Calcium carbonate masterbatch is typically priced
lower, while color masterbatch has higher prices and higher profit m argins.
xxxiii. The Authority was requested to obtain separate production and financial data for PUC
and color masterbatch; identify which of the 12 applicants are primarily engaged in
producing the PUC; determine what proportion of capacity is dedicated to PUC v ersus
color masterbatch; and ensure that applicant standing and injury evaluation is assessed
only with reference to PUC production.
xxxiv. Objections relating to sampling -related disclosure were reiterated , stating that mere
disclosure of consolidated NIP does not satisfy Trade Notice No. 09/2021 and that non -
confidential versions of Formats VI -1 to VI -5 for sampled producers are required to
enable meaningful examination.
xxxv. The injury analysis cannot be reviewed based on NIP alone and requires access t o the
underlying injury formats, including cost allocation methodologies, consumption norms,
utilities, working capital assumptions, capacity utilisation and plant -wise optimum
production levels, and adjustments/normalisa tion.
xxxvi. The Authority has not disclos ed the pr oduction share represented by sampled producers,
which undermines transparency and prevents assessment of representativeness.
xxxvii. No submission filed by the applicant should be taken on record unless a proper non -
confidential version has been shared. The applicant should clearly specify which earlier
submissions are being relied upon, and that the Authority should verify that each
confidential submission is accompanied by a proper non -confidential version and reject
submissions that do not meet this r equiremen t.
xxxviii. The supporters did not provide details corresponding to the POI considered in the
initiation notification and trade notices must be followed and that non -compliance has
been overlooked.
xxxix. Even if certain document s are business sensitive, at least index-based non -confidential
information should be provided. Support letters should not be withheld without reasons
and, at minimum, information should be provided in percentage form to enable
respondents to analyse suppo rt in a fair manner.
xl. Excessive con fidentiality hinders meaningful submissions, including on injury
parameters, and all non -confidential data and meaningful summaries be made available
to allow effective defence .
xli. Rule 18 of the Subsidy Rules, 1995 requires that the designated authority, sha ll, befor e
giving its final findings, inform all interested parties and interested countries of the
essential facts under consideration which form the basis of its decision and permit the
interested parties to defend their interest. The excerpts of Rule 18 are provided below to
substantiate our claim in this context.
Rule 18. Disclosure of information
The designated authority, shall, before giving its final findings, inform
all interested parties and interested countries of the essential facts under
considerat ion which form the basis of its decision and permit the interested parties
to defend their interest.
xlii. They submitted that the requirements and obligations of Rule 18 have not been complied
with, t hereby resulting into denial of a fair opportunity to the in terested parties to
comment upon the same and adequately defend their interests. Therefore, they request ed
the Hon’ble Authority to issue fresh Disclosure Statement so that the they are able to fi le
their meaningful comments and adequately defend their interests.
E.2 Submissions by the domestic industry
42. The following submissions have been made by domestic industry with regard to the
confidentiality and other miscellaneous issues :
i. The Authority must assess confidentiality based on various factor s includi ng nature
of information and whether such information is by law, custom, usage or practice
treated as confidential in the relevant field.
ii. The domestic industry denied failure to comp ly with Trade Notice 09/2021 which
recognizes challenges in gath ering com plete information from all producers in
fragmented industries and provides simplified procedures for initial filings. The
petitioners filed all required information under Annexure -I for twelve applicant
producers supported by requisite production and injur y data across the injury period.
iii. The domestic industry denied that only Proforma IV -A and single -page NIP
statement was provided, stating that complete confidential data including PCN -wise
cost and price data and cost sheets were submitted to the Auth ority . Non -confidential
versions were submitted to extent possible without disclosing information that could
harm commercial interests of sampled producers operating in highly competitive
market.
iv. The domestic industry denie d failure to adhere to Trade Notice 10 /2018 and Trade
Notice 14/2018 , stating that as per the Trade Notice , producers are required to
provide reasonable non -confidential summary or explanation where summary is not
possible. In all instances where data was marked confidential, either s umma ry in
indexed form was submitted or explanation was provided why disclosure would
severely prejudice companies.
v. Non-confidential versions were submitted with data marked with justifiable
confidentiality indicators in accordance with Trade Notice. Summa ry trends in
domestic sales, profit margins, interest costs and depreciation were provided in
indexed form, fully complying with confidentiality treatment requirements.
vi. Allegation s of excessive confidentiality are without basis as the Authority has
consist ently acc epted confidential filings where companies can show risk of
significant commercial harm. The market for the PUC is competitive and disclosure
of costs and pricing would m aterially harm sampled producers. Confidentiality
claims are made in accordan ce with T rade Notice and CVD Rules .
vii. There is no legal obligation to disclose actual numbers in public version when such
disclosure would lead to commercial harm. The Authority has not raised any
deficiency with respect to confidentiality and there is no pr oced ural violation.
viii. The Authority is competent body to assess completeness, confidentiality and
procedural compliance. All mandatory information has been placed on record and
the Authority retains discretion to verify and evaluate all data on record and di rect
disclosure of further information if required.
ix. The domestic industry submitted that it has placed on record the list of members of
CMMAI and MMA along with their status as supporters or opposers, and a
statement depicting the share of production of ap plicants, supporters, and other
Indian producers in t otal domestic production.
x. The domestic industry submitted that the request to disregard the support of the
supporting producers is untenable and that the record contains supporter -wise
information in non -confiden tial form as required under the applicable f ramework .
xi. Interested parties have misread the Trade Notice by asserting that it mandates
disclosure of aggregated actual figures in all cases involving multiple domestic
producers.
xii. Trade Notice No. 10/20 18 expres sly provides that the confidentiality guidel ines are
not absolute and that the Authority may permit deviation on a case -to-case basis
upon demonstration of good cause, consistent with Rule 8 of the CVD Rules.
xiii. Good cause exists in the present case for claim ing confidentiality over aggregated
sales va lue and profitability figures. Aggregate sales quantities have been disclosed
in the non -confidential version, and disclosure of aggregated sales value and
profitability, when read with quantities, would reveal e stimated selling prices and
profit levels of the domestic producers.
xiv. The domestic market for the PUC is highly competitive and fragmented, with
multiple Indian producers competing among themselves and with exporters.
Disclosure of consolidated sal es v alue and profitability figures would provide
pricing benchmarks to competitors and exporters, enabling undercutting and causing
serious commercial harm.
xv. The allegation that aggregated disclosure for multiple producers would not prejudice
commercial int erests ignores market realities, as aggregated figure s can still reveal
sensitive pricing and margin information in industries with comparable cost
structures and product characteristics.
xvi. The allegation regarding non -disclosure of interest and depreciation data is factually
incorrect, as aggregate informatio n relating to interest expenses and depreciation and
amortization has been provided in the non -confidential version of the petition.
xvii. Confidentiality has not been claimed through bald assertions. The dome stic industry
has clearly explained the justification for confidentiality, including risks of price
undercutting, loss of bargaining power, and distortion of competition.
xviii. Reliance was placed on past practice of the Authority, including the anti -dumping
investigatio n concerning imports of Soda As h from Turkey, Russia, USA and Iran,
where the Authority accepted disclosure of trends instead of aggregated actual
figures for sales value and profitability in view of potential commercial harm .
xix. The Authority, in th e Soda As h Final Findings, expressly rec orded that disclosure of
actual selling price, cost, and profitability information could cause significant
adverse effects and confer undue competitive advantage, and therefore allowed
confidentiality on such paramet ers.
xx. The factual matrix in the present i nvestigation is materially identical to the Soda Ash
case, as the domestic industry here also comprises multiple producers competing
inter se and with exporters, and disclosure of aggregated actual figures would
similarly rev eal sensitive pricing and margi n information.
xxi. Acceptance of trend -based disclosure does not dilute transparency. The non -
confidential trends provide sufficient information to understand injury parameters,
examine patterns over the injury period, a nd m ake m eaningful submissions while
protecting confidential business information.
xxii. The Authority has consistently allowed confidentiality of selling price and
profitability -related information in investigations involving multiple producers,
including inves tigations concerning printed circuit boa rds, PVC suspension resins,
solar cells, tyres, polyester yarn, and caustic soda.
xxiii. Interested parties are not prejudiced in their right of defense and are able to make
submissions on volume effects, price effects, pro fitability trends, and causation on
the basis of the non -confidential information placed on record.
xxiv. With respect to allegations regarding inadequate disclosure by supporting producers,
the present investigation concerns a fragmented industry dominated by M SMEs , and
that the special procedural framework under Trade Notice No. 09/2021 applies.
xxv. Trade Notice No. 09/2021 requires applicant domestic producers to file basic injury
information i n Annexure -I and does not require supporting producers to file detailed
injury, cost, sales, or financial information.
xxvi. The purpose of Trade Notice No. 09/2021 is to simplify initiation for fragmented
industries and avoid procedural barriers that would othe rwise prevent such industries
from seeking trade remedy protection.
xxvii. In comp lianc e with Trade Notice No. 09/2021, it has already filed and circulated a
complete list of members of CMMAI and MMA indicating supporters, opposers, and
neutral producers, along w ith aggregated production data sufficient to understand the
production structure of the domestic industry.
xxviii. Without prejudice, it was reiterated that the twelve applicant domestic producers
alone account for more than 35% of total domestic production during the POI,
independently satisfying the 25% threshold under Rule 6(3), i rrespecti ve of
supporter data.
xxix. No domestic producer has opposed the application, and therefore the second limb of
the standing test under Rule 6(3), requiring supporters to represent more than 50% of
those expressing support or opposition, is automatically satisfied.
xxx. Allegations regarding violation of Trade Notice No. 14/2018 must be assessed in
harmony with Trade Notice No. 09/2021, which was issued later in ti me and
specifically addresses filing requirements for fragmented industries.
xxxi. The injury determina tion unde r the CVD Rules is based on data of the applicant
domestic producers, including sampled producers where applicable, and supporting
producers are not r equired to submit detailed injury information.
xxxii. The consolidated Proforma IV -A captures key injury paramete rs and that interested
parties have access to non -confidential injury information sufficient to comment on
injury and causation.
xxxiii. No principles of natu ral justice have been violated and that interested parties have
been afforded full opportunity to examine and comment on injury on the basis of
information placed on record.
xxxiv. With respect to allegations regarding failure to re -file a complete updated application
for the extended POI, the Authority has discretion to determine the POI at initiation
and t hat initiation is based on prima facie evidence. Once the POI was extended, t he
domestic industry furnished updated information for the additional period in the
manner directed by the Authority, and there is no requirement under the CVD Rules
to re-file th e entire petition.
xxxv. No prejudice has been caused to interested parties, as non -confidential information
reflecting trends over the injury period, including the extended POI, has been placed
on record.
xxxvi. With respect to allegations regarding absence of certifi cations o r declarations for the
extended POI, the application contained the r equired certifications at the time of
filing and that extension of the POI does not invalidate certifications already on
record.
xxxvii. Any alleged procedural deficiency is curable and d oes not r ender the initiation void
or without jurisdiction.
xxxviii. Company -wise info rmation for individual applicant producers was provided at the
time of filing in accordance with Trade Notice No. 09/2021 and that updated
company -wise information for the extende d PO I has also been filed with the
Authority . The non -confidential versions of individual company -wise information
for the updated POI have also been filed and circulated to all other interested parties .
xxxix. The initiation was based on examination of accuracy and adequ acy of evidence
under Rule 6 of the CV D Rules and Articles 11.2 and 11.3 of the SCM Agreement .
xl. The import trends relied upon show a consistent increase in imports from Vietnam
over the injury period, culminating in a surge during the POI, and that these trends
have been corroborated by verifie d import data examined by the Authority.
xli. Reliance on secondary import data at the stage of initiation is an established practice
of the Authority where official data is not contemporaneously available, and suc h
data is subsequently verified during investig ation.
xlii. With respect to allegations regarding mixing of PUC data with colour masterbatch
data, all information furnished relates exclusively to Calcium Carbonate Filler
Masterbatch and that consolidated Proform a IV-A reflects only PUC -specific data.
xliii. The fac t that some applicant producers may also manufacture colour masterbatch
does not invalidate the injury analysis, as long as the analysis is based on PUC -
specific data, which is the case here.
xliv. The domestic indu stry requested that the submissions of the interested parties on
confidentiality and miscellaneous procedural issues be rejected.
E.3 Examination by the Authority
43. The submissions made by the other interested parties and the domestic industry with
regard to confid entiality and other miscellaneous issues have been examined as under:
i. The Authority notes the objection that the investigation was initiated with 15-month POI
and that Explanation (ii) to Rule 6 of the CVD Rules prescribes a 12 -month POI as the
norm, perm itting a minimum of six months or a maximum of eighteen months only “for
reasons to be recorded in writing”. Explanation (ii) to Rule 6 of the CVD Ru les provides
as follows:
(ii) be for a period of twelve months and for the reasons to be recorded in
writi ng the designated authority may consider a minimum of six months or
maximum of eighteen months.
ii. The Authority considers that, at the stage of initiat ion, the Authority is required to record
reasons for the POI selected, and such reasons are requir ed to be adequate to explain the
basis for the choice made. The Authority that submissions of interested parties that the
investigation was initiated with an 18 months POI is wrong and denied. The Initiation
notification dated 27.12.2024 clearly records th at invest igation was initiated with a 15
months POI.
iii. The Authority notes the reasons relate d to the structure of the domestic industry in the
present case and the practical feasibility of compiling data for a fragmented MSME -
driven industry. The Authority considers these considerations relevant for selecting an
appropriate POI within the range provided under Explanation (ii) to Rule 6 of the CVD
Rules .
iv. The Auth ority considers that selection of an appropriate POI within the permissible
statutory range requir es balanc ing comparability and practicality, and that the reasons
recorded in the initiation notification are sufficient for the purpose of Explanation (ii) t o
Rule 6 of the CVD Rules .
v. Accordingly, the Authority has not accept ed the submission that the inv estigatio n is
without jurisdiction on the grounds that the POI is more than 12 months . The Authority
further notes that the choice of POI within the permissible statutory range .
vi. The Authority made available non -confidential version of the information provi ded by
various parties to all interested parties as per Rule 7(7) of the CVD Rules. With regard to
confidentiality of information, Rule 8 of CVD Rule s provides as follows:
“(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub -rules (1), (2), (3) and (7)
of rule 7, sub-rule (2) of rule 14, sub -rule (4) of rule 17 and sub -rule (3) of
rule 19, copies of applications received under sub -rule (1) of rule 6 or any
other information provided to the designated authority on a confidential
basis by any party in the course o f investigation, shall, upon the designated
authority being satisfied as to its confidentiality, be treated as such by it
and no such information sha ll be disclosed to any other party without
specific authorisation of the party providing such information.
(2) The designated authority may require the parties providing information
on a confidential basis to furnish non -confidential summary thereof in
sufficient details to permit a reasonable understanding of the substance of
the confidential information and if, in the opinion of a party providing such
information, such information is not susceptible of summary, such party
may submit to the designated authority a statement of reasons why
summarisation is not possible.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (2), if the designated
authority, is satisfied that the request for confidentiality is not warranted or
the supplier of the information is either unwilling to make the information
public or to authorise its disclosure in generalised or summary for m, it may
disregard such information.”
vii. The Authority notes the submission of other interested parties that supporters have not
provided meaningful non -confidential data on production, capacity, sales, profitability or
injury, that the non -confidential ver sions are heavily redacted, and that supporters’
support should therefore be disregarded for the purposes of standing.
viii. The Authority notes that twelve (12) applicant domestic producers filed the required
information in Annexure -I under Trade Notice No. 09/ 2021 constitute domestic industry,
and that twenty -one (21) producers expressly supported the application.
ix. The Authority notes that, in any event, the twelve applicant producers alone constitute
more than 25% of total domestic production. The Authority th erefore c onsiders that
satisfaction of the 25% threshold under Rule 6(3) does not depend on the supporters.
Further, the Authority notes that no domestic producer has expressed opposition to the
application. In view of the explanation to Rule 6(3), the Aut hority co nsiders that the
standing requirement relating to the degree of support among those expressing support or
opposition is satisfied on the facts of the present case.
x. The Authority notes the submission that Trade Notice No. 14/2018 requires detailed non-
confi dential summaries and that supporters’ data is non -compliant. The Authority
considers that confidentiality obligations apply to all submissions, and that the adequacy
of non -confidential summaries must be assessed in the context of the information required
to be filed and the nature of information for which confidentiality is sought.
xi. The Authority notes the submission that Trade Notice No. 10/2018 requires disclosure of
aggregated data in actual figures in cases involving multiple domest ic producer s, and th at
the domestic industry disclosed only trends for parameters such as sales value,
profitability, interest/finance cost, and depreciation/ amortization .
xii. The Authority has examined the domestic industry’s justification that aggregate sale s
quantitie s ha ve be en disclosed and that disclosure of aggregated sales value and
profitability, when read with quantities, can reveal estimated selling price and profit levels
of domestic producers in a competitive and fragmented market. The Authority no tes the
domestic ind ustry’s submission that such disclosure can provide pricing benchmarks to
competitors and exporters and may cause commercial harm.
xiii. The Authority considers that the confidentiality regime under the CVD R ules seeks to
balance transparency and due pr ocess wit h protection of confidential business
information. The Authority considers that trend -based disclosure can be permissible
where it permits reasonable understanding of the substance of information while
protecting sensitive data, provide d the summa ries are meaningful and sufficient for
interested parties to present their case.
xiv. On the facts of the present case, the Authority considers that the domestic industry has
provided non -confidential information in a manner that enables interested p arties to
understand trends over the injury period and make submissions on injury, price effects,
profitability trends, and causation, while protecting information that is confidential by
nature.
xv. The Authority has undertaken a thorough examination of the c onfidential ity claim s
submitted by both the domestic industry and other interested parties. Upon review, the
Authority finds that these claims were, in general, appropriately substantiated and in
conformity with the applicable legal provisions.
xvi. Accordingl y, on being satisfied, the Authority has accepted the confidentiality claims,
wherever warranted and such information has been considered confidential and not
disclosed to the other interested parties. Wherever possible, parties providing information
on a confidentia l basis w ere directed to provide a sufficient non -confidential version of
the information filed on a confidential basis.
xvii. The Authority notes the submission of other interested parties that the application was
originally filed for April 2023 –Marc h 2024, whi le the Au thority initiated with an
extended POI of 1 April 2023 –30 June 2024, and that the applicant allegedly failed to re -
file a complete updated application and revised injury analysis for the notified POI.
xviii. The Authority notes that it may fix the POI at initiation based on prima facie evidence and
may later seek updated information or additional evidence during the investigation. The
domestic industry has stated that it submitted all required updated POI data in the manner
directed, and that t he CVD Rule s do not require a complete re‑filing of the petition for
such updates. It also submitted company‑wise information in the prescribed formats,
including for the updated POI, along with a circulated non‑confidential version.
Regarding the allegati on that fre sh certifications were not provided for the extended POI,
the domestic industry maintains that the original certifications filed with the application
remain valid and are not invalidated merely because the POI was extended.
xix. The Authority conside rs that the relevant question is whether the information required for
examination is available on record for the POI adopted, and whether the Authority has had
the ability to examine and verify the information during the investigation. The Authority
notes that the in vestigation process includes opportunities to seek and provide updated
information, and procedural requirements are to be applied to ensure a fair process
without treating curable procedural aspects as jurisdictional defects in the absence of
prejudice.
xx. The Au thori ty notes that interested parties have had access to non -confidential
information for the injury period including the extended POI and have been afforded
opportunity to file submissions. The Authority therefore does not accept the submis sion
that t he procee dings are vitiated at the threshold on account of the form in which updated
POI information was provided or on account of the allegations regarding certifications,
particularly where information has been placed on record and examined.
xxi. The Authorit y notes the submission that the petitioner relied on secondary/private sources
for import data and that the Authority should have called for DGCI&S data at initiation,
and that the source of import data was not disclosed.
xxii. The Authority notes tha t import tr ends relied upon for initiation were examined for
reasonableness and consistency and that the Authority has access to official import data
during investigation for verification.
xxiii. The Authority notes that for the purpose of investigation, it has r elied upon the DG
Systems data.
xxiv. The Authority notes the submission that sampled companies may manufacture both
calcium carbonate filler masterbatch (PUC) and colour masterbatch, and that profitability
of colour masterbatch could distort injury analysis unless PUC -specific dat a is used.
xxv. The investigation concerns only Calcium Carbonate Filler Masterbatch and that all
information furnished by applicant domestic producers, including company -wise and
consolidated Proforma IV -A data, pertains exclusively to the PUC, and do es not in clude
production, sales, costs or profitability relating to colour masterbatch or other non -subject
products.
xxvi. The relevant issue is whether the injury analysis is based on PUC -specific data. On the
basis of the record, the Authority holds that the applican t domestic producers have filed
product -specific information relating to the PUC in the prescribed formats. The Authority
therefore has not accept ed the submission that the injury analysis is vitiated m erely
because certain producers may also manu facture o ther products, where the data relied
upon is product -specific and duly verified by the Authority .
xxvii. The Authority notes that certain interested parties reiterated that non -confidential versions
of injury formats VI -1 to VI -5 for sampled producers sh ould be circulated and that mere
disclosure of a consolidated non -confidential NIP is insufficient, and that non -disclosure
of production share of sampled producers affects representativeness.
xxviii. The Authori ty reiterates that the injury analysis and NIP are b ased on c omplete
information placed on record by the sampled producers and examined by the Authority,
and confidentiality claims are assessed under the applicable framework to balance
transparency and pro tection of confidential information.
xxix. In view of the abov e exa mination, the Authority holds that the above issues have been
examined in accordance with the applicable legal framework and do not vitiate the
initiation or continuation of the present investigation .
F. DETERMINATION OF SUBSIDY AND SUBSIDY MA RGIN
F.1. Submissions by other interested parties:
44. The other interested parties have made the following submissions with regard to the
subsidies and subsidy margin :
i. The producers/exporters submit ted that the allegations of subsidization made in the
petition are u nfounded and unsupported by evidence.
ii. The producers/exporters contended that the petition lacks “sufficient evidence” of
subsidization as required under Articles 11.2 and 11.3 of the SCM Agr eement and the
corresponding provisions of the Indian CV D Rules. The petition relies on assertions and
general descriptions of government policies without establishing the constitutive elements
of a subsidy for each alleged programme.
iii. The existence of a su bsidy under the SCM Agreement and the CVD Rules requires proof
of a financial contribution, benefit, and specificity, and that mere availability or existence
of a programme under domestic law is legally insufficient.
iv. Reliance is placed on WTO jurisprudence , including the Panel Report in China – GOES,
to argue t hat the i nvestigating authority must examine the accuracy and adequacy of
evidence before initiating an investigation and must filter out applications that do not meet
the sufficiency standard. It is contended that “prima facie” evidence is not equivalent to
“suffi cient evidence” and that the latter requires legally satisfactory substantiation.
v. One of the interested parties submitted that o ut of the thirteen subsidy programmes
alleged in the petition, they have not availed any programme except a minor inves tment -
linked corporate income tax exemption, which is claimed to be a general measure under
Vietnamese law and non -specific in nature.
vi. The said corporate income tax exemption was available only for a limited period of six
months during the fifteen -month pe riod of i nvestigation and yielded a negligible benefit.
Such a limited and general tax measure cannot be treated as a countervailable subsidy.
vii. Few producers/ exporters submit ted that they are either not eligible under the respective
schemes, have not parti cipated i n such schemes, or have engaged in purely commercial
transactions conducted at market -determined rates. Documentary evidence has been
submitted to demonstrate non -eligibility, non -availment, or absence of any preferential
treatment.
viii. The petition a nd the in itiation notification merely list thirteen programmes without
demonstrating, with evidence, that any exporter actually received a financial contribution
conferring a quantifiable benefit.
ix. The producers/exporters submit that the petition fails to establish : (i) a financial
contribution by the Government of Vietnam or a public body; (ii) a benefit conferred; and
(iii) specificity of the alleged programmes. The failure to establish these elements vitiates
the initiation of the investigation and canno t be cure d at a later stage.
x. Vitaplas has submitted that the jurisprudence of the WTO Appellate Body has
unequivocally established that domestic prices constitute the primary and preferred
benchmark, and that recourse to out -of-country benchmarks is strict ly residu al in nature.
In US – Softwo od Lumber IV, Appellate Body Report, WT/DS257/AB/R (adopted 17th
February 2004), paras 90 –103, the Appellate Body held that private prices in the country
of provision are the primary benchmark, and that out -of-country benchmark s may be
used only where do mestic prices are distorted. The Appellate Body expressly rejected any
automatic or presumed rejection of domestic prices. This position was reinforced in US –
Countervailing Measures (China) - WT/DS437/AB/R, US – Carbo n Steel (India) -
WT/DS436/AB/R.
xi. The Authority has not demonstrated that it assessed the adequacy and accuracy of the
evidence prior to initiation, as required under Article 11.3 of the SCM Agreement and
Section 6 of the Indian CVD Rules. The respondents request t he Authority to clarify the
basis on which the petition was considered to contain sufficient evidence.
xii. The producers/exporters further rel ied on WTO Panel findings, including Mexico – Pipes
and Tubes and Japan – DRAMs, to submit that countervailin g duties can only be imposed
where th ere is evidence of ongoing subsidization and that general assertions, policy
descriptions, or unsubstantiated claims do not meet the evidentiary threshold .
xiii. It is further submitted that any determination regarding existe nce, bene fit, or specificity of
alleg ed subsidies must be based on a combined examination of exporters’ questionnaire
responses and the response filed by the Government of Vietnam. No adverse inference
can be drawn without such correlated examination.
xiv. The responden t submitted that rejection o f its response on the ground of non -filing of the
additional questionnaire response is unwarranted, as it had filed a complete questionnaire
response and the information sought by the Authority had either already been f urnished in
the original questionnair e response or was not applicable to the company.
xv. With regard to CaCO₃ details, the applicant submitted that CaCO₃ was the only raw
material used for manufacture of the subject goods, and details of its consumption and
purchase h ad already been provided in Section I(C) of the original questionnaire response.
As regards export promotion incentive, grant or drawback, the applicant submitted that no
such benefit was received during the POI for exports of the subject goods, a nd the sa me
had already been confirme d in Section I(A)(7) of the original response.
xvi. The respondent further submitted that it had not received any exemption on purchase of
raw materials. All imported raw materials used by the company were subject to the
general impo rt-export tariff schedule under Vietnamese law, and no specific import duty
exemption or preferential treatment was granted exclusively to enterprises engaged in
manufacture of the subject goods. It was also submitted that import duty concessions
under Fre e Trade Agreements are not countervailable, as such concessions are generally
available t o all enterprises satisfying the prescribed origin and FTA requirements and are
not industry -specific or exclusive to the subject goods.
xvii. With regard to capita l goods a nd spares, the respondent submitted that it had not imported
any capital goods or stores/ spares and, therefore, no benefit under any such scheme was
availed. As regards land -related benefits, the applicant submitted that it had not purchased
land and had n ot participated in any Government programme providing land at below -
market rates or grant ing land -related exemptions. The premises were stated to have been
taken on rent from a private party.
xviii. The respondent also submitted that it does not use wate r or gas in the manufacture of the
subject goods. With regard to electricity, it submitted that el ectricity is purchased at arm’s
length prices applicable generally to all companies and that no electricity subsidy has been
received.
xix. As regards corporate ta x, the respondent submitted that US Masterbatch JSC paid regular
corporate income tax at the rate of 20% during the POI. It further submitted that US
Masterbatch JSC – Hung Yen Branch availed 50% corporate income tax reduction in
2023, 2024 and 2025, and t hat copie s of the relevant income tax returns of the producer
and related trader had already been submitted with the original questionnaire response.
xx. With respect to loans, the respondent submitted that all loans were obtained from
commercial banks on arm’ s length terms and at normal banking rates. It further submitted
that no loan was taken from the S tate Bank of Vietnam and, therefore, the alleged scheme
was not applicable to the company. The respondent also stated that details of loans had
already been p rovided a t pages 28 to 30 of the original questionnaire response.
xxi. The respondent finally submitted that several alleged schemes, including export
incentives, raw material purchase exemptions, capital goods concessions, and water/gas
benefits, were not coun tervailed in the Disclosure Statement dated 20 th March 2026.
xxii. The respondent submitted that reject ion of the entire questionnaire response is contrary to
the consistent practice of the Authority. It was submitted that in several investigations,
where part of the in formation was found deficient or was not accepted, the Authority
applied best information available only to the deficient portion and nevertheless granted
individual duty margins.
xxiii. In support, the respondent relied on the final findings in the anti -dumping investigation
concerning imports of Aluminium and Zinc Coated Flat Products from China PR ,
Vietnam and Korea RP, wherein the Authority did not reject the complete response of M/s
Nam Kim Steel despite non -submission of the practicing accountant’s certifica te. Instead,
the Authority rejected only the claimed normal value and determined the same on the
basis of best facts available.
xxiv. Accordingly, the respondent submitted that even assuming there is any missing or
deficient information, the complete re sponse of US Masterbatch Group cannot be rejected
in totality. The Authority may, at best, apply b est information available only to the
specific missing information, in accordance with the ASCM, past practice of the
Authority and principles of natural just ice.
xxv. The respondent further submitted that both US Masterbatch Joint Stock Company and US
Masterba tch Joint Stock Company – Hung Yen Branch are manufacturers of the subject
goods and, therefore, requested that individual duty margins be granted to both
companies.
F.2 Submissions by the domestic industry
45. The domestic industry has made the following submission with regard to the subsidies
and subsidy margin :
i. The domestic industry submit ted that the determination of countervailable subsidies in
the present i nvestigat ion is governed by the WTO Agreement on Su bsidies and
Countervailing Measures and the domestic legal framework contained in Section 9 of the
Customs Tariff Act, 1975 read with the Countervailing Duty Rules.
ii. In terms of Section 9(1) of the Customs Tariff Ac t, a subsidy is deemed to exist where a
financial contribution is made by the government or a public body of the exporting
country and a benefit is thereby conferred on the recipient. For a subsidy to be
countervailed, the requirement of specifici ty must a lso be satisfied.
iii. Section 9(1) of the Cu stoms Tariff Act expressly provides that a financial contribution
may take the form of, inter alia, direct transfer of funds, government revenue foregone or
not collected, provision of goods or services othe r than ge neral infrastructure, purchase
of goods, or income or price support that operates to increase exports or reduce imports,
provided that a benefit is conferred.
iv. Rule 12 of the CVD Rules provides the methodology for calculation of the amount of
count ervailabl e subsidy. The Rule mandates that counte rvailable subsidies shall be
calculated in terms of the benefit conferred on the recipient, as found to exist during the
period of investigation.
v. Based on publicly available information, the domestic industr y made de tailed and
programme -specific submission s in the petition seeking initiation of the present
countervailing duty investigation. These submissions identified the nature of the alleged
subsidy programmes, the legal basis under Vietnamese law, the man ner in wh ich
financial contribution was made by t he Government of Vietnam, and the benefit
conferred on the producers/exporters of the subject goods.
vi. The petition and the benchmark submissions were supported by publicly available
documents, government noti fications , policy documents, and secondary eviden ce, and
were sufficient to establish the existence of financial contribution, benefit, and
specificity for the purposes of initiation and investigation.
vii. The investigation has progressed beyond the initiation stage an d that the determination
of subsidizatio n must now be based on a detailed examination of exporters’
questionnaire responses, the response filed by the Government of Vietnam, and
verification of information on record, in accordance with the CVD Rul es.
F.3 Examination by the Authority
46. The Author ity has examined the submissions made by various interested parties regarding
the determination of subsidies and subsidy margin . The Authority notes that under
Section 9(1) of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975, read with the CVD Rules, a subsidy is
deemed to exist where financial contribution is made by the government, conferring a
benefit to the recipient. Further, for a subsidy to be countervailed, it should fulfill the
requirements of specificity .
47. The Authorit y notes t hat, for the purpose of determining subsidization and subsidy
margin, it has relied upon:
(i) the information and evidence filed by the domestic industry in the petition and
subsequent submissions, including benchmark submissions;
(ii) the qu estionnaire responses /additional questionnaire response and supporting documents
filed by the participating producers/exporters; and
(iii) the response and information provided by the Government of Vietnam through the Trade
Remedies Authority of Vietnam (TRAV), along with the verif ication and examination
carried out by the Authority during the course of investigation.
48. The Authority further notes that the record in the present investigation contains
information from all cooperating parties relevant to examinatio n of the con stitutive
elements of subsidization.
49. The Authority notes that the exporters’ contentions regarding programme -wise non -
eligibility, non -availment, market -based transactions, and the alleged non -countervailable
nature of certain schemes raise is sues that re quire pro gramme -specific examination. The
Authority considers that these issues cannot be concluded on the basis of general
assertions and must be assessed in light of verified information on record.
50. Accordingly, the Authority has examined the alleged sub sidy prog rammes, the evidence
placed on record by the domestic industry, the information filed by the cooperating
producers/exporters, and the response filed by TRAV, for the purpose of determining
whether countervailable subsidies exist and fo r quantifica tion of s ubsidy margin. The
Authority’s programme -wise examination, including examination of benchmarks and
benefit calculations, has been set out in the subsequent paragraphs under the relevant
programme headings.
51. The Authority has therefore proceeded to determin e subsidization and subsidy margin on
the basis of the information available, consistent with the requirements of the CVD Rules.
52. The Authority finds that wherever the level of cooperation by Vietnamese
producers/exporters has been sat isfactory, t he Author ity has considered the information
provided by cooperating producers/exporters for determination of individual subsidy
margin s.
53. US Masterbatch Joint Stock Company and US Masterbatch Joint Stock Company – Hung
Yen Branch (exporters) ha ve submitted that the y have filed complete questionnaire
response. It is noted that the exporters have filed the information relating to raw material,
land, electricity, corporate income tax and loan in their original questionnaire response.
The exporters have also cl aimed in their original questionnaire response that they have
not availed any export promotion incentive, not availed specific import duty exemptions
on imported raw material / capital goods and not imported capital goods / stores. The
Authorit y has examin ed the qu estionnaire response filed by the exporters and notes that
the information relevant for the determination of the margins for the schemes
countervailed by the Authority were filed by the exporters in the original questionnaire
response. Therefore, it is decided to grant individual margin to the exporters.
I. List of schemes identified in the form of provision of goods/services for Less Than
Adequate Remuneration (“LTAR”)
• Program 1 - Supply of Limestone at LTAR
• Program 12 - Provision of Natural Gas /Electric ity/Coal for Power Consumption at LTAR
• Program 13 - Government Provision of Land at LTAR And Exemption/ Reduction of Land
and Water Rent
II. List of schemes identified in the form of tax exemptions and rebates
• Program 3 - Exemption on Corporate I ncome Tax for Enterprise
• Program 4 - Import Duty Exemption
III. List of schemes identified in the form of interest rate subsidies
• Program 5 - Preferential Lending for Investor
• Program 7 - Preferential Lending to the Exporter
• Program 8 - Interest Rate of I nvestment Credit Loans
• Program 9 - Investment Support on Investors who Invested on establishing small and
medium enterprises
• Program 10 - Export Credit from V ietnam Development Bank (“VDB”)
• Program 11 - Financial Guar antee by Vietin Bank
IV. List of schem es identi fied in the form of other financial incentives
• Program 2 -Masterplan For Development of Vietnam
• Program 6 -Export Promotion Program
54. Post initiation, the producers/ exporters of the subject goods were advised to file response
to the questionnaire and addit ional questionnaire in the form and manner prescribed and
were given adequate time and opportunity to provide verifiable evidence on the existence,
degree and effect of the alleged subsidy program for making an appropriate determination
of existen ce and qu antum of such subsidies, if any.
55. The Authority notes that the following exporters of the subject goods have filed
exporter’s questionnaire responses:
i) European Plastic Joint Stock Company
ii) Polyfill Joint Stock Company
iii) Nghe An European Plastic One M ember Lim ited Liability Company
iv) Yen Bai European Plastic Joint Stock Company
v) A Dong Plastic Joint Stock Company
vi) Vitaplas Joi nt Stock Company
vii) An Tien Industries Joint Stock Company
viii) Filler Masterbatch Joint Stock Company
ix) Vietnam Industrial Minerals Internati onal Join t Stock Company
56. Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1994 (“ GATT ”) read with
Article 19 of th e Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (“ SCM ”) allows
importing countries to impose a countervailing duty on subsidize d importe d goods.
57. Accordingly, Section 9 of the Customs Tariff Act allows the Central Government to
impose a countervailing duty on subsidized imports. Section 9(1) of the Customs Tariff
Act states as follows:
(1) Where any country or territory pays, bestows, directly or indirectly, any
subsidy upon the manufacture or production therein or the exportation
therefrom of any article including any subsidy on transportation of such
article, then, upon the importation of any such article into India, whether the
same is impor ted directly from the country of manufacture, production or
otherwise, and whether it is imported in the same condi tion as when exported
from the country of manufacture or production or has been changed in
condition by manufacture, production or o therwise, the Central Government
may, by notification in the Official Gazette, impose a countervailing duty not
exceeding th e amount of such subsidy .
58. The Explanation to Section 9(1) of the Customs Tariff Act contains the same language
of Article 1 of the SCM, whic h defines a ‘subsidy’ for the purposes of a countervailing
duty investigation. It states that a subsidy shall be deemed to exist if:
“(a) the re is financial contribution by a Government, or any public body in the
exporting or producing country or territor y, that is, where –
(i) a Government practice involves a direct transfer of funds (including grants,
loans and equity infusion), or potential direct transfer of funds or liabilities, or
both;
(ii) Government revenue that is otherwise due is fore gone or n ot collected
(including fiscal incentives);
(iii) a Government provides goods or services other than general infrastructure
or purchases good s;
(iv) a Government makes payments to a funding mechanism, or entrusts or directs
a private body to car ry out on e or more of the type of functions specified in
clauses (i) to (iii) above which would normally be vested in the Government and
the practice i n, no real sense, differs from practices normally followed by
Governments; or
(b) a Government grants or maintain s any form of income or price support, which
operates directly or indirectly to increase export of any article from, or to reduce
import of any article into, its territory, and a benefit is thereby conferred. ”
59. Additionally, S ection 9(3) read with section 9(1) and section 9 (2) of the Customs Tariff
Act suggests that for a subsidy to be countervailable, it must be for a limited number of
persons engaged in the manufacture, production or export of articles .
60. Rule 7(8) of the CVD Rules allows the Aut hority to rely on ‘facts available’ in the event
the exporters fail to cooperate in the investigation. In this regard, it states:
“In a case where an interested party refuses access to, or otherwise does not provide
necessary informa tion within a reasona ble perio d, or significantly impedes the
investigation, the designated authority may record its findings on the basis of facts
available to it and make such recommendations to the Central Government as it
deems fit under such circumsta nce.”
F.3.1 Programs Found to be Countervailable
List of schemes identified in the form of provision of goods/services for Less Than Adequate
Remuneration (“LTAR”)
Program 1 - Supply of Limestone at LTAR
61. The other interested parties have made the following submissions wit h respect to this :
i. The allegation of “supply of limestone at less than adequate remuneration” is either not
applicable to individual entities on facts or not a countervailable subsidy in law.
ii. The domestic industry has not dischar ged the burden of establi shing the essential elements
of a countervailable subsidy, namely financial contribution, benefit, and specificity, and has
also proposed an incorrect benchmark for examining adequacy of remuneration.
iii. One responding producer/export er submit ted that the all eged prog ramme does not apply to
it because it does not purchase limestone in lump form at all. It submit ted that it procures
commercially available calcium carbonate (CaCO₃) powder from independent suppliers at
market prices, supp orted by purchase invoice s, long -term purchase agreements and supplier
certificates. It submit ted that it does not have any facility to convert limestone into CaCO₃
powder and, therefore, the alleged “limestone export tax” cannot be linked to its raw
mater ial procurement or produc tion meth ods.
iv. The said party further submit ted that the domestic industry’s allegation is factually
misplaced because the product purchased by it is CaCO₃ powder classifiable under HS
2517.41.00.10, whereas limestone is covered und er HS 2521 00 00.
v. It sub mitted that CaCO₃ powder is subject to export tax of 5%, which has remained
unchanged during the POI, and contend ed that it is illogical to assume that such export tax
on CaCO₃ powder could depress domestic prices to the advantage of downstream
producers.
vi. It also s ubmitted that the CaCO₃ powder supplied to it is produced from white stone/marble
and not from limestone, and therefore the Government of Vietnam has not made available
the relevant input at LTAR to it. On this b asis, it submit ted that the program me should be
treated as not applicable to it.
vii. Other parties submit ted that the domestic industry has failed to provide any evidence to
establish that Vietnam’s export tax on limestone constitutes a subsidy under Article 1 .1 of
the SCM Agreement. They submi tted that a subsidy requires (i) a financial contribution by
the government or public body and (ii) a benefit conferred, and further that the subsidy
must be specific under Article 2 to be countervailable.
viii. They submit ted that the domestic industry has not provided evidence satisfying these
requirements and, in particular, has not established that an export tax can be equated to a
government financial contribution.
ix. They submit ted that an export tax or levy is a regulatory fiscal measure and does not
involve any tran sfer of funds, government revenue foregone, or government provision of
goods to enterprises. They submit that the theory advanced by the domestic industry that an
export tax allegedly creates surplus domestic sup ply and hence lowers domestic price s
cannot be treated as a government “financial contribution” and cannot substitute for proof
of governmental action amounting to a financial contribution under the SCM Agreement
and CVD Rules.
x. In support, reliance was pla ced on WTO jurisprudence to submit that the reaction of private
entities to a government measure, or the economic effects of regulation (including export
restraints/taxes), cannot by itself establish “entrustment or direction” or a “financial
contribution” under Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) of the SCM . The y relied on the reasoning in WTO
disputes cited by them, including US – Export Restraints (DS194) and US – Softwood
Lumber, to submit that export restraints or taxes cannot be treated as government -entrusted
or directed provision of goods and that entrustm ent/direction requires a demonstrable
governmental link to private conduct, not merely market effects.
xi. They also rel ied on WTO panel reports cited by them, including European Union –
Countervailing Duties on Impo rts of Biodiesel from Indonesia (DS 618) and European
Union – Countervailing and Anti -Dumping Duties on Stainless Steel Cold -Rolled Flat
Products from Indonesia (DS616), to submit that entrustment/direction requires evidence of
government action that effect ively denies suppliers the freedom to sell f reely and that mere
regulatory intervention or export measures affecting domestic pricing or supply is
insufficient.
xii. They submit ted that limestone suppliers in Vietnam retain commercial discretion to sell
domesti cally or export, to sell to multipl e sectors , and are not mandated to provide
limestone to producers of the product under consideration or at any particular price, thereby
failing the “demonstrable link” test.
xiii. The other interested parties further submit ted that, even assuming arguendo the e xistence of
a financial contribution, the domestic industry has not demonstrated that any benefit was
conferred on producers of the subject goods. They rel ied on WTO jurisprudence to submit
that benefit must be shown to be actually received by a recipient and must be examined
both in nature and extent.
xiv. They contend ed that the domestic industry has not provided evidence showing that any
producer procured limest one at below -market prices during the POI compared to an
appropriate benchmark, or that the export tax resu lted in actual reduction of input cost for
the producers of the subject goods.
xv. With respect to specificity, the other interested parties submit ted that limestone is a multi -
use mineral used across numerous sectors (including cement, steel, mining, paper, w ater
treatment and other industries) and therefore any export tax measure cannot be presumed to
be limited to or designed for the benefit of PUC prod ucers.
xvi. They contend ed that there is no explicit limitation of access to any alleged benefit to ce rtain
enterprises or industries within the meaning of Article 2 of the SCM Agreement. They
further submit ted that, in terms of Article 8.1, a non -specific sub sidy is non -actionable and
cannot be countervailed.
xvii. The Government of Vietnam, through TRAV, has a lso submi tted that the allegation does
not constitute a subsidy programme under the SCM Agreement. It submit ted that an export
tax is a fiscal regulatory meas ure and does not fall within the exhaustive list of “financial
contributions” under Article 1.1(a) (1) and t hat the Government does not provide limestone,
control domestic pricing, or supply limestone at a discount.
xviii. It submit ted that, in the absence of a f inancial contribution, there can be no subsidy, and
therefore no countervailing duty can be impose d under t he alleged programme. It further
submit ted that no WTO Member investigating authority has treated an export tax as a
subsidy in an anti -subsidy inves tigation.
xix. Certain producers/exporters submit ted that their raw material procurement is from privat e
supplie rs at arm’s length, at prices determined through competitive negotiations in a
competitive market. They submit ted that there is no government interve ntion in purchase
transactions and, therefore, the test of benefit under Article 14(d) is not sati sfied. Th ey
further submit ted that DGTR’s past practice recognises that market -based purchases cannot
be treated as countervailable subsidies.
xx. The other inter ested parties submit ted that the domestic industry’s benchmark proposal is
flawed. They submit ted that the domestic industry proposes to use Malaysia FOB export
prices for HS 2521, which covers a heterogeneous basket of calcareous products and not
necessar ily comparable limestone lumps relevant to the producers’ input.
xxi. They submit ted that the domestic industry ’s own benchmark data contains extreme outliers
across destinations, which indicates product mix, misclassification, or other distortions, and
cannot be treated as “prevailing market conditions” under Article 14(d). They also
submit ted that the ex port tax alleged by the domestic industry applies to limestone (HS
2521) and not to processed CaCO ₃ products (HS 2517 / 3824), and therefore any attempt to
benchmark or compute benefit using CaCO₃ prices is legally impermissible.
xxii. In place of Malaysia FOB b enchmarks , one responding exporter submit ted that an
appropriate benchmark would be Indian import prices of limestone lumps, stated to be the
precise form procured by a responding exporter.
xxiii. For this purpose, interested party has provide d a transaction -wise summary of imports into
India during the POI, showing an average import price from United Arab E mirates
accounting major source of supply with smaller volume from other countries . On this basis,
it submitted that UAE prices are representative of prevaili ng intern ational prices.
xxiv. The interested parties also submit ted that the stated rationale for Viet nam’s export duty on
limestone is resource conservation and prevention of over -exploitation of natural resources,
and not to ensure supply at LTAR. They submi tted that the Government does not itself
supply limestone and that limestone is supplied by privat e vendors.
xxv. They further submit ted that limestone is naturally occurring and is also available in India,
and that India imports limestone from several countri es, which can serve as a verifiable
benchmark, and that reliance on third -country export price dat a is unwarranted.
xxvi. Certain interested parties submit ted that any attempt to infer a pass -through from upstream
measures on limestone to downstream pricing of C aCO₃ or m asterbatch is speculative.
They submit ted that an export tax could, depending on market c onditions, lead to different
price outcomes and that no empirical evidence has been provided demonstrating sustained
domestic suppression relative to an undis torted be nchmark after appropriate adjustments.
They further submit ted that any pass -through analy sis is not automatic and must be
supported by evidence, which is absent.
xxvii. The other interested parties submit ted that, for the purpose of benefit computation, it is not
permissible to compute benefit against CaCO₃ when the alleged measure pertains only to
limestone, and that benefit, if any, must be tested only against limestone lumps. They
contend ed that there is no allegation regarding direct provision of CaCO ₃ by the
Government and therefore no benefit can be computed against CaCO₃.
xxviii. On the basis of the above, the other interested parties request the Authority to reject the
domestic industry’s alleg ations under this programme, to reject the benchmark proposed b y
the dom estic industry, and to determine that the alleged measure does not constitute a
countervailable subsidy and/or is not applicable to the responding producers/exporters.
xxix. The GOV respectf ully submits that the DGTR’s findings are inconsistent with Art icles 1, 2,
and 14(d) of the SCM Agreement. The GOV respectfully disagrees with the conclusion that
the alleged program is specific to downstream industries using limestone or calcium
carbonate as principal raw materials. Limestone is a widely used multi -purpose mi neral
consumed across numerous industries, including cement, steel, paper, plastics, paints,
rubber, water treatment, mining, construction, fertilizers, food, pharmaceuticals, and othe r
sectors. Decree No. 26/2023/ND -CP is a generally applicable r esource m anagement
measure applicable to all entities engaged in the extraction and export of limestone and
does not provide any benefit exclusively to the masterbatch or PUC sectors.
xxx. The poli cy objective of the measure is the conservation of natural reso urces, th e prevention
of over -exploitation and depletion of non -renewable resources, environmental protection,
and sustainable development, rather than the provision of targeted support to down stream
industries. Accordingly, the GOV respectfully submits th at the pr ogram does not exhibit
either de jure or de facto specificity within the meaning of Article 2 of the SCM
Agreement.
xxxi. The GOV further respectfully submits that no “financial contributio n” exists within the
meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) of the SC M Agreeme nt. The interpretation adopted by the
DGTR appears to equate export duties and regulatory measures with “entrustment or
direction” of private bodies and directly contradicts establishe d WTO jurisprudence,
including United States – Export Restraint s and Eur opean Union – Countervailing Duties
on Biodiesel from Indonesia. These WTO reports confirm that export restraints or export
duties do not constitute government entrustment or direction merely because they may
affect market conditions. The GOV furt her notes that, although the Panel Report in
European Union – Countervailing Duties on Biodiesel from Indonesia is currently subject
to an “appeal into the void,” the report remains the most re cent and authoritative
interpretation of Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) of the SC M Agreement. Since the Appellate Body is
non-operational, such appeals do not invalidate or overturn panel findings, and WTO
Members have continued to rely on reports under “appeal int o the void” as persuasive legal
authority.
xxxii. The limestone suppli ers retai n full commercial discretion regarding pricing, customers, and
sales. Any domestic price effects therefore reflect ordinary market dynamics rather than
government delegation or command through evidence -based economic analysis. The
DGTR did not con duct a pa ss-through analysis, regression analysis, cost build -up analysis,
or transaction -level comparison demonstrating that export duties on limestone translated
into lower prices for process ed calcium carbonate powder.
xxxiii. The GOV further respectfully submi ts that l imestone and processed calcium carbonate
powder are distinct products with different classifications, production processes,
characteristics, cost structures, and end uses. Limestone is a raw natural mineral primarily
used in cement and steel indus tries, wh ereas calcium carbonate powder is a processed
industrial product requiring crushing, grinding, classification, drying, packaging, surface
treatment, and quality control for use in plas tics, paints, paper, and masterbatch production.
Export duties apply onl y to raw limestone and not to processed calcium carbonate products.
The GOV therefore respectfully submits that the DGTR improperly conflated raw
limestone with processed calcium carbo nate products and assumed, without sufficient
evidentiary basis , that an y alleged upstream distortion is automatically transmitted to
downstream products. The GOV further notes that the DGTR effectively adopted a multi -
layer pass -through theory without con ducting any pass -through analysis at any level,
contrary to Art icles 1.1 (b) and 14(d) of the SCM Agreement and established WTO
jurisprudence.
xxxiv. The Malaysian benchmark selected by the DGTR concerns chemically processed calcium
carbonate products classified u nder HS code 283650, whereas Vietnamese producers use
natural g round cal cium carbonate classified under HS code 251741. These products differ
materially in production methods, characteristics, cost structures, purity levels, and market
uses. The GOV theref ore respectfully submits that the selected benchmark does not
appropriat ely reflect prevailing market conditions in Viet Nam and results in a distorted
comparison and an inflated calculation of the alleged benefit. The GOV further notes that
the DGTR did n ot sufficiently demonstrate comparability in terms of quality, productio n
conditions, economies of scale, logistics, trade patterns, or competitive conditions between
Malaysia and Viet Nam.
xxxv. The GOV also respectfully notes that, given India’s formal recogni tion of Viet Nam as a
market economy, the DGTR is not entitled to reject domestic prices and replace them with
surrogate out -of-country benchmarks. Such an approach is inconsistent with the recognition
of Viet Nam as a market economy and effectively amount s to the application of a
surrogate -value methodology, which is not perm issible in this context.
xxxvi. The respondents submitted that the alleged export tax on limestone cannot be treated as a
countervailable subsidy, as it does not constitute a “financial contr ibution” under Article
1.1(a)(1)(iv) of the SCM Agreement. Ther e is no e vidence that the Government of Vietnam
entrusted or directed private suppliers to provide limestone or calcium carbonate to
producers of the subject goods at a particular price. Mere e xport restraint or market effect
of a regulatory measure cannot be equat ed with Government direction, as recognised in
WTO jurisprudence.
xxxvii. The respondents further submitted that the Authority has not established any “benefit”,
since no transaction -level ana lysis, cost analysis or company -specific examination was
conduc ted to sh ow that inputs were procured below prevailing market prices. Companies
such as VMI, Vitaplas and ADC stated that their calcium carbonate inputs were purchased
from independent private suppliers on arm’s length, commercially negotiated terms,
witho ut Govern ment involvement or preferential treatment.
xxxviii. A major objection concerns the incorrect treatment of limestone lumps and calcium
carbonate powder as the same product. The respondents subm itted that limestone lumps are
raw mineral rocks, whereas CaCO₃ powder i s a processed, value -added industrial input,
with different HS classifications, characteristics, impurity levels, uses and prices. Since the
alleged export tax applies to limestone and not to CaCO₃ powder, CaCO₃ cannot be used as
the relevant benc hmark whe re the producer has used limestone lumps.
xxxix. The Disclosure Statement dated 20.03.2026 is not compliant with Rule 18 of the Subsidy
Rules as evidenced from the following facts. The disclo sure statement is woefully silent on
many of the key issues rai sed by th e respondents. Some of the key issues include:
a) Test of “Entrustment” / “Direction” provided in Section 9 of the Customs Tariff Act,
1975 and Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) of ASCM to consider e xport tax as financial
contribution has not been carried out.
b) The disclo sure statement dated 20.03.2026 has not examined the issue that economic
effects cannot be conflated as the government "giving responsibility to
(Entrustment)" or "exercising authority over (Direction)" a private body to provide
goods. A reaction of the pr ivate entities to a government measure (like export tax)
cannot be the basis of a determination of financial contribution by the government.
c) No evidence provided or proposal made in th e Disclosure Statement dated
20.03.2026 to show that the Govern ment of V ietnam directed the suppliers of
Limestone Lumps to provide Limestone Lumps to the manufacturers of the subject
goods or at a particular price.
d) The suppliers of Limestone Lumps have co mplete freedom to sell their products in
the domestic market to the manu factures of subject goods / non -subject goods /
downstream industries, captive use or exports.
e) Following WTO Appellate Body and Panel Reports clearly established that
entrustment/direction requires more than mere regulatory intervention affecting
private b ehaviour, there must be evidence of government action whose object is to
impose a "type of func tion" on private bodies, denying them freedom to operate
commercially. General economic effects, such as export restraints influencing
domestic supply o r pricing , do not suffice, as "a government would not be
considered to entrust or direct a private party in situations where a private party's
behavior is merely affected by the regulatory framework in which it operates.
a) Appellate Body Report in US – Coun tervailin g Duty on DRAMS
b) WTO Panel Report (WT/DS618/R dated 22 August 2025) - European
Union – Counterva iling Duties on Imports of Biodiesel from Indonesia
c) WTO Panel Report (WT/DS616/R dated 02 October 2025) - European
Union – Countervailing and Anti -Dumpi ng Duties on Stainless Steel
Cold -Rolled Flat Products from Indonesia”
f) Findings of the Australian Commi ssion in the case of Aluminium Zinc Coated Steel
of a Width Equal to or Greater Than 600 Millimetres from Vietnam has not been
examined in the Disclosur e Stateme nt dated 20.03.2026 , despite the fact that it is
directly applicable to the facts and issues in volved in this case.
g) “Explicit” test to consider export tax as specific has not been carried out.
xl. Without prejudice to the aforesaid, most of the key issues r aised by the respondents have
not been properly examined or addressed in the disclosure stateme nt dated 20.03.2026 ,
which the Authority is obligated to do under the Rules.
xli. The respondent submitted that the benchmark adopted by the Authority is fu ndamental ly
flawed, as the respondent used limestone lumps for manufacture of the PUC and not
CaCO₃ powder. Once the Authority itself recognised that benchmarking must be
undertaken with reference to the “relevant good” under Article 14(d), the relevant go od
in the present case ought to have been limestone lumps, particularly when the alleged
export restriction / tax is on limestone and not on calcium carbonate.
xlii. It was further submitt ed that the Disclosure Statement dated 20.03.2026 itself records
that wher e a produ cer purchases CaCO₃ powder, a CaCO₃ benchmark may be
appropriate, and where a producer uses limestone lumps, a limestone -based benchmark
is required. Despite this admitted p osition, the Authority proposed to apply Malaysian
CaCO₃ export prices to the respo ndent, apparently on the incorrect assumption that all
participating exporters purchased CaCO₃ powder directly. Since the respondent
admittedly used limestone lumps, adoptio n of CaCO₃ as benchmark is factually incorrect
and legally unsustainable.
xliii. The respo ndent also submitted that limestone lumps and CaCO₃ are distinct products.
Limestone is a natural rock containing impurities, whereas CaCO₃ is a processed, value -
added chemi cal product. They fall under different HS classifications, have different
character istics, processing levels and prices, and the domestic industry itself provided
separate Malaysian FOB benchmarks for limestone and CaCO₃. Therefore, CaCO₃
cannot be treated as the relevant benchmark merely because both may contain calcium
carbona te.
xliv. Accor dingly, since the allegation concerns provision of limestone lumps at less than
adequate remuneration and not provision of CaCO₃, the subsidy margin, if any, must be
determi ned only with reference to limestone lumps. At the highest, only the limes tone
comp onent embedded in processed CaCO₃, after appropriate adjustment for processing
costs, could be considered. The use of CaCO₃ benchmark without such adjustment is
therefore er roneous in principle, fact and law.
UAE wrongly rejected as benchmark
xlv. Further, in paragraph 121 itself, the Authority observes “that the import of limestone from
UAE is primarily used for steel industry and cement industry and not by the PUC producers” .
It is submitted that the said statement is not based on any concrete infor mation or analysis but
it seems that the Authority has chosen to accept the contention of the domestic industry
without seeking any substantiation or supporting evidence. The respondent submits as follows
in this context:
a) The Imports of Limestone Lumps fr om UAE is also used in the manufacture of the subject
goods. The applicant industry has not provided any evidence to shows that Limestone
Lumps imported from UAE is not u sed for the manufacture of the subject goods.
b) The adjustments claimed in the CIF pric e to dete rmine the FOB price are either taken based
on the application or as per the consistent practice followed by the Authority.
c) The Authority may, at best, apply the best available information on the missing information
and cannot totally reject the ei ght-digit level transaction wise segregated imports data
submitted by the respondent which is also validated by the eight -digit level import data
available on the website of the Ministry of Commerce.
xlvi. Without prejudice, the Authority may consider average import pr ices to India of
Limestone Lumps from all sources after making appropriate adjustments. The Authority
may consider the eight -digit level transaction -wise import data of Limestone Lump duly
corroborated with the Ministry of Commerce data for the p urpose of benchmarking.
xlvii. Without prejudice, it is submitted that even if the prices from UAE to India are not
found acceptable by the Authority for benchmarking purposes o f limestone lumps, there
is no reason as to why the Authority should ignore the data f iled by t he respondent with
respect to the “relevant good” i.e., limestone lumps on which it is alleged that
countervailable subsidy has been provided by the Vietnam gove rnment.
xlviii. It may not be out of place to mention that it is clear from the disclosure sta tement dated
20.03.2026 that the Authority has no difficulty in accepting the specific import data
supplied by the exporter for limestone lumps at the 8 -digit level for t he relevant good
i.e., limestone lumps except its apprehension that such data may unde rstate th e “true
economic value” of the actual input used by the PUC producers in the absence of
“appropriate processing adjustments and verifiable evidence supporting ea ch cost
deduction” . With respect, it is submitted that the above statement is bereft o f any fac tual
substance for the following reasons:
a) Malaysia FOB export prices for products classified at the 4 -digit HS Code 2521
level, which aggregates limestone, limes tone flux and other calcareous stones used,
inter alia, for manufacture of lime or cem ent.
b) The cited FOB prices, range from about USD 28/MT to USD 5143672/MT, relate to
a broad, heterogeneous product basket that is neither identical nor even sufficiently
comparable to the material relevant to the subject goods
c) Reasons for rejecting the res pondent’s proposal to consider the eight -digit level
segregated transaction wise Indian import data of Limestone Lumps duly validated
by the eight -digit level import data available on the website of Ministry of
Commerce for determining benchmark are superf icial.
d) A comparative summary of the import data procured by the respondent from
secondary source, import data available on the website of Ministry of commerce and
trade map data filed by the applicant industry vide our submissions dated 10 March,
2026 sho ws that t he raw / unsegregated import data reported on the website of
Ministry of Commerce including limestone lump is comparable to the raw /
unsegregated import data su bmitted by the respondent. The average price of major
suppliers (countries) is also in the same range.
e) The proposed data is at the 8 -digit level as against the data proposed to be used by
the Authority which is at the 4 -digit level and includes limestone, limestone flux and
other calcareous stones used, inter alia, for manufacture of lime o r cement.
f) The data provided by the exporter has been fully corroborated by the information
available on the website of the Ministry of Commerce & Industry.
g) The Authority ’s observation that there is no “verifiable evidence in respect of
processing adjustme nts”, is completely incomprehensible as the data itself relates to
the relevant product namely, limestone lumps and, therefore, there is no question of
making any process ing adjustments whatsoever.
Four -digit level FOB export price from Malaysia of Limest one Lumps to India
claimed by the applicant industry is higher than the CIF import price from Malaysia
of Limestone Lumps to India
xlix. It may not be out of place to mention that the Authority’s proposal to take the data at the 4 -
digit level (raw / unsegregat ed import data from Trade Map) has led to an absurd
proposition wherein the proposed benchmark of FOB price from Malaysia to India is USD
43/MT while the segregated transaction wise data for the “relevant good” i.e., Limestone
Lumps at the 8 -digit level sh ows the C IF price of imports from Malysia itself as about USD
41/MT. It may be noted that the CIF import price from Malaysia of Limes tone Lumps to
India claimed by the respondent is based on eight -digit level transaction -wise segregated
import data which i s duly co rroborated with import data from Ministry of Commerce.
l. It also clearly shows that the four digit level raw / unsegregated FO B data taken from Trade
Map by the applicant industry is incorrect and cannot be relied upon as it includes
heterogen eous prod ucts.
Proposal made in the Disclosure Statement dated 20.03.2026 to consider export price from
Malaysia as an appropriate benchm ark is wrong and misplaced
li. The proposal made in the Disclosure Statement to consider Malaysian export price as
appro priate be nchmark on the ground that external benchmark most reasonably reflects
undistorted prevailing market conditions for the relevant g ood, after suitable adjustments, is
completely misplaced and erroneous. It may be noted that in plethora of investiga tions, th e
Hon’b le Authority has considered the international prices and not the prices prevailing in the
neighboring country. The list of the illustrative cases is provided below for the ease of
reference of the Authority .
Sl.
No Name of
Investigation F. No. & D ate Benchmark Considered Comment
1 Fiberboards F. No. Para 71 of FF - Export price of log International
from Indonesia,
Malaysia,
Thailand,
Vietnam and Sri
Lanka 06/17/2019 -
DGTR dated
03 May 2021 from New Zealand has been
considered as an appropriate
benchmark being the largest
exporter. prices
conside red
and n ot the
price
prevailing in
the
neighboring
country of the
subject
country 2 Atrazine
Technical from
China PR F. No.
6/19/2018 -
DGAD 22
August, 2019 Para 56 – International prices of
Cyanuric chlorid e and Caustic soda
considered as an appropriate
benchmark price.
3 Saturated Fatty F. No.
6/18/2021 -
DGTR dated
07 February
2023 Para 56 - CPKO CIF Rotterdam
prices have been considered as an
appropriate international
benchmark price. Alcoho l from
Indonesia,
Malaysia, and
Thailand
lii. The Limestone subsidy margin proposed in the disclosure statement dated 20.03.2026 based
on the misleading information filed by the applicant industry is incorrect as CaCO3
benchmark has been considere d instead of Lim estone benchmark.
liii. An Tien has submitted that the Domestic Industry has proposed a Benchmark Price both for
Limestone Lumps as well as CaCO3 which happens to be more than three times the
purchase price even though the extent of alleged subsi dization in the form of export tax is a
mere 30%. Even assuming but not accepting that the entire extent of export tax of 30% can
be considered as countervailable subsidy (which indeed would be in stark contradiction to
the established jurisprudence on the issue), the ben chmarking price of more than 300%,
woul d be ex facie absurd. Unfortunately, the disclosure statement dated 20.03.2026 seems to
have ignored this basic fact and allowed itself to be completely misled by the Domestic
Industry. This reinforces our aver ment th at even if the export tax is to be cons idered as
countervailable subsidy, the benchmarking has to be done only and only for the “relevant
good”, which in this case is Limestone Lumps and NOT CaCO3. Unfortunately, this
position has been enun ciated by the Au thority itself in paragraph 116 but not followed while
proposing the benchmark price.
62. The following submissions have been made on behalf of the domestic industry :
i. The domestic industry submit ted that limestone is the primary raw materi al used f or
manu facturing calcium carbonate (CaCO₃), which constitutes approximately 70 –85% of
the total raw material input used in the production of the PUC .
ii. It submitted that, as per the WTO Trade Policy Review of Vietnam, the Government of
Vietnam levie s export taxes o n certain products, including minerals. In this regard,
Vietnam has imposed export taxes on limestone under Decree No. 26/2023/ND -CP.
iii. Limestones are classified under HSN Code 2521 00 00, covering lim estone -based
melting agents and other cal careous s tones u sed for the manufacture of lime or cement.
The applicable export tax rates imposed by Vietnam on limestone have increased
progressively over time and are tabulated as follows:
Period Rate of Export Tax
01-01-2020 to 30 -06-2022 17%
01-07-2022 to 3 0-06-2023 20%
01-07-2023 to 30 -06-2024 25%
01-07-2024 onwards 30%
iv. The domestic industry submit ted that the imposition of increasing export taxes
discourages exports of limestone from Vietnam and restricts its availability in
international mark ets. This result s in increased domestic supply and downward pressure
on domestic prices of limestone and limes tone-derived calcium carbonate in Vietnam.
v. It is submitted that the Government of Vietnam has acknowledged that the objective of
the export tax po licy is t o regul ate exports, conserve natural resources, and improve
efficiency of downstream industries using limestone domestically. The policy
framework is aimed at limiting exports of raw and unprocessed minerals and promoting
downstream value addition within V ietnam.
vi. Through the export tax regime and associated regulatory framework, limestone is made
availabl e to domestic downstream producers, including producers of the PUC, at prices
below international levels. This constitutes provision of goods at l ess than adequat e
remuneration within the meaning of Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement and Rule
12(2)(d) of t he CVD Rules.
vii. The domestic industry note d that the Respondents have argued that financial
contribution, benefit, and specificity have not been est ablished and hav e relied on WTO
panel reports to contend that export taxes or restraints cannot amount to a fi nancial
contribution merely based on market effects. They have also challenged the benchmark
proposed by the domestic industry and proposed altern ate bench marks b ased on Indian
import prices or UAE prices with adjustments.
viii. The domestic industry submit ted that, under Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement, a
subsidy exists where a government makes a financial contribution and a benefit is
conferred. In ter ms of Art icle 1. 1(a)(1)(iv), a financial contribution may arise where a
government entrusts or directs a priva te body to carry out functions such as provision of
goods, even indirectly, where the practice does not meaningfully differ from typical
governmen t practic es.
ix. It submitted that an export tax discourages exports by increasing their cost, diverts
supply to t he domestic market, and suppresses domestic prices below international
market levels. In such circumstances, the government effectively entrusts o r directs
privat e suppliers to supply the product domestically at suppressed prices, resulting in
provision of goods at LTAR to downstream users.
x. The domestic industry submit ted that export taxes are often instruments of a broader
policy framework aimed at retainin g raw m aterials domestically, stabilizing domestic
prices, and promoting downstream value -added indus tries. In Vietnam, limestone is
subject to licensing, extraction controls, and export regulation, which collectively
influence domestic supply and pricing conditi ons.
xi. Where government policy is designed, explicitly or implicitly, to promote domestic
downst ream industries by ensuring availability of raw materials at lower or stabilized
prices, the Authority is required to examine whether such interve ntion res ults in
domestic prices that no longer reflect prevailing market conditions, as required under
Articl e 14(d).
xii. The domestic industry submit ted that the reliance placed by the Respondents on WTO
jurisprudence to argue that export taxes can never amo unt to a financi al contribution is
misplaced. WTO panels have consistently held that subsidy determinations ar e fact -
specific and depend on the design, operation, and effects of the measures concerned.
xiii. The domestic industry relie d on the Authority’s own se ttled pra ctice. In the
countervailing duty investigation concerning Digital Offset Printing Plates, the
Author ity examined export restraints on an upstream raw material and held that export
tariffs and fiscal measures discouraged exports, increased domesti c supply, suppre ssed
domestic prices, and resulted in provision of goods at LTAR to downstream industries.
xiv. In that investigation, the Authority rejected the argument that no subsidy could exist
merely because inputs were purchased from private suppliers. T he Author ity hel d that
government intervention through export tariffs and fiscal policies can distort domestic
pricing and confer a benefit, irrespective of the identity of the supplier.
xv. Similar findings were recorded by the Authority in investigations con cerning S aturate d
Fatty Alcohol and Continuous Cast Copper Wire Rods, where export restraints on
upstream raw materials were treated as countervailable subsidies.
xvi. The domestic industry submit ted that the same legal principles apply in the present
investiga tion. Vie tnam’s export tax regime on limestone is designed to retain mineral
resources domestically and promote downstream industries, thereby distorting domestic
pricing of limestone -derived ca lcium carbonate.
xvii. The objection raised by certain parties that the progr am is n ot applicable because they do
not purchase limestone lumps but instead purchase calcium carbonate powder is
misconceived.
xviii. The allegation is not limited to direct purchase of lim estone lumps but concerns
distortion of the downstream input m arket res ulting from government measures affecting
the upstream limestone market.
xix. Calcium carbonate is derived from limestone and forms a principal raw material for the
PUC. Ground calcium carbo nate (GCC) powder is produced by crushing limestone,
particula rly high -purity limestone deposits with calcium carbonate content exceeding
98%, which are widely available in Vietnam.
xx. Publicly available information from Vietnamese suppliers confirms that gro und calcium
carbonate is commercially referred to as “limeston e powder” and or iginates from
limestone deposits. Limestone and calcium carbonate powder are therefore part of the
same mineral value chain and are functionally equivalent inputs for industrial use in the
masterbatch sector.
xxi. Consequently, government measur es affect ing the availability and pricing of limestone
logically affect the domestic supply and pricing of limestone -derived calcium carbonate,
even where producers procure the processed derivat ive rather than the raw mineral.
xxii. The domestic industry submit ted that r eliance on HS classification alone is not
determinative for subsidy analysis. The relevant inquiry under the SCM Agreement and
the CVD Rules is whether government intervention results i n provision of a good at
LTAR and confers a benefit, regardles s of whet her the input is procured under one tariff
heading or another.
xxiii. The submission that calcium carbonate is derived from marble or white stone and not
limestone is technically incorrect. Fr om an industrial and geological perspective,
limestone is the primary s ource f or GCC used in masterbatch production. Marble is a
higher -value metamorphic stone and is commercially unsuitable and uneconomical for
use as a filler in polymer masterbatch appli cations.
xxiv. Limestone -derived GCC is preferred in the masterbatch industry due to its suitability for
controlled particle size, dispersion, whiteness, and compatibility with polymer matrices.
Vietnamese suppliers themselves market GCC products as limestone -derived material.
xxv. The fact that certain parties do not have faci lities to conver t limestone into calcium
carbonate powder is irrelevant. The alleged benefit accrues through the price of calcium
carbonate powder purchased in Vietnam, and the relevant inquiry is whether that price
reflects prevailing market conditions or is disto rted by government intervention in the
upstream limestone market.
xxvi. The domestic industry submit ted that specificity exists because the alleged benefit
accrues predominantly to industries using limestone or calcium carbonate as inputs,
including pro ducers of the PU C. Specificity does not require exclusive use by PUC
producers but may be established de facto based on predominant beneficiaries and
market structure.
xxvii. The domestic industry furt her submit ted that reliance placed by the Respondents on the
WTO Panel Report in EU – Biodiesel (DS618) is misplaced, as the report is under
appeal and does not represent a final or settled interpretation of WTO law. In any event,
investigating authorities are required to apply the SCM Agreement and domestic law to
the facts on reco rd and are not bound to mechanically adopt panel reasoning.
xxviii. In contrast, the Authority’s own findings in concluded investigations, including Digital
Offset Printing Plates and Sa turated Fatty Alcohol, constitute settled domestic practice
and are dir ectly r elevant to the present case.
xxix. The domestic industry submitted that domestic prices in Vietnam cannot be treated as an
appropriate benchmark for determining adequacy of remuneratio n, as such prices are
distorted by government intervention. In circumst ances w here in -country prices are
distorted, WTO law permits the use of an external benchmark.
xxx. For this purpose, the domestic industry submitted that the FOB export prices of
limestone or calcium carbonate from Malaysia constitute an appropriate b enchmark.
Malays ia is a major supplier of comparable material in the same region, has similar
geological limestone deposits, and operates under market -oriented conditions without
compa rable export restraints.
xxxi. The benefit under the program should therefore be calcul ated as the difference between
the benchmark price and the price at which limestone or calcium carbonate is procured
or captively consumed by Vietnamese producers of the PUC d uring the POI.
xxxii. The domestic industry submit ted that the benchmark propos ed by the other parties based
on UAE prices is flawed because CaCO₃ production in the UAE is largely based on
marble waste rather than sedimentary limestone, resulting in a fundamentally different
cost structure and market dynamics.
xxxiii. Malaysia, by contrast, has sedim entary limestone deposits comparable to Vietnam,
produces high -purity calcium carbonate from limestone, operates under market -oriented
conditions, and is a major ex porter of CaCO₃ to global markets, including India
particularly used by the masterb atch indu stry. Export prices from Malaysia therefore
reflect undistorted market conditions and are suitable for benchmarking.
xxxiv. The selection of Malaysia is the appropriate re ference country, taking into account
similarity of raw material, product characteri stics, pr ocessin g stage, availability of data,
and absence of comparable export restraints .
xxxv. The claim that the alleged program is “not applicable” to certain producers is pr emature
and cannot be accepted without examination of questionnaire responses, veri fication of
input sourcing, pricing, and assessment of whether domestic prices reflect distorted
market conditions.
The Authority has examined the submissions below :
Financial Contribution
63. The Authority notes that the Government of Vietnam has imposed e xport tax es on
limestone under Decree No. 26/2023/ND -CP with rates progressively increasing and
reaching 30% during the POI. Limestone is a natural mineral resource, ex traction and
export of which in Vietnam is subject to licensing, regulatory oversight, a nd fiscal contro l
by the Government.
64. The Authority notes that limestone constitutes the principal upstream raw material for the
production of calcium carbonate (CaCO₃) , which in turn accounts for a substantial
proportion of the raw material consumption in the manu facture of the PUC . The
Authority further notes that the export tax is expressly designed to discourage exports of
raw limestone and retain the mineral within Vietnam.
65. The Authority has examined whether such export tax measures, viewed in isolati on or in
conjunc tion with the broader regulatory framework governing mineral resources, can
constitute a financial contribution within the meaning of Section 9 of the Customs Tariff
Act, 1975 read with Rule 12 of the CVD Rules and Article 1.1(a) of the SCM Agreemen t.
66. While the Authority notes the submissions of the Government of Vietnam and certain
exporters that an export tax is a regulatory measure and does not i nvolve a direct transfer
of funds or direct provision of goods, the Authority considers that Article 1 .1(a)(1 )(iv) of
the SCM Agreement recognizes that a financial contribution may also exist where the
government, through a set of measures, effectively cau ses private bodies to perform
functions that would normally be vested in the government, incl uding pro vision of goods,
where such conduct does not meaningfully differ from normal government practice.
67. In the present case, the Authority notes that limestone is a state -controlled natural
resource and that the export tax regime operates in a manner t hat restr icts ex ports, alters
supply conditions, and materially influences domestic availability and pricing of
limestone and limestone -derived inputs. The Authori ty further notes that the Government
of Vietnam, in its responses, has acknowledged that the policy ob jective of the export tax
is to regulate exports of limestone and improve efficiency of downstream industries.
68. The Authority considers that such regulato ry and fiscal measures, when examined
cumulatively, constitute affirmative government action that alte rs the conditions under
which limestone is supplied in the domestic market. The resulting domestic supply
conditions are not the outcome of free market fo rces alone but are shaped by government
intervention in the form of export taxation and miner al policy .
69. Export restraints such as export taxes constitute a financial contribution within the
meaning of Section 9(1) of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 because t hey are an indirect
transfer of funds. This position has been affirmed by the Authority in in vestigati ons
concerning various products such as “Saturated Fatty Alcohol” from Indonesia, Malaysia
and Thailand and “Continuous Cast Copper Wire Rods” from Indone sia, Malaysia,
Thailand and Vietnam, “Digital Offset Printing Plates” (DOPP) originating in o r exporte d
from China PR and Taiwan.
70. With regard to the argument that purchase are made from private suppliers, and not from
the government, the Authority notes that the Government of Vietnam exercises its
authority over private bodies through its regulat ory mecha nism sp ecifically, the export
restraints imposed by the GOV, such as the 30% export tariff, to compel them to provide
limestone to the downstream industries at a cheaper price. By artificially suppressing
domestic prices for limestone, these measu res signi ficantl y distort the limeston e market in
Vietnam and provide s downstream manufacturers of PUC with limestone at LTAR.
Consequently, even private suppliers benefit from these state -backed measures.
71. In view of the above, the Authority conclude s that the exp ort tax and regulatory
framew ork governing limestone in Vietnam constitute a financial contribution by the
Government of Vietnam within the meaning of Section 9 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975
read with Rule 12 of the CVD Rules and Article 1.1(a)( 1)(iv) of the SC M Agreement, as
the Go vernment, through its measures, effectively influences the provision of a key raw
material to downstream industries in the domestic market.
Benefit
72. The Authority notes that, in terms of Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Agre ement and Rule 1 2 of
the CVD Rules, a subsidy exists only if a financial contribution confers a benefit on the
recipient. Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement provides that, where goods are provided
by the government or through its intervention, the adequacy of remun eration shall be
determined i n relation to prevailing market conditions in the country of provision.
73. The Authority has examined whether the financial contribution identified above has
resulted in limestone or limestone -derived CaCO₃ being made av ailable t o produ cers of
the PUC at remuneration below what would prevail under undistorted market conditions.
74. The Authority notes the domestic industry’s contention that the export tax discourages
exports of limestone, increases domestic availability, and suppress es dome stic prices of
limestone and CaCO₃ below international levels. The Authority also notes the exp orters’
submissions that certain producers purchase CaCO₃ powder from private suppliers, that
HS codes differ, and that no direct government pric e control exists .
75. The Authority considers that the relevant inquiry under Article 14(d) is not limited to
whet her the government directly supplies goods, but whether the price paid for the
relevant input reflects prevailing market conditions. The Authorit y further consid ers that
purchasing inputs from private suppliers does not preclude the finding of benefit wher e
domestic prices are themselves distorted due to government intervention upstream.
76. The Authority notes that CaCO₃ used in the manufacture of th e PUC is also commercially
referred to as “limestone powder” industrially derived from limestone and that the
limestone and CaCO₃ markets are economically integrated . The Authority further notes
that distinctions based solely on HS classification do not ne gate the upstrea m-downstream
linkage for purposes of benefit analysis under the SCM Agreement.
77. The Authority f inds that the export tax regime, by restricting exports of limestone, alters
normal supply -demand equilibrium and results in domestic prices that do not r eflect
undistorted market conditions. Consequently, downstream producers using limestone -
derived CaCO₃ obtain access to this input at prices lower than would prevail absent the
government intervention.
78. In view of the above, the Authority conclude s that th e finan cial contribution by the
Government of Vietnam confers a benefit on producers of the PUC , as li mestone -derived
inputs are made available at less than adequate remuneration within the meaning of
Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement and Rule 12 (2)(d) of the CV D Rules.
Specificity
79. The Authority notes that, in terms of Article 2 of the SCM Agreement and Section 9 of
the Customs Tariff Act, a subsidy is countervailable only if it is specific, either de jure or
de facto, to an enterprise, industry , or grou p of en terprises or industries .
80. The Authority has examined the exporters’ submissions that limestone is used across
multiple industries and therefore the measure lacks specificity. The Authority notes that
specificity does not require that the go ods be us ed excl usively by the subject industry, but
requires examination of whether the benefit accrues predominantly to certain industries or
is limited in practice.
81. The Authority notes that limestone and limestone -derived CaCO₃ are critical inputs for a
defined group of downstream industrie s, including masterbatch producers. The Authority
further notes that the policy objective of Vietnam’s export tax regime is to retain mineral
resources domestically and promote downstream value addition, which inheren tly favou rs
industries consuming limest one/CaCo3 as a key input.
82. The Authority considers that industries not dependent on limestone /CaCo3 do not derive
any benefit from the export tax regime, whereas industries using limestone /limestone
derived inputs dir ectly ben efit fr om increased domestic availability and suppressed prices.
The benefit is therefore limited in practice to a group of indus tries that use limestone and
CaCO₃ as principal raw materials.
83. In view of the above, the Authority conclude s that the subsidy arising from the provision
of limestone at LTAR is specific, to industries using limestone -derived inputs, including
producers of the PUC , within the meaning of Article 2 of the SCM Agreement and
Section 9 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975.
Benchma rk
84. The A uthorit y notes that, for determining benefit under Article 14(d) of the SCM
Agreement and Rule 12(2)(d) of the CVD Rules, the adequacy of remuneration must be
assessed in relation to prevailing market conditions for the good s in question i n the
country of provisi on. The Authority further notes that where in -country prices are
distorted due to government intervention, an external benchmark may be used, subject to
appropriate adjustments to ensure comparability.
85. In the present case, the dome stic ind ustry has submit ted that domestic prices of limestone
and limestone -derived calcium carbonate in Vietnam are not appropriate benchmarks, as
the export tax regime on limestone discourages exports and alters domestic demand -
supply equilibrium. The do mestic i ndustry h as ther efore proposed an external benchmark
based on FOB export prices of CaCO₃ from Malaysia, asserting that Malaysia is a
proximate, comparable supplier within the same region and that its prices reflect
undistorted market conditions.
86. The Autho rity note s the s ubmissions of the producers/exporters and certain other
interested parties opposing the domestic industry’s proposed benchmark on grounds that
the export tax applies only to limestone, not to CaCO₃ powder; that Malaysia data at the
4‑digit HS level mixes d ifferent stone products, reducing comparability; that Malaysian
price data contains extreme outliers; and that the domestic industry has not actually
shown distortion in Vietnam’s domestic prices. They also propose an alternative
benchmark based on Indian import prices of limestone lumps (mainly from the UAE),
adjusted to derive an FOB price.
87. The Authority has examined the submissions made by all parties and finds that the
benchmark exercise must be undertaken by identifying:
i. the relevant “ good” who se remu neration is to be assessed under Article 14(d);
ii. whether domestic prices for that good in Vietnam reflect prevailing market conditions;
and
iii. if not, which external benchmark most reasonably reflects undistorted prevailing market
conditions f or the re levant good, after suitable adjustments.
88. Although the program is described as “supply of limestone at LTAR,” the Authority
recognizes that the downstream manufacturing of the subject product uses CaCO₃
powder, which is itself produced fro m limesto ne or sim ilar ca lcareous feedstock.
89. The Authority also notes that Vietnam’s export tax on limestone is substantial and
increasing, and aims to regulate exports and promote downstream processing. Based on
that, the Authority finds it reasonable to treat V ietnamese domest ic prices for
limestone‑derived inputs with caution and to consider external benchmarks.
90. The Authority evaluates the domestic industry’s proposed Malaysian benchmark, noting
Malaysia’s role as a regional supplier of c omparable high‑purity CaCO₃ having hi ghest
exports to India during the POI . Further, the domestic industry is also procuring CaCO3
from Mal aysia for producing PUC.
91. The Authority observes that most of the participating exporters purchase CaCO ₃ powder
directly rather than limes tone lump s, ther efore, the benchmark must assess whether the
remuneration for CaCO₃ powder is adequate.
92. The Authority observes that the HS chapter difference of limestone and calcium
carbonate reflects nomenclature or p rocessing levels, but does not alte r the che mical
identity (CaCO₃) or subsidy analysis. It also examines the exporters’ proposed benchmark
based on Indian import prices of limestone lumps from UAE . It is noted that t he calcium
carbonate used for PUC produc tion requires high-purity limestone , with fi ner par ticle size
with calcium carbonate content exceeding 9 8%. The Authority observes that the import of
limestone from UAE is primarily used by the steel industry and cement industry and not
by the PUC producer s. Further, t he exporters’ benchmar k focuses solely on limestone
lumps but does not account for the additional processing required to convert lumps into
CaCO₃ powder. Without appropriate processing adjustments and verifiable evidence
supporting each cost d eduction, the exporters’ benchmark may under state t he true
economic value of the actual input used by PUC producers .
93. The Authority therefore considers that a benchmark approach that relies on a comparat ive
market with active exports of CaCO₃ / limestone -derived industrial inputs specifica lly for
producti on of PUC , and that enables conversion to a comparable price basis, is more
suitable for Article 14(d) purposes.
94. The Authority has taken into considering the following submissions made by the
interested parties regarding reliability of the benchmar k data (trade map) submitted by the
applicants:
a) Malaysia FOB export prices proposed as benchmark by the applicants is classified at
the 4 -digit HS Code level, which includes other heterogeneous product s.
b) The FOB prices proposed by the appl icants ra nge from abou t USD 28/MT to USD
5143672/MT, substantiates that the data includes a broad, heterogeneous product
basket that is neither identical nor even sufficiently comparable to the material
relevant to th e subject goods .
c) A comparative summary of the im port data pro cured by the interested parties at eight -
digit level from secondary source, import data available on the website of Ministry of
commerce and trade map data filed by the applicant industry shows t hat the raw /
unsegregated import data reported on the websit e of Ministry of Commerce including
limestone lump and CaCO 3 is comparable to the raw / unsegregated import data
submitted by the respondent. The average price of major suppliers (countries) is a lso
in the same range.
d) The data propose d by the interested pa rties is at the 8 -digit level as against the data
initially proposed by the applicants which was at the 4 -digit level and include d
limestone, limestone flux and other calcareous stones used, inter alia, for manufacture
of lime or ceme nt.
e) Subs equently, t he applicant submitted the 8 digit level data of HSN Code 28365000
pertaining to import of Calcium Carbonate from Malaysia to India , on CIF basis,
extracted from the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. The necessary appropriate
adjustme nts have been made in this to arrive at the benchmark rate on FOB basis.
f) The data provi ded by the domestic industry and interested parties pertaining to
CaCO 3 has been fully corroborated by the information available on the website of the
Ministry of Commer ce & Indu stry.
95. Accordingly, the Autho rity initially proposed to adopt the Malaysi an export price of
CaCO₃ to India on FoB basis as appropriate benchmark under Article 14(d) based on
eight -digit level data available on the website of Ministry of Commerce and the resulting
benefit has been quantified for the responding exporters on the basis of verified
information.
96. However, in view of the post disclosure comments, wherein the other interested parties
requested to adopt the import prices from Egypt into Indi a as an a ppropriate ex ternal
benchmark due to the large quantum of imports from Eg ypt to India and on the other
hand, the emphasis of domestic industry to consider only Malaysian import prices into
India as an appropriate benchmark, the Authority specifica lly exami ned these com peting
claims regarding consideration of external benchmark. The participating producers /
exporters relied on Egypt's substantial production and exports, its significant share in
Indian imports, the domestic industry's own procuremen t from Eg ypt and the c ommercial
relevance of Egyptian prices. The domestic industr y relied on the product -specific and
reconcilable Malaysian data under tariff item 28365000. Upon reconsideration, the
Authority found that both countries supplied relevant c alcium ca rbonate to In dia during
the POI and that neither source should be discard ed merely because the other had a larger
volume or more detailed transaction data.
97. The Authority has re -examined the benchmark for calcium carbonate strictly in
accordance w ith Rule 12(2)(d), Ann exure IV and Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement,
which requi re adequacy of remuneration to be assessed against prevailing market
conditions, including price, quality, availability, marketability, transportation and other
conditions of sale. Be nchmark selec tion is therefore not governed by the lowest price, the
nearest source, the largest supplier or the outcome most favourable to either side. The
controlling test is whether the benchmark is reliable, representative, comparable and
capable of me asuring the b enefit on a like -for-like basis
98. Egypt represented the mater ially larger import volume into India of CaCO 3 and its use by
the domestic industry confirmed commercial availability for industrial use. Malaysia,
however, offered a more de tailed pr oduct -specifi c transaction data and useful evidence on
descriptions, pric e dispersion and shipment conditions. The Authority has, therefore,
considered the weighted average CIF prices of both the sources duly adjusted to FOB
level, that is, import prices o f Egypt as we ll as Malaysia to India as extracted from
website of Ministr y of Commerce & Industry, as an appropriate external benchmark, for
the purpose of programme no. 1. The Authority has relied on actual 8 digit level HSN
code imports into Ind ia from E gypt and Mala ysia in POI at CIF level, as extracted from
website of Minis try of Commerce & Industry, which has been duly adjusted to FOB level.
99. The benchmark has been calculated by weighting each country’s adjusted price by its
corresponding eli gible imp ort quantity. This methodology is not an equitable compromise
between com peting claims; it is the most representative and legally defensible measure of
prevailing market remuneration available on the record. It recognises Egypt’s greater
commercia l presenc e, preserves the reliability of the Malaysian product -specific data,
minimises source -specific distortion and provides a balanced, objective and robust basis
for the final recipient -specific benefit and subsidy margin calculations. Objections
conc erning gr ade, particle size, purity, coating, whiteness, processing route, end use and
tariff classification were duly examined for both countries.
100. It is noted that Malaysian CIF prices have been converted to a FOB -equivalent basis by
deducting verified f reight an d insurance p rices based on the contemporaneous, route -
specific and produ ct-relevant documentary evidence provided by the domestic industry ,
whereas the Egyptian CIF prices have been converted to a FOB -equivalent basis by
deducting verified freig ht and in surance price s based on the contemporaneous, route -
specific and product -relevant documentary evidence provided by the respondents or
producer -exporters. This ensures that the benchmark reflects the value of the input itself
and is not distorted by differen ces in produc t characteristics, shipment terms or level of
trade.
101. The co mposite benchmark is considered more objective and representative than exclusive
use of either country. Exclusive reliance on Egypt would disregard the detailed Malaysian
transaction evidence, whi le exclusive reliance on Malaysia would understate the
signi ficance of the larger volume of comparable imports from Egypt. The combined
series, after harmonisation of product scope and commercial terms, better reflects
prevailing mar ket condi tions.
102. The le gal basis of this methodology is representativeness, compara bility and prevailing
market conditions under Rule 12 and Article 14(d). Although it incidentally balances the
competing concerns of exporters and the domestic industry, it is adopte d because it
provides a broader and more reliable external market referenc e-based benchmark.
103. The weighted benchmark is applied only to producers that purchased or consumed
calcium carbonate during the POI. It is compared with each cooperating pro ducer's
verified purcha se price on a like -for-like basis, with adjustments for frei ght, insurance,
port handling, trading level and other conditions of purchase. The company -specific
benefit calculations are contained in the confidential calculation sheets .
104. Specif icity was conf irmed because the identified mineral -input framework benefit s a
limited group of downstream enterprises dependent on the affected limestone and
limestone -derived input. The fact that these minerals may have other uses does not negate
specific ity where the design and operation of the programme and the benefit to
investigated producers are established.
105. Accordingly, Program 1 remains countervailable. For calcium -carbonate purchases, the
final producer -specific subsidy calculations shall use the quantity -weigh ted average of
adjusted comparable POI import prices from Egypt and Malaysia. Consequential
revisions shall be made to the subsidy margins.
Subsidy Margin
106. In accordance with Rule 12 of the CVD Rules, the Autho rity has quantified the benefit as
the dif ference between the benchmark price determined above and the price at which
CaCO₃ was pur chased by the respond ing export ers du ring the POI.
107. Based on verified questionnaire responses submitted by the exporters, information
provided by t he Govern ment of Vietna m through TRAV, and benchmark data placed on
record by the domestic industry, the Authority has calculated the subsidy amount
attributable to this program for each responding exporter, which has been included in the
net countervailab le subsid y margin.
Program 12 - Supply of Natural Gas / Electricity / Coal for Power Consumption at
LTAR
108. The other interested parties have made the following submissions with respect to this :
i. The other interested parties submitted that the petition alle ges that natural gas, e lectricity
and coal are provided by the Vietnamese authorities at less than adequate remuneration,
on the premise that government -set prices are lower than international market prices,
thereby conferring a financial benefit on recipi ent enter prises. The parties categorically
denied having received any such benefit.
ii. It was submitted that the producers in Vietnam do not use natural gas or coal for power
generation or for their manufacturing operations. Accordingly, the allegation relati ng to
provision of natu ral gas or coal at LTAR is stated to be factually incorrect and not
applicable to them.
iii. With respect to electricity, the parties submitted that electricity is procured through
private commercial arrangements and not supplied by the G overnment of Vietnam. T hey
stated that electricity is purchased from private entities pursuant to duly executed
agreements, and that monthly electricity bills evidencing such purchases have been
submitted to the Authority.
iv. The parties further submitted tha t utiliti es such as wat er are purchased from the private
entities on commercial terms. On this basis, it was contended that electricity and utilities
are sourced through private contracts rather than through any government program
alleged.
v. The parties contended tha t electricity prices in Vietnam are not distorted and reflect
prevailing market conditions. They reiterated, to the extent applicable, their su bmissions
made in relation to the allegation of limestone being provided at LTAR, and submitted
that reg ulation o f prices does not, by itself, render a measure actionable under the SCM
Agreement or the CVD Rules.
vi. The parties relied on the findings of the A ustralian Anti -Dumping Commission in the
anti-subsidy investigation concerning imports of Aluminium Zinc Coated S teel from
Vietnam. They submitted that the Commission, after examining electricity pricing in
Vietnam with reference to World Bank data, conclu ded that there were no significant
cost distortions in the Vietnamese electricity market and that electr icity pri ces in
Vietnam were comparable to, or higher than, prices in several other countries.
vii. The parties emphasized that, although the Government of V ietnam regulates electricity
pricing and prescribes different tariff categories such as manufacturing,
administra tive/governmen tal, trading and household, all entities within each category are
charged uniform and publicly notified rates. They submitted tha t such categorization is
common across jurisdictions, including India, and does not imply targeted benef it,
prefe rential treatm ent or specificity.
viii. It was further submitted that the petitioner has failed to place any enterprise -specific or
industry -specific evidence on record to show that the respondents received electricity,
natural gas or coal at prices dif ferent fr om those paid by other industrial consumers in
Vietnam, or that any preferential tariff, rebate, discount or financial advantage was
extended t o them.
ix. The parties argued that government regulation of utilities does not automatically imply
LTAR or subsidiza tion. They sub mitted that electricity and gas sectors are regulated
worldwide due to their public utility character, and that regulation for grid stability,
safety and consumer protection does not establish that prices are lower than market
benchm arks or t hat a subsidy exists.
x. The parties disputed the petitioner’s reliance on earlier DGTR findings, including the
Fiberboards inves tigation, and submitted that such reliance is misplaced. They
contended that those findings were based on the specific fa ctual rec ord in those
investigations, whereas in the present case complete tariff schedules, invoices, bills and
government notificatio ns have been provided, leaving no basis for presuming distortion.
xi. The parties also challenged the benchmarks proposed by the petit ioner, includi ng
reliance on Global Petrol Prices or prices prevailing in Malaysia, on the ground that such
sources reflect re tail or consumer -level prices, do not represent industrial tariffs, and do
not account for country -specific factors such as fuel m ix, transmissi on and distribution
costs, subsidy frameworks and climatic conditions.
xii. In relation to natural gas, the parties reiterated that they do not use natural gas in their
manufacturing process. They submitted that the allegation regarding u se of nat ural gas is
speculative and unsupported by any documentary or technical evidence on record.
xiii. The parties submitted that oversig ht by the Ministry of Industry and Trade under Decree
87/2018 relates to safety, licensing and technical standards, and n ot to pri ce fixation.
They contended that natural gas prices in Vietnam are determined by commercial
suppliers and fluctuate based on i nternational benchmarks such as PLATTS, CP or FOB
prices.
xiv. The parties further submitted that where natural gas is purchas ed, it is procured from
private suppliers under arm’s -length commercial contracts with price variation clauses,
and that invoices and p ayment records demonstrate that no concession, subsidy or
LTAR exists.
xv. It was also submitted that even assuming, without admitting , that electri city or gas were
supplied at a different price, the allegation would still fail for lack of specificity.
Accordi ng to the respondents, tariffs apply uniformly to all industrial users in Vietnam,
with no enterprise -specific, sector -specific, r egional or con ditional preference, thereby
failing the requirements of specificity under Article 2 of the SCM Agreement.
xvi. The G OV submits that government involvement in a market does not automatically
establish price distortion and that the DGTR ha s not dem onstrated why in-country prices
could not serve as appropriate benchmarks. The GOV further submits that the DGTR
has not suffi ciently demonstrated that the selected external benchmarks appropriately
reflect prevailing market conditions in Viet Nam through adjustments re lating to quality,
transportation, availability, and other conditions of sale.
xvii. European Plastic Joint Stock Comp any, Polyfill Joint Stock Company, Nghe An
European Plastic One Member Limited Liability Company and Yen Bai European
Plastic Join t Stock Compan y submitted that they have not received benefit under this
program. The reliance on Malaysian electricity prices is legally untenable, as domestic
prices in Vietnam must be used in the absence of proven distortion.
xviii. VMI submitted that electric ity was procur ed from private suppliers at market -
determined commercial rates and not from government -owned utilities. VMI arg ued that
the Authority improperly presumed distortion in Vietnam’s electricity market without
conducting a company -specif ic analys is of VMI’s ve rified electricity contracts and
invoices. VMI also challenged the use of Malaysian electricity prices from Glob al Petrol
Prices as a benchmark, asserting that Malaysia’s energy market structure, subsidy
regime, and consumer tariff d ata were not comparable to Vietnam’s industrial electricity
market conditions .
xix. Vitaplas Joint Stock Company submits that it purchases electricity from private
commercial entities pursuant to duly executed electricity supply agreements, that the
electricity tariffs paid by Vitapl as are determined in accordance with publicly notified
tariff sc hedules applicable to all industrial consumers in Vietnam, and that there is no
evidence that Vitaplas has received electricity at preferential rates, concessional terms ,
or belo w-market price s.
xx. Electricity is a public utility service characterized by natu ral monopoly features in
transmission and distribution networks. Virtually all countries, including India, regulate
electricity tariffs to ensure grid stability, prevent abuse of monopoly powe r, protect
consumer interests, ensure cost recovery for utilitie s, and promote efficient resource
allocation. Such regulation is a normal and necessary function of government and does
not, by itself, constitute a financial contributi on or con fer a benefit within the meaning
of the SCM Agreement.
xxi. ADC procures electricit y and other utilities from independent suppliers under
commercial arrangements. Such procurement is undertaken on an arm’s -length basis and
at prevailing market prices, without a ny involvement of the Government of Vietnam in
the provision of such utilities . The Authority has not identified any instance where the
Government of Vietnam has directly or indirectly provided electricity, natural gas, coal,
or any other utility to the Re spondent. In t he absence of such evidence, the essential
requirement of a fina ncial contribution under Article 1.1(a) of the SCM Agreement is
not satisfied.
xxii. The Respondent further submits that the mere existence of regulatory oversight or state
participati on in the ener gy sector does not imply that all utilities supplied within the
economy are provided by the government or at subsidised rates. The Authority is
required to establish a direct nexus between the government and the provision of the
good s to the Respondent, wh ich has not been done.
xxiii. The respondent has not availed any LTAR b enefit on electricity prices. The proposal
made in the disclosure statement dated 20.03.2026, that “The Authority finds, on the
basis of the regulatory/tariff -setting fr amework p laced on recor d and the role of the
Government of Vietnam through MOIT, that t here exists a financial contribution in
respect of provision of electricity within the meaning of the SCM Agreement and the
CVD Rules.” is completely wrong, misleading, and hence , denied. It i s submitted that no
evidence has been placed on record that Gove rnment of Vietnam has provided any
benefit to the manufacturers in any of the following forms:
(i) direct transfer of funds to the manufacturers of the subject goods;
(ii) rev enue foregone or not collected i.e., electricity charges waived fully or partly;
xxiv. The Authority has consistently analysed whether any rebate / discount / exemption on
electricity tariff is provided by the respective government to the manufacturer s of the
subject goods vis-à-vis normal rates. If yes, the same has been considered as subsidy to
the extent of rebate/discount/exemption provided to the manufacturers of the subject
goods.
xxv. The Authority has not found LTAR on Electricity in the recent inv estigatio ns. They have
submitted that Authority may cross -check this claim from the recent findings.
Illustrative list of the investigations is provided below for the ready reference of the
Authority:
a) Welded Stainless -Steel Pipes and Tubes originating in or export ed from China PR and
Vietnam [F. No. 7/23/2023 -DGTR dated 15 June, 2024] Welded
b) Welded Stainless Steel Pipes and Tubes originating in or exported from China PR and
Vietnam [F.No. 6/22/2018 -DGAD dated 31 July, 2019]
c) Textured Tempered Glass originat ing in or exported from Vietnam [F. No. 6/32/2023 -
DGTR dated 11 February, 2025]
xxvi. Curiously, in this investigation an incomparable benchmark has been considered based
on the misleading submissions of the domestic industry to prove a non -existent case of
subsidizatio n. It may be noted that the policy of the Government remains the same. In
such a case, the respondent is not able to understand the reason for the adoption of an
unprecedented methodology in this investigation.
xxvii. The allegations of the Applicant a lso stand s un substantia ted and invalidated by the
determination of the Australian Anti -dumping Commission wherein the commission, in
Anti-subsidy investigation against imports of Aluminium Zinc Coated Steel of a Width
Equal to or Greater Than 600 Millimetr es from V ietnam found t he absence of cost
distortions in the Vietnamese electricity market. The Australian Commission has noted
as follows:
a) Vietnam different rates apply to different sectors and are dependent on voltage;
b) World Bank electricity price adequ ately ref lects electric ity prices in Vietnam and
aligns with the data the GOV provided.
c) The electricity prices in the Korea, Malaysia and Taiwan are all cheaper than
Vietnam.
xxviii. With regard to specificity, it is noted in the Disclosure Statement dated 20.03 .2026 that
the scheme i s specific since retail tariff is set for different categories, including
manufacturing, administrative/non -business, business and households. Such
differentiation indicates that the tariff mechanism is not uniformly appl icable acros s all
users, but is adm inistered through defined user categories, including
industrial/manufacturing users that consume electricity as an input for production. It is
submitted that the proposal made regarding specificity is completely wrong as tariff is
always diff erent based on the factors mentioned above. This practice is being followed
around the globe including India. The tariff is applicable to all enterprises and is not
specific to any particular enterprise.
109. The domestic industry has mad e the follow ing submi ssions with re spect to this :
i. The domestic industry submitted that energy prices in Vietnam, including electricity, natural
gas and coal, are set or regulated by government authorities and do not reflect market -
determined conditions. I t was s ubmitted that such administe red pricing results in distortion
of energy prices in Vietnam.
ii. According to the domestic industry, the provision of electricity, natural gas and coal at
administered prices constitutes provision of goods at less than adeq uate re muneratio n within
the meanin g of Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement and the CVD Rules. The difference
between the government -set prices and international market prices represents a financial
benefit conferred on recipient enterprises.
iii. It was further submit ted that the provision of el ectricity, natural gas and coal for power
consumption at LTAR by Vietnamese authorities constitutes a countervailable subsidy. The
domestic industry submitted that the Government of Vietnam exercises direct control over
these se ctors thr ough the Ministry o f Industry and Trade (“MOIT”), which demonstrates
that the program is specific and actionable.
iv. The domestic industry submitted that the benchmark for assessing adequacy of
remuneration cannot be domestic Vietnamese prices , as th ese are d istorted due to
government intervention. It proposed that energy prices from a comparable external market,
such as Malaysia, be used as an appropriate benchmark, based on publicly available data.
The benefit, according to the domestic indus try, sh ould be c alculated as the di fference
between such benchmark prices and the prices actually paid by producers of the PUC in
Vietnam.
v. With respect to electricity, the domestic industry submitted that MOIT sets the electricity
retail tariffs within pre scribed price fr ames for four categ ories of users, namely (i)
manufacturing sectors, (ii) administrative and non -business sectors, (iii) business sectors,
and (iv) households.
vi. The domestic industry relied on the Authority’s findings in the anti -subsidy inv estigat ion
conce rning imports of Fi berboards from Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam and Sri
Lanka, wherein the Authority held that electricity rates in Vietnam were distorted and not
reflective of market forces due to government control.
vii. In the Fiberboards i nvestigat ion, the Authority had relied on ‘Global Petrol Prices’ as a
benchmark source on the basis that it publishes a wide range of reliable and up -to-date
information on retail energy prices across countries. The domestic industry su bmitted that
this es tablished practice supports the conclusion that Vietnamese electricity prices are
distorted.
viii. On this basis, the domestic industry proposed adoption of electricity prices from another
ASEAN country, namely Malaysia, as an appropriate ext ernal benchmark. The Malaysia n
electricity price s, as extracted from ‘Global Petrol Prices’, were placed on record, and the
Authority was requested to compare the actual electricity tariffs paid by responding
Vietnamese producers with this benchmark to det ermine the subsidy m argin.
ix. In response to the parties’ denial of LTAR, the domestic industry submitted that such
denials are incorrect, selective and misleading. It reiterated that electricity pricing in
Vietnam is administered, regulated and controlled by the Government of V ietnam an d
therefore does no t reflect prevailing market conditions as required under Article 14(d) of the
SCM Agreement.
x. The domestic industry further submitted that reliance by parties on findings of the
Australian Anti-Dumping Commission is misplaced, as determin ations by foreign
authorities are not binding on this Authority and are based on different periods, facts and
evidentiary records.
xi. The domestic industry pointed out that even the extracts relied upon by the respondents
acknowledge that electricity prices i n Vietnam are fixed sector -wise by the government and
applied uniformly, rather than being determined through competitive market forces. It was
submitted that such administered pricing itself warrants scruti ny under Article 14(d).
xii. The domestic ind ustry sub mitted that its ben chmark submissions demonstrate systematic
suppression of electricity tariffs in Vietnam through tariff caps and policy intervention by
state-owned or state -controlled entities. Accordingly , it denied the parties ’ claim that no
LTAR exist s in respect of ele ctricity and requested the Authority to assess electricity pricing
based on objective external benchmarks already proposed.
xiii. With respect to natural gas, the domestic industry submitted tha t under Decree No.
87/2018/ND -CP, MOIT h as been d esignated as the ad ministrative authority for the
petroleum sector and oversees all business activities relating to LPG, LNG and CNG. The
relevant Decree was placed on record.
xiv. The domestic industry submitted that such regulatory oversight demonstr ates dire ct
government contr ol over the natural gas sector in Vietnam, resulting in distortion of natural
gas prices. It was contended that these prices therefore do not reflect market -determined
conditions.
xv. Reliance was placed on the Authority’s findings in the an ti-subsidy investig ation concerning
imports of Copper Tubes and Pipes from Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam, wherein the
Authority held that natural gas prices in Vietnam were distorted due to government contr ol
and were not reflective of market for ces.
xvi. In that investigation, the Authority had relied on ‘Global Petrol Prices’ as a benchmark
source for natural gas prices. The domestic industry submitted that this constitutes a well -
established practice of the Au thority in circumstances where domestic prices ar e distorted.
xvii. Accord ingly, the domestic industry proposed adoption of natural gas prices from Malaysia,
as extracted from ‘Global Petrol Prices’, as the appropriate benchmark. The relevant
Malaysian natural g as price data was placed on record, and the Autho rity was requested to
compare these benchmark prices with the prices paid by Vietnamese producers to determine
the subsidy margin.
110. The Authority has examined the submissions below:
A.1 Financial Contribution & Benefi t
111. The Authority notes that the a llegation under this concern s the provision of energy inputs,
namely electricity, natural gas and coal, for power consumption in Vietnam at
administered or regulated prices. However, based on the questionnaire
response/additional questionnaire response pla ced on re cord by the produce rs/exporters,
the Authority notes that the users/consumers including the producers of the PUC have
consumed electricity at less than adequate remuneration.
112. The Authority has examined the material on record regarding the structu re of the
electricity sector s in Vietnam and the role of the Government of Vietnam, including
through the Ministry of Industry and Trade (“MOIT”), in tariff sett ing and oversight.
113. The Authority finds, on the basis of the regulatory/tariff -setting framewo rk placed on
record and the role of the Government of Vietnam through MOIT, that there exists a
financial contribution in respect of provision of electricity wit hin the meaning of the SCM
Agreement and the CVD Rules.
Specificity
114. The Autho rity has examined the structure of the electricity tariff regime placed on record,
wherein the retail tariff is set for different categories, including manu facturing,
administrative/non-busin ess, busin ess and hous eholds. However, the same is unifo rmly
applicable across all users w ithin each us er categories. The applicants have failed to
provide evidence to demonstrate that electricity is provided only to the manufactures of
PUC at a rate lower than the normal rates.
115. Therefore, the Authority notes that this program is not specific . Further, this is also
corroborated by the fact that the Authority has also not found LTAR on Electricity in
Vietnam in the following investigations conducted by the Authority .
a) Textured Tempered Glass originating in or exported from Vietnam [F. No. 6/32/ 2023 -DGTR
dated 11 February, 2025]
b) Welded Stainless -Steel Pipes and Tubes originating in or exported from China PR and Vietnam
[F. No. 7/23/2023 -DGTR dated 15 June, 2024] Welded
c) Welded Stainless Steel Pipes and Tubes originating in or exported fro m China P R and Vietnam
[F. No. 6/22/2018 -DGAD dated 31 July, 2019]
116. Accordingly , the Authority has not examine d the countervaila bility of this particular
program.
Program 13 - Provision of Land at LTAR and Exemptions or Reductions from Land
and Water Rent s
117. The other interested part ies have made the following submissions with respect to this :
i. The producers/exporters submit ted that the allegation that the Government of Vietnam
provides land at LTAR , water rent exemptions or reductions is unfounded, factual ly
incorr ect, and not applic able to the responding producers/exporters.
ii. It submitted that this program refers to exemptions or reductions in land and water rent
for periods ranging from three to eleven years, and reductions of up to fifty percent for
certa in enterp rises. The parties submit ted that they have not availed any such alleged
program during the POI.
iii. The parties submit ted that land used by them is not owned or directly allotted by the
Government of Vietnam. Instead, land has been obtained through c ommercial sub-lease
arrangem ents with private industrial park infrastructure development companies.
iv. In this regard, one of the parties submit ted that it entered into a land sub -lease agreement
with the lease valid until 2065.
v. It submitted that the unit pri ce for su b-leasing land with infrastr ucture (excluding VAT)
under the said agreement is equivalent to approximately USD 75 per square meter,
applicable for the entire lease term.
vi. The parties submit ted that the land price paid by them is significantly highe r than th e
base land prices prescribe d by the People’s Committee of Hung Yen Province under
Decree No. 40/2019/QD -UBND dated 20 December 2019, which promulgates the land
price list for the period 2020 –2024.
vii. As per Table 09 of Decree No. 40/2019/QD -UBND, th e base pr ice for commercial,
service, and non -agricultural production land in industrial parks located in Yen My
District is VND 1,200,000 per square meter.
viii. It submitted that the land price paid by the parties exceeds the base price prescribed
under the sa id Decree . This premium demo nstrates that the land lease price is not
incentivised, concessional, or provided at LTAR.
ix. The parties submit ted that the payment of a premium over the provincial base price
conclusively establishes that no benefit has been conf erred and that the transacti on
reflec ts market -based commercial terms.
x. The parties further submit ted that the allegation of provision of land at LTAR is not
applicable, as they have not purchased land but have only taken land on lease.
According to the parties, the petition incorrect ly equates leasing arrangements with
government provision of land.
xi. The parties rely on findings of the Australian Anti -Dumping Commission in the anti -
subsidy investigation concerning imports of Aluminium Zinc Coated Steel of a w idth
equa l to or gr eater tha n 600 millimetres from Vietnam, wherein no subsidy was found in
relation to land use levy exemptions or reductions.
xii. The parties submit ted that the Australian authority found no evidence that exporters of
the subject goods had re ceived an y financia l benefit under land -related programs and
consequently terminated the investigation with respect to that program.
xiii. The parties submit ted that land rent exemption and reduction policies in Vietnam
constitute general investment promotion me asures th at are uni formly av ailable to all
enterprises investing in industrial zones, particularly those located in socio -economically
difficult regions.
xiv. It submitted that these measures do not distinguish between sectors, products, sizes of
enterprises, e xport ori entation, or locali sation requirements, and therefore lack both de
jure and de facto specificity.
xv. Eligibility for any land or water rent exemption or reduction is based solely on objective
geographical criteria, namely the location of the project in design ated indus trial zon es or
economically difficult regions, and not on the nature of the product manufactured.
xvi. One respondent submits that its project, located in Yen Bai Province, qualifies for land
rent exemption under Point (b), Clause 3, Article 19 of Dec ree No. 46 /2014/ND -CP, as
the project is situated in an industrial zone located in a socio -economically difficult area,
with the objective of promoting regional development.
xvii. The parties submit ted that such incentives constitute general regional de velopment
measures and fall within the category of permissible investment promotion policies,
which are not countervailable in the absence of specificity.
xviii. The parties further submit ted that similar regional development incentives exist in India
and other W TO Member s, and the refore Vi etnam’s land policies should not be treated
differently.
xix. The parties denied the allegation that the Government of Vietnam provides land to
producers of the PUC at LTAR and submit that the domestic industry has failed to
establis h any dis tortion in land pri ces or any benefit conferred during the period of
investigation.
xx. The partie s also challenge d the domestic industry’s proposal to rely on out -of-country
benchmarks, including Thailand Board of Investment (“BOI”) land rental data, adjusted
by inflation indic es.
xxi. It submitted that Thailand and Vietnam have fundamentally different lan d tenure
systems, industrial zoning frameworks, real estate markets, land conversion costs, and
infrastructure provisioning models, rendering such compar isons inv alid.
xxii. The parties submit ted that inflation -based adjustments across unrelated real estate
mark ets lack economic justification and do not satisfy the requirements of comparability
under Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement.
xxiii. It further submitted that Thailand BOI rates do not r eflect the structure of
Vietnamese industrial zone leasing, which typically includes bundled infrastructure,
services, and long -term concession arrangements.
xxiv. The parties argue d that reliance on precedents from the United States Departmen t of
Commerce regar ding out -of-country benchmarks is misplaced and not binding on the
Authorit y.
xxv. Even under U.S. practice, use of external benchmarks requires a prior finding of
domestic market distortion and a rigorous comparability analysis, nei ther of w hich has
been demon strated by the domestic industry.
xxvi. The parties submit ted that, for determini ng adequacy of remuneration, the Authority
must consider the nature of land, lease tenure, escalation clauses, included infrastructure,
local market cond itions, z oning restrictions, and bundled charges.
xxvii. The parties submit ted that they have placed on record complete land lease agreements,
rent payment schedules, and supporting documentation demonstrating that land was
obtained on market -based terms.
xxviii. It subm itted tha t the domestic indu stry has failed to establish the existence of a financial
contribution, benefit, or specificity, and therefore the allegations relating to provision of
land at LTAR and exemption or reduction of land and water rent deserve to be rejected in
entirety.
xxix. The r espondents submitted that no coun tervailable benefit has been received under the
alleged land -related programme. European Plastic Joint Stock Company, Polyfill Joint
Stock Company, Nghe An European Plastic One Member Limited Lia bility Co mpany
and Yen Bai E uropean Plastic Joint Stock Compa ny contended that reliance on Thailand
land rental benchmarks is legally untenable, as domestic Vietnamese prices must be
used unless distortion in Vietnam is first established.
xxx. VMI submitted tha t the Aut hority’s finding is unsupported, as it incurred subs tantial
commercial costs for acquiring land use rights, constructing factory infrastructure and
developing industrial facilities at its own expense. Such costs were capitalised in its
audited fin ancial st atements and result ed in depreciation expenses excee ding any alleged
notional land rent benefit. VMI further objected that the Disclosure Statement dated
20.03.2026 does not disclose essential calculation elements such as benchmark rate, land
area, calcula tion period and adj ustments applied. It also challen ged the use of Thailand
Board of Investment rental rates, as Thailand and Vietnam differ materially in land
ownership systems, economic conditions, infrastructure, geography and industrial
develo pment.
xxxi. ADC submitted that it acquired land at prices approxim ately 45% above the applicable
benchmark values, thereby establishing absence of any benefit. It further submitted that
there is no evidence of exemption, reduction, waiver or preferential treatm ent in re spect
of land or wa ter rent, and all payments were m ade in accordance with applicable laws at
commercially determined rates. In the absence of any financial contribution by the
Government of Vietnam, the threshold requirement for establishing a su bsidy its elf is
not met.
xxxii. The respondents further submitted th at no evidence has been placed on record to show
any direct transfer of funds or revenue foregone by the Government of Vietnam, such as
full or partial waiver of land charges. The Disclosure Stat ement als o ignores that the
Government of Vietnam merely pres cribes a floor or circle rate, while actual purchase
price is determined by market forces, subject only to the condition that it cannot fall
below such floor rate. This is a normal regulatory pra ctice fol lowed in several co untries,
including India, and doe s not establish subsidisation.
xxxiii. A major objection concerns the benchmark adopted by the Authority. The respondents
submitted that Nakhon Nayok Province, Thailand is not comparable with Van Tien
commune, Ye n Bai Province, Vie tnam, where the factory is locate d. Van Tien is a
developing rural area about 200 km from Hanoi, whereas Nakhon Nayok is a developed
province in central Thailand, around 100 km from Bangkok, with mature tourism and
infrastructur e facilit ies. The respondent s submitted that population densi ty is not the
proper basis for comparison; the relevant criterion is level of development. The
proposed Thai benchmark is more than 1,000 times the actual rent paid by the
respondent, which itsel f shows t hat the benchmark i s distorted, incomparable and
misleading.
Particulars Van Tien
commune, Yen Bai
Province, Vietnam Nakhon Nayok Province,
Thailand
i Location Rural Area Central Thailand
ii Distance from capital city 200 km from Hanoi 100 km from Bang kok
iii Scale Smal l administrative
unit Entire administrative province
iv Level of development Developing rural
area Mature; international -
standard resorts, water parks,
and part of a UNESCO World
Heritage site (Khao Yai).
v Benchmark Claimed ( $ per M2 per
Annum) - 50.53
vi Benchmark as no. of times of
actual rent *** Times No comparable area can have
*** times difference in rent
xxxiv. The respondent s submit ted that the subsidy margin under this scheme has always been
assessed less than 0.5%. Thi s can be cross -check ed from the recent findings issued by
DGTR mentioned below . In this case, the alleged subsidy margin on this account has been
calculated as 5%, which is more than 10 times higher than what has been determined
earlier by the Authority. I llustrati ve list of the inve stigations is provided below for the
ready reference of the Authority:
a. Welded Stainless -Steel Pipes and Tubes originating in or exported from China PR and
Vietnam [F. No. 7/23/2023 -DGTR dated 15 June, 2024] Welded
b. Welded Stainle ss Steel Pipes and Tubes ori ginating in or exported from China PR and
Vietnam [F. No. 6/22/2018 -DGAD dated 31 July, 2019]
c. Textured Tempered Glass originating in or expor ted from Vietnam [F. No. 6/32/2023 -
DGTR dated 11 February, 2025]
xxxv. On specificity, the re spondents submitted that the finding is unsupported because the
Disclosure Statement dated 20.03.2026 merely states that the programme is region -
specific and limited to encouraged sectors. However, the respondents’ project does not
fall under any encourage d sector, and no evidence ha s been provided by the domestic
industry to prove otherwise.
xxxvi. Lastly, the respondents relied on the Australian Anti -Dumping Commission’s
termi nation of the anti -subsidy investigation concerning Aluminium Zinc Coated Steel
from Vi etnam, wh erein no subsidy wa s found in respect of the same / similar land -
related programme. They submitted that this supports their position that the alleged
programme does not confer a countervailable benefit.
118. The domestic industry has made the followin g submiss ions with respect t o this :
i. The domestic industry submit ted that the Government of Vietnam provides land -use
rights to enterprises at less than adequate remuneration through various schemes
involving reduced land rents, full or partial exemptions from land rent, and reductio ns or
exemptions from land and water sur face rent.
ii. These measures are granted under government frameworks applicable to enterprises
investing in identified regions, industrial zones, or projects classified as encouraged
industri es under Vietnamese law.
iii. The domestic industry submit ted that such measures constitute a financial contribution
within the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) of the SCM Agreement and Section 9 of the
Customs Tariff Act, 1975, as they involve the provision o f goods, namely land, and al so
involve government revenu e foregone in the form of exemptions or reductions in land
and water rent.
iv. The provision of land at reduced rent or with rent exemptions confers a benefit on the
recipient enterprises, as the terms an d conditi ons of such land -use rights are more
favourable than those prevailing under market -determined conditions.
v. The subsidy is specific within the meaning of Article 2 of the SCM Agreement, as
access to such exemptions or reductions is limited to enterp rises loc ated in particular
regions, industrial zones, o r undertaking projects classified as encouraged under
Vietnamese investment policy .
vi. The domestic industry submit ted that the parties ’ contention that the land program is not
applicable because land wa s taken o n lease rather than purchased is legally untena ble.
Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) of the SCM Agreement covers provision of goods irrespective of
the mode of provision, whether by sale, lease, or concession.
vii. The relevant legal inquiry is not whether land was purch ased or leased, but whether the
terms and condi tions of the land lease reflect adequate remuneration as determined by
prevailing market conditions.
viii. The domestic industry has alleged the existence of schemes involving preferential land
pricing, exe mptions, reductions, and adm inistered land -use levies, a ll of which must be
examined by the Authority to determine whether remuneration is adequate.
ix. Where parties claim that no benefit has been availed, the Authority may rely on the
confidential questionna ire respo nses, land lease ag reements, and verification r ecords
submitted by the participating foreign producers to determine applicability and benefit,
if any.
x. The domestic industry submitted that the Government of Vietnam provides land rent
exemptions eit her for t he entire lease per iod or for a limited number of years, as well as
rent reductions for certain enterprises, under various decrees governing land
administration and investment promotion.
xi. These exemptions and reductions result in government revenue foregone and confer a
direc t benefit on recipient enter prises, thereby satisfyin g the definition of a subsidy
xii. The domestic industry relie d on the Authority’s findings in the countervailing duty
investigation concerning imports of Copper Tubes and Pipes fr om Malays ia, Thailand
and Vi etnam, wherein the Authority held that the Government of Vietnam’s provision of
land at LTAR and exemptions or reductions of land and water rent constituted a
financial contribution and conferred a benefit.
xiii. In that investigation , the Aut hority further held that such land -related measures were
specific, as they were limited to enterprises located in particular regio ns and to projects
falling within encouraged sectors.
xiv. The domestic industry submit ted that the same reasoning and leg al princi ples apply in
the p resent investigation, as the structure, design, and operation of the Vietnamese land
incentive framework remain comparable.
xv. The domestic industry further submit ted that investigating authorities in other
jurisdictions have also treated s imilar Vietnamese l and programs as countervailable
subsidies.
xvi. In this regard, the domestic industry relie d on the findings of the United States
Department of Commerce in the countervailing duty investigation concerning Frozen
Warmwater Shrimp from Vietnam, wherein USDOC dete rmined that Vietnamese
domestic land rent data was distorted by state intervention.
xvii. In that investigation, USDOC relied on out -of-country benchmarks published by the
Thailand Board of Investment in the “Cost of Doing Business in Thailand 2023” report
to de termine appropriate market -based land rents.
xviii. The domestic industry submit ted that the Thaila nd Board of Investment data was
considered the best available information by USDOC, as it provided market -based
industrial land rental r ates in a comparable regiona l context.
xix. In the present case, the domestic industry propose d to adopt rental rates for ind ustrial
and logistics properties reported in the “Cost of Doing Business in Thailand 2023”
report as the appropriate external benchmark.
xx. The data in the Board of In vestment report is presented on a regional basis. To identify
the appropriate comparable reg ion, the domestic industry submits that population
density of regions in Thailand should be compared with the population density of the
locations where the Vietname se producers’ factories are situated.
xxi. The domestic industry submit ted that the same methodol ogy was adopted by USDOC in
the Frozen Warmwater Shrimp investigation and represents a reasonable and transparent
approach to identifyin g compara ble regions.
xxii. As the Thailand Board of Investment has not published a “Cost of Doing Business”
report for 2024, the domestic industry submits that the benchmark land rents for 2024
should be derived by adjusting the 2023 BOI rental rates using Viet nam’s inf lation
index.
xxiii. The b enefit should be quantified as the difference between the land rent that would have
been pay able at these benchmark rates and the rent actually paid by the producers of the
PUC in Vietnam after accounting for any exemptions or r eductions .
xxiv. In cases where fu ll land rent exemption has been granted, the domestic industry submits
that the entire bench mark rent amount should be treated as the benefit conferred during
the relevant period.
The Authority has examined the submissions belo w:
Finan cial Contribution & Benefit
119. The Authority considers that the form of provision (sale, lease, concession, sub -lease) is
not determinative for the purpose of examining a financial contribution. Where land -use
rights are made available within a gove rnment -administered framewor k and/or w here
exemptions/reductions in land and water rents are granted pursuant to legal instruments,
the Authority has examine d whether such measures involve provision of land -use rights by
or at the direction of the Governme nt and/or involve foregone r evenue tha t is otherwise
due.
120. The Authority notes that land is owned by the Government of Vietnam and price of land is
determined by them. The Authority further notes that the land rent exemption/reduction
measures relied upon by the do mestic industry con stitute go vernment revenue foregone.
The Authority in its past Anti -subsidy investigation concerning namely “Welded Stainless -
Steel Pipes and Tubes” and “Continuous Cast Copper Wire Rods” has already determined
that countervaili ng duty s hould be imposed ag ainst these programs .
121. The issue of program -wise applicability to the individual responding producers/exporters is
examined on the basis of their questionnaire responses and supporting documents.
Specificity
122. The Authority con siders th at measures limited to enterprises operating in identified
regions, industrial zones, or designated investment -incentive areas . In view of the
aforesaid, the Authority notes that this program is also specific because it is region specific
and is l imited to certain encouraged sectors. The Authority holds that countervailing duty
should be imposed against this subsidy program.
Benchmark
123. In the present investig ation, the Auth ority has examined the document ary eviden ce placed
on record by the respond ing producers/exporters, inc luding lease agreements, payment
schedules, and details of any exemptions/reductions. The Autho rity noted that the
government of Vietnam granted rebate in land rates to the manufactures of the PUC.
124. Accordingly, for the purpose of the present program, the Auth ority consider ed the normal
rates prevailing in Vietnam i.e., without rebates as appropriate benchmark.
Subsidy Marg in
125. The Autho rity notes that, in terms of Rule 12 of the CVD Rules, counte rvailable subs idies
are calculat ed in terms of the benefit confer red on the recipient which is found to exist
during the p eriod of investig ation.
126. Accordingly, for the responding producers/exporters found to have availed land-related
benefits during the POI, the Autho rity has compu ted the benefit by compa ring (i) the
benchmark rentals based on normal land rates that would have been payable und er
market-consistent conditions for compa rable industri al land-use rights, wi th (ii) the rent
actually paid after accounting for any exemptions or reductions.
List of schemes identified in the form of tax exemptions and rebates
Program 3 - Exemption on Corporate Income Tax for Enterprise
127. The other interested parties have made the following submissions with respect to this:
i. The other interested par ties subm itted that the corp orate income tax (“CIT”) exemptions or
reductions alleged by the domestic industry are general policy measures under Vietnamese
law and are available to all enterprises that meet objective statutory criteria. It is submitted
that such me asure s do not satis fy the requirement of specificity under Article 2 of the SCM
Agreement .
ii. ADC Plastic JSC submitted that the only incentive availed by it during the POI was a
general investment -linked CIT exemption applicable for a limited period of six m onths .
This exempti on arises automatically under the Law on Corporate Income Tax No.
32/2013/QH13 and the Law on Investment No. 61/2020/QH14, which confer eligibility
based on objective investment thresholds, without regard to export performance, industry,
region, foreign ow nership, or enterprise size.
iii. The parties submit ted that the CIT incentive is wholly non -specific, as confirmed by the
Investment Registration Certificate and tax records.
iv. The parties submit ted that the domestic industry has fai led to es tablish de jure or de facto
specificity. The statutory instruments governing the CIT incentives apply horizontally
across the Vietnamese economy and are neither directed at the plastics industry nor
contingent upon exportation, localization, or fo reign inv estme nt. It further submitted that
no discretion is exercised by the administering authority to favour certain enterprises, as
eligibility is determined solely on the basis of objective legal criteria.
v. Reliance was placed on the Appellate Body rep ort in Un ited States – Softw ood Lumber IV,
wherein it was held that general government policies that incidentally affect market
conditions cannot be treated as financial contributions or as entrustment or direction. The
parties submit ted that economic effe cts alone , absent evidence o f targeted transfer of
economic resources or preferential treatment to particular enterprises, are insufficient to
establish the existence of a subsidy under the SCM Agreement .
vi. It further submitted that, even assuming arguendo t hat the A uthority were to tr eat the CIT
incentive as specific, the quantum of benefit conferred during the POI is minimal.
vii. The parties submit ted that the Authority must consider only the actual benefit accrued
during the POI and cannot a nnualize or extrapo late bene fits beyond the inv estigation
period.
viii. The parties further submit ted that the CIT incentives are not contingent upon export
performance and therefore cannot be treated as export subsidies under Article 3.1(a) of the
SCM Agreement . It submitted that the bene fit applies at the enterprise level and is not
linked specifically to the production or export of the product under consideration.
ix. It submitted that similar general tax incentive frameworks exist in several jurisdictions,
includ ing India. Both Vie tnam and India apply a stand ard corporate tax rate supplemented
by generally available investment -linked incentives such as tax holidays, reduced rates,
and R&D deductions. There is no evidence to show that Vietnamese enterprises receive a
systematically m ore favou rable tax regime co mpared to Indian enterprises.
x. The parties relied on past determinations of the Authority, including Polyester Yarn from
China PR and Cold Rolled Flat Steel Products from Korea, where it was held that general
tax benefits availab le under national law do not constitute countervailable subsidies in the
absence of enterprise -specific or industry -specific targeting.
xi. Any assessment of benefit must be recipient -specific and based on actual tax liability,
taking into account taxable inco me, depre ciation, loss carry -forwards, and applicable tax
credits. The domestic industry’s approach of presuming the statutory tax rate a s the
benchmark without examining the actual tax base and effective tax rate is legally
unsustainable.
xii. Certain parties submit ted that they have not availed any CIT exemption or reduction during
the POI and that they paid corporate income tax at the standar d rate of 20% and did not
receive any tax benefit. Other parties similarly submit ted that they neither applied for nor
received any benefit under t he alleged CIT exemption schemes.
xiii. The GOV submits that the relevant policies form part of a generally applica ble legal
framework and are not specific to certain enterprises or industries.
xiv. VMI stated that it paid corporate income tax at t he standard statuto ry rate of 20%
throughout the period of investigation and did not receive any tax exemption or
preferential r eduction. VMI submitted that its tax filings and payment records confirmed
the absence of any countervailable tax benef it.
xv. Europ ean Plastic Joint S tock Company, Polyfill Joint Stock Company, Nghe An European
Plastic One Member Limited Liability Company and Yen Bai European Plastic Joint Stock
Company submitted that the CIT -related incentives are not countervailable, as th ey are no t
linked to inputs consumed in the production of the exported product.
xvi. ADC has submitted that while it has disclosed the availme nt of a limited corporate income
tax exemption for a portion of the POI, the Authority’s treatment of this measure as a
counterv ailable subsidy is legally unsustainable and contrary to the framework of the SCM
Agreement. The corporate income tax regime in Vietnam is a general fiscal measure
applicable across sectors and industries. The exemption relied upon by the Authorit y is part
of a broader, econ omy-wide tax framework and is not limited to a specific enterprise or
industry. Accordingly, the requirement of specificity under Article 2 of the SCM
Agreement is not satisfied. The Respondent reiterates that the alleged benefi t is mini mal
and, when prope rly allocated, is de minimis in nature. The Authority has not engaged with
this submission, nor has it demons trated that the quantum of benefit is sufficient to warrant
countervailing measures. Further, the Authority has not und ertaken a ny analysis to
exam ine whether the tax treatment received by ADC deviates from the normal taxation
regime applicable in Vietnam. In the absence of such benchmark analysis, it cannot be
concluded that any benefit has been conferred. The treatment o f a gener al tax measure as a
countervailable subsidy, without establishing specificity and without quantifying a
meaningful benefit, is c ontrary to settled principles under the SCM Agreement and the
CVD Rules .
xvii. An Tien has submitted that its submissions reg arding co rporate income tax has not been
examined properly. The respondent has not availed any income tax benefit as evidenced
from the following facts. Therefore, the proposal to impose the corporate income tax
subsi dy on the respondent is completely wron g and mis leading.
a) 20% is th e normal / regular corporate income tax rate in Vietnam during the period of
investigation as also confirmed by the Government of Vietnam in its questionnaire response.
b) The company has pai d the corporate income tax at the norma l rate of 20% during the POI as
evidenced from the Income Tax Return filed with the Authority as part of the verification
documents.
c) The proposed corporate income tax subsidy is misleading and incorrect as evidence a s the
company overpaid income tax in bo th FY 202 3 / FY 2024 as evid enced from the Income Tax
Return filed with the Authority.
xviii. Without prejudice to the above, it is submitted that the Authority has not even mentioned
the program of the Government of Vietna m under which corporate income tax has been
coun tervailed. It is su bmitted that delay in the payment of income tax cannot be
countervailed as no subsidy provided by the Government of Vietnam.
128. The domestic industry has made the following submissions with r espect to this :
i. The domestic industry submit ted that Vietnam provi des preferential CIT rates and tax
holidays to certain enterprises under the Law on Enterprise Income Tax. The statutory
corporate income tax rate in Vietnam is 20%. Enterprises qualifying under incentive
schemes are either exem pt from p ayment of CIT for a n initial period or are taxed at
reduced rates.
ii. It submitted that such preferential treatment results in foregone government revenue that
would otherwise have been collected at the statutory rate of 20% and thereby confers a
benefit on t he recipient enterp rises. This constitutes a financial contribution in terms of
Article 1 of the SCM Agreement and Section 9 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975.
iii. The said subsidy is specific, as access to such exemptions or reduced rates is limited to
enterpri ses meeting defined eligibility conditions relating to particular sectors, regions,
project characteristics, or government -prioritised activities. These conditions result in the
benefit being available only to a limited set of enterprises in pract ice.
iv. The domestic industry d enied the parties ’ contention that CIT exemptions are general and
non-specific. It submitted that even investment -linked tax exemptions framed in neutral
statutory language may be de facto specific under Article 2.1(c) of the SC M Agreeme nt if,
in practice, they are limited to certain enterprises, sectors, or regions.
v. The parties ’ own admission of having availed CIT exemption or reduction during the POI
establishes the existence of both a financial contribution and a benefit. The existence of a
subsidy does not depend on the magnitude of the benefit, and arguments that the benefit is
small or time -limited are irrelevant for determining whether the program is
countervailable.
vi. The Authority is required to examine the actual benefit a ccrued du ring the POI based on
verified tax records. Where parties claim that the benefit is de minimis, such claims must
be assessed and confirmed by the Authority on the basis of confidential financial and tax
data.
vii. Under Law No. 14/2008/QH12, the standa rd CIT ra te in Vietnam was i nitially 25%, which
was subsequently reduced to 20% with effect from 1 January 2016 pursuant to Law No.
32/2013/QH13. This statutory rate of 20% applies to all enterprises that do not qualify for
preferential treatment.
viii. The Gove rnment of Vietnam has introd uced schemes under which certain enterprises are
granted complete exemption from CIT for an initial period of two to four years, followed
by reduced CIT rates ranging between 10% and 20% for extended periods that may last up
to 30 years. Eligibility for th ese schemes is based on criteria such as sectoral focus,
regional location, project size, and alignment with government priorities including high
technology, infrastructure, research, and agriculture.
ix. Where enterprises pay CIT a t a rate below the statutory rate of 20%, the government
foregoes revenue otherwise due, and a benefit is conferred on such enterprises. This
interpretation is consistent with Article 1 of the SCM Agreement and Annexure IV of the
CVD Rules.
x. The Authority was reques ted to calculate th e amount of countervailable subsidy by
comparing the actual tax paid with the tax that would have been payable at the statutory
rate.
xi. Similar approach has been adopted by investigating authorities in other jurisdictions.
Referen ce was made to the investiga tion on Frozen Warmwater Shrimp, wherein the
statutory corporate tax rate was treated as the benchmark and preferential rates were
compared against it to determine the benefit .
129. The Authority has examined the submissions below :
Financia l contribution
130. Based on the verified tax records and questionnaire responses of the participating
producers/exporters, the Authority finds that, to the extent a participating
producer/exporter has availed CIT exemption or reduction resulting in p ayment of CIT
below the norm al statutory treatment during the POI, the program involves a financial
contribution in the nature of foregone government revenue otherwise due.
Benefit
131. The Autho rity finds that, to the extent the participating producers/exporters have paid CIT
at a rate lower than the no rmal st atutory C IT rate of 20%, or have paid no CIT du ring the
relevant part of the POI due to an incentive, a benefit is thereby confer red, measurable as
the difference between the CIT payable under norm al statutory treatment and the CIT
actually paid during the PO I.
Specificity
132. Based on the operation of the incentive schemes as evidenced on record, the Authority
finds that the CIT exemption/reduction program is specific, as access to the benefit is
limited t o enterpr ises meeting define d eligibility criteria linked to identified
region s/industrial zones and/or qualifying project categories, and the benefit is not
available to all enterprises under identical conditions.
Benchmark
133. The Authority holds that the appropria te benchmark for me asuring benefit under this
program is the normal s tatutory CIT rate of 20%, applied to the verified taxable
income/tax base for the POI, with due consideration of recipient -specific tax
computations reflected in the verified tax records.
Subsidy Margin
134. The subsidy amount for this program has been computed for each participating
producer/exporter on the basis of verified tax filings, tax computation statements, and
supporting accounting records for the POI, by determining (i) th e benchma rk tax liability
at the normal statutory treatment, (ii) the ac tual tax liability and tax paid during the POI,
and (iii) the difference between the two as the benefit.
Program 4 - Exemptions from import duties on raw materials, machinery and
equipment
135. The other interested parties have made the following submissions with respect to this :
i. The allegation relating to import duty exemption on raw materials under is not
applicable to the responding producers/exporters. None of the respondents applied for,
or availed, any import duty exemption or reimbursement for raw materials or capital
goods/machinery during the POI or the injury period. All imports of raw materials and
capital goods were already subject to nil customs duty under various Free Trade
Agreements , upon submission o f valid certificates of origin. Duty foregone under an
FTA does not constitute a countervailable subsidy.
ii. The parties did not receive any separate or additional import duty exemption linked to
their operations. Item -wise import duty scre enshots, bills of e ntry, and duty -free import
records were submitted to demonstrate that imports were cleared at zero duty solely by
operation of FTAs and not under any subsidy scheme.
iii. The Government of Vietnam submit ted that import duty exemptio n on inpu ts used in the
manu facture of exported products does not, per se, constitute a countervailable export
subsidy. Reliance is placed on Annex I(i) of the SCM Agreement, which clarifies that
remission or drawback of import charges on inputs consumed i n the pro duction of
exported products is not countervailable, provided such remission does not exceed the
duties actually levied on the imported inputs.
iv. The Government of Vietnam further submit ted that earlier determinations alleging lack
of an effective t racking s ystem in Vietnam ar e no longer valid. Vietnam has established
a comprehensive customs control and verification mechanism to track the import,
consumption, and use of duty -free raw materials for export production. Reference was
made to Decree 08/20 15/ND -CP, Circulars 38/2015/ TT-BTC and 39/2018/TT -BTC, and
Decree 59/2018/ND -CP, which prescribe obligations on producers and customs
authorities.
v. The Government of Vietnam submitted that producers importing raw materials for
export production are required to (i) n otify customs autho rities of production facilities
and storage locations, (ii) maintain norms of material consumption for each product, (iii)
keep detailed records of stock -in, stock -out, and leftovers of imported materials, and (iv)
reconcile suc h records with accounting do cumentation. Importers are stated to bear legal
responsibility for the accuracy of such records and declarations.
vi. It further submitted that customs authorities are empowered to receive and examine
these records, conduct facility inspecti ons, verify invento ries, and undertake post -
clearance audits based on risk management criteria. Where irregularities or trade fraud
are suspected, customs authorities may impose duties and penalties in accordance with
law. It contended that this s ystem ena bles customs author ities to verify whether duty -
free imported inputs are actually used in exported products.
vii. The Government of Vietnam submit ted that this customs verification framework is
comparable to systems adopted in other jurisdictions. It a rgued tha t, if the domestic
industry disputes the effectiveness of Vietnam’s system, it must demonstrate how
Vietnam’s system materially differs from or is less effective than India’s customs
system. In the absence of such proof, the program should not be treated a s
countervailable.
viii. Individual responding producers/exporters submit ted that they have not availed any
import duty exemption or remission on raw materials during the POI. Since no
exemption or remission was availed by them, the essential elements o f a subsi dy,
financial contr ibution and benefit , are absent in their case.
ix. The parties further submit ted that the petitioner’s allegation that import duty exemptions
constitute revenue foregone is incorrect. The petitioner’s proposal to treat statutory dut y
rates a s benchmarks, and t o allocate benefits on a recurring basis for inputs or over an
assumed avera ge useful life (AUL) for capital goods, is hypothetical and unsupported by
evidence in the absence of any actual exemption availed.
x. With respect to capi tal goods , it was submit ted that allocation over an AUL may be
relevant only if an exemption is actually availed. Even otherwise, the petitioner’s
assumption of a uniform AUL of eight years for all machinery is arbitrary and
inconsistent with DGTR practice . AUL mus t be asset -specific and supported by
evidence such as audited records or applicable depreciatio n schedules.
136. The domestic industry has made the following submissions with respect to this:
i. Under Decree No. 134/2016/ND -CP, the Government of Vietnam provides exemptions
from im port duties on raw materials, machinery, and equipment used for production and
export. Such exemptions involve foregone government revenue that would otherwise
have been collected in the form of customs duties and therefore cons titute a financial
contribut ion within the meaning of the SCM Agreement and the CVD Rules.
ii. Import duty exemptions on raw materials constitute recurring subsidies, as raw materials
are imported on a continuous and repetitive basis for production. Each insta nce of du ty-
free import of r aw materials results in revenue foregone by the government and c onfers
a benefit on the recipient enterprises.
iii. Under WTO law and DGTR practice, import duty exemptions on inputs consumed in the
production of exported goods may be treated as non -countervaila ble only where there
exists a properly implemented and verified system ensuring that duty -free inputs are
limited strictly to the quantities consumed in exported goods. In the absence of such a
verified system, or where its impl ementatio n is inadequate, th e entire duty exemption
must be treated as countervailable.
iv. It is incumbent upon the participating producers/exporters of the PUC in Vietnam to
demonstrate, through their questionnaire responses and supporting evidence, the spec ific
raw materials imported, the quantities consumed in production, and the manner in which
any duty exemption was applied. Where such evidence is absent, incomplete, or
unverifiable, the Authority must treat the entire duty foregone as a countervailable
subsidy.
v. Reliance was placed on DGTR’s past practice, including the countervailing duty
inves tigation concerning imports of “Fiberboards” from Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand,
Vietnam and Sri Lanka, wherein import duty exemptions on raw materials were treated
as count ervailable in the a bsence of effective verification of consumption of duty -free
inputs in exported goods.
vi. For raw materials the appropriate benchmark is the statutory import duty rate applicable
to the relevant raw material during the POI. The ben efit shou ld be calculated as the
difference between the statutory duty payable and the duty actually paid. Where no duty
is paid, the entire statutory duty foregone should be treated as the benefit.
vii. With respect to machinery and equipment, import duty exem ptions co nstitute non -
recurr ing subsidies, as machinery and equipment are typically imported once and then
used over their useful life. Although the exemption occurs at a single point in time, the
benefit continues to accrue over the period during which th e asset i s used in productio n.
viii. WTO law and DGTR practice recognize that import duty exemptio ns on capital goods
are countervailable even if such goods are used for production of exported products. The
benefit conferred is the duty foregone at the time of i mport, wh ich must be allocat ed
over the Average Useful Life (AUL) of the machinery or equipm ent.
ix. The benchmark for machinery and equipment should be the statutory customs duty
applicable at the time of import. The benefit is the difference between the duty that
would have been payabl e at the statutory rate and the duty actually paid.
x. The DGTR’s M anual of Operating Practices for Trade Remedy Investigations expressly
provides that benefits from non -recurring subsidies, such as duty exemptions on capital
asset s, should be considered over the AUL of the relevant tangible or intangible assets
used in p roduction.
xi. The domestic industry has proposed an AUL of eight years, consistent with established
DGTR practice, including in the Fiberboards investigation. Accordin gly, any benefit
arising fro m import duty exemptions on machinery and equipment should be al located
over an eight -year period to determine the portion of the benefit attributable to the POI.
xii. The Authority must examine whether any such non -recurring subsidi es on mac hinery
and equipmen t were availed by producers of the PUC in Vietnam during the per iod from
1 April 2016 to 31 March 2024, as non -recurring subsidies received in earlier years but
continuing to yield benefits during the POI remain countervailable.
xiii. The Auth ority may rely on c onfidential import data, bills of entry, duty payment records,
and questionnaire responses to verify whether any import duty foregone constitutes a
financial contribution and benefit.
The Authority has examined the submissions below:
137. The Authority notes that none of the respondents applied for, or availed, any import duty
exemption or reimbursement for raw materials or capital goods/machinery during the POI
or the injury period. All imports of raw materials and capital goods we re alrea dy subject
to nil cu stoms duty.
138. Accordingly, t he Authority has not examine d the countervailability of this particular
program.
List of schemes identified in the form of interest rate subsidies
Program 5 - Preferential Lending for Investor
Progr am 7 - Preferential Lending to the Exporters
Program 8 - Interest Rate of Investment Credit Loans
Program 9 - Investment Support on Foreign Investors Establishing SMEs
Program 10 - Export Credits from the Vietnam Development Bank (VDB)
Program 11 - Financi al Guaran tees by Vietin Bank
139. The other interested parties have made the following submissions with respect to above
programs :
i. The producers/exporters submitted that the allegation regarding preferential lending for
investors is not applicable to the m, as none of the responding prod ucers/exporters have
availed any loans from the Vietnam Development Bank (“VDB”).
ii. Some of the interested parties have submitted that they have not availed any concessional or
export -linked loans from state -owned banks, SBV, or VDB during the POI. SBV’s int erest -
rate ceilings and related measures are general monetary policy tools of economy -wide
application and do not constitute subsidies or demonstrate specificity.
iii. Some of the interested parties submitted that they are not eligib le under the SME
framework, as their capital investment exceeds the thresholds for classification as small or
medium enterprises. Consequently, the program does not apply to them.
iv. The parties submitted that they have not availed any export credit or export -linked f inancing
from the V DB during the POI or at any other relevant period. The other interested parties
also submitted that they have not availed any financial guarantees from Vietin Bank or any
other state -owned bank during the POI. There is no lendin g or guar antee relationship with
Vietin Bank.
v. Some of the interested parties submitted that the loans availed during the POI were obtained
from private commercial banks at market -determined interest rates on arm’s length terms.
Documentary eviden ce of such commerci al borrowings has b een placed on record to
demonstrate the absence of any concessional or government -directed lending.
vi. The existence of a policy framework for preferential lending does not, by itself, establish
countervailability. A bene fit can ar ise only where a loan is pro vided on terms more
favourable than those available on the market, which has not been demonstrated in the
present case.
vii. The GOV submits that the investigated exporters did not receive any actual measurable
benefit and that subsi dy findin gs should be based on verified evidence demonstrating the
existence of a real and measurable benefit to the enterprises concerned, rather than
assumptions or theoretical calculations.
viii. VMI maintained that it had not received any loans from state -owned banks , the Vietnam
Devel opment Bank, or any preferential government financing program during the period of
investigation. VMI stated that all financing arrangements during the relevant period were
obtained from private commercial ban ks at market intere st rates and that documentar y
evidence supporting these facts had already been submitted to the Authority during
verification. VMI therefore argued that no financial contribution or benefit existed under
these programs and requested the Authority to assign a zero s ubsidy margin accor dingly.
ix. An Tien stated that it did not receive any preferential loans or interest -rate benefit. It argues
that the Disclosure Statement dated 20.03.2026 has not properly examined the evidence
showing that no d irect transfer of f unds was made by Vietnamese state-owned banks, and
that treating ordinary loans from state -owned banks as financial contribution would wrongly
imply that loans from public sector banks in India, such as SBI, are also subsidies. An Tien
further submits that its proj ects/products are n ot covered under Decree No. 32/2017/ND -CP,
and that its local currency loans were obtained from both state -owned and private foreign
banks at market -driven interest rates. The comparable rates charged by both categories of
banks demonstr ate that no prefere ntial rate or countervailable benefit was conferred.
x. The rate of interest of the foreign currency (USD) loans is determined by the international
benchmark (LIBOR) and not by the regulations / decree of Governm ent of Vietnam. Thi s is
the reason that no inte rest subsidy is determined by the Authority on foreign currency loans
in the past investigations like Fiberboard.
xi. As regards benchmark, it is proposed in the disclosure statement dated 20.03.2026 that
“Author ity proposes to ado pt intere st rate provided by Bank of India branch in Vietnam
which is not a state -owned bank in Vietnam.” It means that interest rate of foreign private
bank is proposed to be considered as a benchmark. It is submitted that interest rate of
Vietnam branch of Bank o f India as a benchm ark is arbitrary and does not take in to account
parameters like whether the loan is secured or not, tenure of loan, credit rating, industry risk
etc. It may also be noted that that the supporting documents provided for the Bank of India
interest rate clea rly mentions that "The above rates are for reference and negotiable from
case-to-case basis". Therefore, the same cannot be considered as a benchmark
xii. Without prejudice to the submission of the respondent that it has not availed any inter est
subsidy, it is submitted that the respondent has also taken loan from *** (Private Foreign
Bank) and *** (Private Foreign Bank). Therefore, the actual interest rate of the same shall
be considered for the determination of th e subsidy margin of the resp ondent as the inter est
rate varies on account of above -mentioned factors.
140. The domestic industry has made the following submissions with respect to this:
i. Lending by a government -owned or government -directed financial institution constitutes a
financial co ntribution in the f orm of direct transfer of funds. Where such loans are extended
at concessional interest rates, they confer a measurable benefit on the recipient enterprises.
ii. The Government of Vietnam provides prefer ential lending to investors t hrough th e VDB
under Decree No. 75/2011/ND -CP. Under this program, eligible enterprises can obtain loans
at interest rates lower than those available from commercial banks. The state -owned banks
in Vietnam extend export -linked loans to exporters at concess ional int erest rates under t he
policy direction and regulatory control of the State Bank of Vietnam.
iii. Plastic manufacturing is classified as a support industry. Consequently, producers engaged
in plastic manufacturing are eligib le to access investment credi t loans u nder this program,
and the program is applicable to producers of the PUC.
iv. The Government of Vietnam provides investment support to enterprises establishing small
and medium -sized enterprises under the Law on Assistance for Small and Medium -Sized
Enterprise s. These legal inst ruments lay down the framework for granting financial
assistance to eligible SMEs, irrespective of whether such enterprises are owned by domestic
or foreign investors.
v. The Government of Vietnam operates an export credit program. Under th is program,
eligibl e exporters are provided loans of up to 85% of the value of export contracts, thereby
directly linking the availability of credit to export activity.
vi. The financial guarantee program offe red by Vietin Bank constitutes a counterva ilable
subsidy. By providing guarantees on loans, Vietin Bank assumes credit risk that would
otherwise be borne by commercial lenders. Such guarantees improve the creditworthiness of
recipient enterprises producing the PUC and enable them to access financi ng at low er
interest rates, or on terms that may not have been available in the absence of such
guarantees.
vii. The difference between the concessional interest rate charged and the market -determined
commercial interes t rate represents the benefit conferred, a nd the fo regone interest rev enue
constitutes revenue forgone by the government.
viii. For determination of the benefit, the appropriate benchmark is the interest rate charged by
private commercial banks in Vietnam for co mparable loans. Only by comparing the
conc essional lending rate with s uch commercial rates can the Authority determine what the
recipient would have paid in the absence of government intervention.
ix. The Authority was requested to examine evidence of commerci al lending rates in Vietnam,
including rat es charge d by private banks operating in Vietnam and publicly available
indicators such as World Bank interest rate data, to establish a reliable benchmark for
benefit calculation.
The Authority has examined the s ubmissions below:
Financial Contribution
141. Authorit y notes that VDB an d other state -owned banks in Vietnam are a public body
because it is owned and controlled by the Government of Vietnam and exercises
Governmental authority. Loans granted by VDB or any o ther state-owned bank are in the
nature of financia l contribution in t he form of direct transfer of funds.
142. When a financial institution that is owned or controlled by the government provides
loans, this amounts to a financial contribution through the dire ct provision of funds. If
these loans are offered a t below‑market inte rest rates, they give the receiving companies a
quantifiable advantage.
143. The Authority in the past Anti -subsidy investigation against Vietnam concerning
“Welded Stainless Steel Pipes and Tubes”, “Continuous Cast Copper Wire Rods ”,
“Coppe r Tubes and Pipes” and “Fiberboards”, have held these programs as
countervailable. The question of whether a given producer/exporter has received such a
financial contribution during the POI is examined on the basis of verified company -
specific re cords.
Benefit
144. The Authori ty considers that, where loans are availed and are at rates more favourable
than comparable commercial lending available in the Vietnamese market to the recipient,
such lending confers a benefit within the meaning of Annexure IV of the C VD Rules and
Articl e 14(b) of the SCM Agreement. The existence and quantum of benefit for each
responding producer/exporter is determined on the basis of verified loan documentation
and comparison with an appropriate commercial benchmark.
Specif icity
145. The Authority consider s that these programs are specific within the meaning of Rule 9
and Article 2, since access to the program is limited to enterprises/projects meeting the
eligibility conditions prescribed in the related project lists and relate d criteri a, and is
therefore not generally available to all enterprises across the economy without restr iction.
Benchmark
146. The Autho rity consid ers that the appropriate benchmark for d etermining the b enefit is the
interest rate on a compa rable commercial loan available in Vietnam to the recipient
during the POI. The applicants proposed to adopt interest rate provided by Bank of
India branch in Vietnam which is not a state -owned bank in Vietnam. However, it is
noted from the supporting evidence provided by t he applic ants that the propos ed rates
are for reference p urposes only and are negotiable on case -to-case basis. The
proposed rate does not consider parameters like whether the loan is secured or not,
tenure of loan, credit rating, industry risk etc. Theref ore, the same is not consider ed
as a benchmark.
147. It is noted from the questionnaire response filed by the producers / exporters that they
have taken loan from both state -owned banks and private foreign (non -Vietnam) banks
during the POI. A ccordingly, the Authority adopts the actual in terest rate (pertaining to
POI) of private foreign banks operating in Vietnam as an appropriate benchmark .
Subsidy Margin
148. The Authority determines that countervailing duty should be imposed against credit
provided by VDB and other local banks of Vietnam. The Authority proceeds to compute
company -specific subsidy margins under Preferential Lending based on the verified loan
data of each responding producer/exporter and the benchmark determined above, and
includes the resulting margins i n the subsidy comput ation tables.
List of schemes identified in the form of other financial incentives
Program 2 - Master Plan for Development of Vietnam’s Plastic Industry
149. The other interested parties have made the following submissions with respect t o this:
i. The parties submit ted that they have not availed any benefit under the alleged Master Plan
for Development of Vietnam’s Plasti c Industry. The Master Plan is described as a
planning document outlining the Government of Vietnam’s long -term v ision to develop a
coordinate d plastic industry from raw material production to finished goods. The Master
Plan identifies certain priority or beneficiary projects, none of which cover the
respondents or the product under investigation. This is also eviden t from th eir Investment
Regis tration Certificates, which do not record any benefit or linkage to the Master Plan.
ii. The Master Plan is a high -level industrial policy or strategy document and does not, by
itself, constitute a subsidy program. It does not con tain any operative mechanism for
granting financial contributions, such as budgetary allocations, grants, preferential loans,
tax incentives, g uarantees, or reimbursements. A policy framework cannot be treated as a
countervailable subsidy unless it establi shes a co ncrete scheme involv ing financial
contribution and confers a measurable benefit on identifiable enterprises. In the absence of
such op erative provisions, the Master Plan cannot be considered a subsidy within the
meaning of the CVD Rules or the SCM Agreemen t.
iii. Master Plan does not mandate or provide for any direct or indirect transfer of funds,
revenue foregone, provision of goods or servi ces, or price/income support. The parties
submit ted that they have not received any preferential loans, tax benef its, trad e promotion
assistan ce, training support, infrastructure support, or any other form of financial
assistance pursuant to the Master Plan. The petitioners are stated to have produced no
evidence of any disbursement, transaction, or measurable advant age. Cons equently, both
the e lements of financial contribution and benefit are asserted to be absent.
iv. The Master Plan applies broadly to the entire plastic industry value chain in Vietnam,
inclu ding raw materials, intermediate inputs, finished products, ad ditives, and ancillary
indust ries. Such a sector -wide policy does not meet the requirement of specificity, as it is
not limited to certain enterprises, groups of enterprises, regions, or product s, nor does it
involve discretionary selection of beneficiarie s. On thi s basis, the Master Plan is claimed
to be non -specific and therefore not countervailable.
v. Reliance by the domestic industry on prior DGTR findings concerning other countries’
market dev elopment or industrial plans is misplaced. Those cases involve d clearly defined
schemes wit h actual budgetary allocations and reimbursable grants, unlike the Vietnamese
Master Plan, which merely sets out policy objectives without any automatic or operation al
financial assistance mechanism.
vi. Even if any downstream init iatives w ere hypothetically l inked to the Master Plan, the
parties have not availed any such initiative during the POI. In line with DGTR practice,
where a program is not used by a party , the be nefit attributable must be treated as nil.
150. The domestic indu stry has made the following s ubmissions with respect to this:
i. The Government of Vietnam has introduced a Master Plan for the Development of
Vietnam’s Plastic Industry with the stated objective of building and developing a
synchronous plastic industry, pro gressing step by step from ra w material production to
final pro duct processing. The Master Plan aims to transform the plastic industry into a
strong economic sector with sustainable growth. Its objectives include mobilising
domestic and foreign investment for produ ction of raw materia ls, semi -finished products,
chemic als and additives; producing high -quality plastic materials and products; and
encouraging investment in plastic material manufacturing.
ii. The Master Plan envisages and provides for multiple form s of supp ort to plastic indus try
participants. These include pr eferential loans from the government, establishment of
development and technology support funds for priority projects, enhanced trade
promotion and market research support, partial state suppor t for tra ining of technical
personnel, and strengthening of exp ort promotion activities. The Master Plan also
contemplates eligibility of plastic industry projects for investment incentives similar to
those granted to key mechanical engineering industries, includin g access to investme nt
credit covering up to a signifi cant portion of total investment costs. Further, it provides
for government -backed guarantees, support for infrastructure development in industrial
zones, and adjustment of import duties on raw material s and finished plast ic products to
promote industry gr owth.
iii. The measures outlined in the Master Plan involve direct transfers of funds, provision of
services, and foregone government revenue in the form of tax and duty incentives. These
measures, taken tog ether, constitute fi nancial contributions by the Gover nment of
Vietnam. The benefit to recipient enterprises arises from access to concessional finance,
grants, guarantees, tax relief, training subsidies, trade promotion assistance, and
infrastruc ture supp ort, which reduce pr oduction and investment costs comp ared to market
conditions.
iv. The PUC is an important raw material used in plastic products and therefore falls squarely
within the scope of encouraged products under the Master Plan. The producti on of suc h
raw materials is s pecifically promoted through incen tives relating to investment, finance,
infrastructure, and import tariff adjustments. As a result, producers of the PUC are
eligible to receive, and benefit from, the support measures contempla ted under the Master
Plan.
v. The support measures under the Maste r Plan are limited to identified sectors and activities
within the plastic industry value chain. By targeting the plastic industry and its upstream
raw materials, including PUC, the program is sector -specific and therefore , meets the
specificity requirement for countervailability.
vi. The Authority has, in prior countervailing duty investigations, treated similar market
development or industry -specific plans as countervailable subsidies, even where
responden ts claimed non -avail ment. In such cases, the Authority has examined the design
and scope of the program and held the measures to be countervailable where they
involved financial contribution and benefit to a defined sector. On this basis, the dome stic
industry submits that th e Master Plan for Development of Vietnam’s Plastic Industry
constitutes a countervailable subsidy program.
vii. The benefit under this program should be measured as the actual amount of financial
assistance received by producers of the PUC o r, where applicable, the amount of
government revenue foregone through tax and duty incentives, guarantees, or
concessional financing provided pursuant to the Master Plan .
The Authority has examined the submissions below:
151. The Authority notes tha t none of the parti cipating p roducer/exporters have availed benefit
under this program. Therefore, the Authority has not examine d the countervailability of
this program.
Program 6 - Export Promotion Program
152. The other interested parties have made the foll owing sub missions with respec t to this :
i. The responding producers/exporters submit that although the Government of Vietnam
operates an Export Promotion Program providing support for export -related activities, the
parties have not participated in, applied f or, or av ailed any assistance under this program
during the period of investigation. It is stated that the Petitioner has sought investigation of
this program without placing prima facie evidence on record demonstrating actual receipt
of benefits by any party.
ii. It is acknowledged that the Export P romotion Program is stated to provide partial cost
support for export promotion activities, including reimbursement of up to 50% of expenses
for hiring experts for export development, participation in trade fairs, c onsultanc y, and
related promo tional initi atives. The Petitioner has also alleged the existence of an export -
related tax incentive of 6% on exports of the PUC, though the Respondents contend that
the Petitioner itself admits to having limited information an d has not substantiated this
claim with d ocumentary evidence or statutory provisions demonstrating such an incentive
in practice.
iii. No financial contribution exists in their case, as no grants, reimbursements, subsidies, tax
incentives, refunds, or other fin ancial in flows from the Gover nment of Vie tnam have been
received. It is emphasized that audited financial statements, accounting records, bank
ledgers, and statutory filings of the Respondents for the POI do not contain any entries
reflecting receipts or b enefits u nder any export prom otion or nat ional trade promotion
scheme. They did not engage in activities such as export consultancy, trade fair
participation, or advisory services that would qualify for reimbursement under the alleged
program.
iv. National tra de promot ion programs in Viet nam are gene ral government functions aimed at
enhancing the country’s overall trade profile and international visibility. Such measures
include market studies, trade fairs, branding initiatives, dissemination of information, an d
export -related advisory sup port, which are available across sectors and are not limited to
exporters of the product under consideration. Such general promotional activities, even
where undertaken by the government, do not constitute specific subsidies an d are not
targeted at any par ticular ente rprise, industry, or group of enterprises.
v. Export Promotion Program is not specific within the meaning of the SCM Agreement or
the CVD Rules, as access to the program is based on broad, economy -wide criteria and is
not limit ed to a particular i ndustry, pro duct, or group of exporters. The mere fact that
certain enterprises may choose to participate does not render the program specific, and the
Petitioner has not demonstrated either de jure or de facto specificity in r espect of exporters
of the PU C.
vi. The alleg ed program is not contingent upon export performance in the sense required
under WTO law. Participation in trade promotion activities does not depend on achieving
export volumes, export values, or export targets, an d does no t automatically conf er
financial rewards linked to export performance. There is no evidence of any linkage
between exports of the PUC and receipt of financial assistance.
vii. All applicable taxes were paid in accordance with statutory requirements, an d no redu ction
in tax liabili ty or export -linked fiscal benefit was received. In the absence of any tax
concession, there is no revenue foregone by the Government of Vietnam in relation to the
Respondents.
viii. The discussions on benchmarking are premature and academic, as benchmarking und er the
CVD f ramework arises only after the existence of a financial contribution and benefit is
established. Since no benefit has been received by the Respondents under the Export
Promotion Program, there is no basis for undert aking any benchmark compariso n.
ix. The burde n lies on the Petitioner to demonstrate actual disbursement, receipt of benefit,
and specificity. The Petitioner has relied on generalized references to government
programs without producing transaction -level eviden ce showin g that any Responden t
received s upport under the Export Promotion Program.
153. The domestic industry has made the following submissions with respect to this:
i. The Government of Vietnam operates export promotion measures under the National
Trade Promo tion Prog ram, established by Decision 279 and governed by Decision 80.
These measures are designed to support exporters, including exporters of the PUC, and
therefor e, constitute countervailable subsidies.
ii. Export Promotion Program involves direct transfer s of fund s by the Government of
Vietnam in the form of financial assistance for export promotion activities. This includes
reimbursement of up to 50% of expenses inc urred by enterprises for hiring experts to
advise on export development and related service s. Such r eimbursements consti tute direct
transfers of funds within the meaning of Annexure IV of the CVD Rules and Article 1 of
the SCM Agreement.
iii. The program also e ntails foregone government revenue, as exporters are provided tax -
related incentives linked to expor t activity. By reduc ing the tax liability of exporters
based on the value of their exports, the Government of Vietnam forgoes revenue that
would otherwise h ave been due under the statutory tax framework. This reduction in tax
liability confers a b enefit by lowering operating costs and enhancing export
competitiveness.
iv. The benefit under the Export Promotion Program arises in two forms:
(a) in cases of direct transfers of funds, the benefit is equal to the actual amount of
financial assistance recei ved by th e enterprise; and
(b) in cases of foregone revenue, the benefit is the difference between the statutory tax
liability and the reduced liab ility after application of the export -linked incentive.
v. The export promotion programs are, by their very nat ure, cont ingent upon export a ctivity
and are therefore specific. The availability of benefits is linked to engagement in export
promotion and export -related activities, satisfying the specificity requirement under the
SCM Agreement and the CVD Rules. Such programs are export -contingen t and thus
countervailable.
vi. While certain parties have claimed that they did not participate in any export promotion
schemes or receive benefits, the domestic industry submits that non -participation is a
matter of verification. The Auth ority is requested t o rely on confidential records,
government disbursement data, and verification findings to determine whether any
financ ial assistance or tax benefit was in fact received during the POI.
vii. Annexure IV of the CVD Rules provides cle ar guidan ce on benchmarking. For direct
transfers of funds, the benchmark is the actual amount of financial assistance received by
the enterprise. F or measures involving foregone revenue, the benchmark is the statutory
tax liability that would have been pa yable in the absence of the i ncentive. The benefit is
the difference between the statutory liability and the reduced liability after application of
the export promotion measures.
The Authority has examined the submissions below:
154. The Authority notes that none of t he participating pro ducer/exporters have availed benefit
under this program. Therefore, the Authority has not examine d the countervailability of
this program.
CVD Schemes in Vietnam
155. In view of the foregoing, the Authority concludes that the Viet namese pr oducers are
benefite d from countervailable subsidies. On the basis of the investigations conducted,
facts on record, and the investigations conducted in the past, and considering absence of
full cooperation from few of the Vietnamese participating producer s/ exporters of PUC,
Authority quantif ied various subsidy schemes and margin of subsidies therein as shown in
table below. It is seen by the Authority that the quantum of CVD margins is above de -
minim is.
156. With respect to Filler Masterbatch Joint Stock Com pany (“FMJSC”) , the Authority notes
that the producer/exporter has furnished the details/information in the questionnaire
format/additional questionnaire format for the calendar year January 2023 to December
2023 instead of Perio d of investigation i.e., Ap ril 2023 to June 202 4. The Authority notes
that FMJSC did not provide information in the given format and has failed to co -operate
with the Authority. Therefore, the Authority has not grant ed an individual su bsidy margin
to FMJSC .
157. Addit ionally, Autho rity notes that followin g producers/exporters of PUC from Vietnam
namely, GCC Mine rals, JSC, Viet Trung Plastic Chemical Joint Stock Company and
Megaplast Joint Stock Company h ave failed to fu rnish r elevant information in the
original as well as addit ional que stionn aire response issued by the Authority during the
course of investig ation and have failed to co-operate with the Autho rity. Therefore, the
Autho rity has not granted the individual margins to above mentioned producers/exporters.
SUBSIDY MARGI N TABLE
Sl
No Producer Program. No. 1 -
Supply of
Limestone at LTAR Program 3 -
Exemption on
Corporate Income
Tax for Enterprise Program. No. 5, 7, 8,
10,11 - Preferential
Lending Program. No. 13
Government
Provision of Land at
LTAR And
Exemption/
Reducti on of Lan d
and Water Rent Total
Subsidy margin Subsidy margin Subsidy margin Subsidy margin Subsidy margin
USD/
MT % Ran
ge USD/
MT % Ran
ge USD/
MT % Ran
ge USD/
MT % Ran
ge USD/
MT % Ran
ge
1 European
Plastic
Joint
Stock
Company
(“EuroPlas
t”), *** *** 0-10 *** **
* 0-10 *** **
* 0-10 *** **
* 0-10 *** **
* 0-10
2 Yen Bai
European
Plastic
Joint
Stock
Company
(“Yenbai”
) *** *** 0-10 *** **
* 0-10 *** **
* 0-10 *** **
* 0-10 *** **
* 0-10
3 Nghe An
European
Plastic
One
Member
Limited
Liability
Company
(“Nghe”) *** *** 0-10 *** **
* 0-10 *** **
* 0-10 *** **
* 0-10 *** **
* 0-10
4 Polyfill
joint stock
company
(“Polyfill”
)
(collective
ly referred
to as
“Europlast
Group”) *** *** 0-10 *** **
* 0-10 *** **
* 0-10 *** **
* 0-10 *** **
* 0-10
W Avg for
Euro Pla st
Group *** *** 0-10 *** **
* 0-10 *** **
* 0-10 *** **
* 0-10 *** **
* 0-10
5 ADC
Plastic.,JS
C *** *** 0-10 *** **
* 0-10 *** **
* 0-10 *** **
* 0-10 *** **
* 0-10
6 An Tien
Industries
Joint
Stock
Company *** *** 0-10 *** **
* 0-10 *** **
* 0-10 *** **
* 0-10 *** **
* 0-10
7 Vitaplas
Joint
Stock
Company
(Vitaplas) *** *** 0-10 *** **
* 0-10 *** **
* 0-10 *** **
* 0-10 *** **
* 0-10
8 Vietnam
Industrial
Minerals
Joint
Stock
Company *** *** 0-10 *** **
* 0-10 *** **
* 0-10 *** **
* 0-10 *** **
* 0-10
9 US
Masterbat
ch Joint
Stock
Company *** *** 0-10 *** **
* 0-10 *** **
* 0-10 *** **
* 0-10 *** **
* 0-10
0 US
Masterbat
ch Joint
Stock
Company
– Hung
Yen
Branch *** *** 0-10 *** **
* 0-10 *** **
* 0-10 *** **
* 0-10 *** **
* 0-10
(collective
ly referred
to as “US
Masterbat
ch
Group”) *** *** 0-10 *** **
* 0-10 *** **
* 0-10 *** **
* 0-10 *** **
* 0-10
1 Others *** *** 10-20 *** **
* 0-10 *** **
* 0-10 *** **
* 0-10 *** **
* 20-30
G. EXAMINATION OF INJURY AND CAUSAL LINK
G.1. Submissio ns made by other interested parties
158. The following submissions have been made by the other interested parties on the issue of
injury and causal link :
i. The other interested parties submitted that the petition does not establish material injury
to the domest ic indu stry or the existence of a causal link between alleged subsidisation
and the condition of the domestic producers. It was submitted that the Auth ority must
undertake a causation and non -attribution analysis before recommending countervailing
duties.
ii. Rule 13 of the CVD Rules mirrors Article 15.5 of the SCM Agreement, which requires
demonstration that subsidised imports are causing injury “through th e effects of
subsidies” based on examination of all relevant evidence and further requires the
Authority to exam ine other known factors injuring the domestic industry and ensure
injuries from such factors are not attributed to subsidised imports.
iii. The petit ion does not satisfy these mandatory requirements and should therefore be
rejected.
iv. Although the petition allege s price undercutting, price suppression, and volume -based
injury, it does not provide reliable evidence that imports from Vietnam exerted signif icant
price pressure on the domestic industry.
v. The domestic industry itself acknowledges that the PUC var ies con siderably in
composition, including calcium carbonate content, polymer base, and additive structure.
The p rice comparisons require “like -for-like” adjustments for grade, functionality, and
specifications, which the petition does not undertake.
vi. The price undercutting methodology in the petition is simplistic and does not meet the
evidentiary threshold because it does not account for product differe nces. The price
undercutting has consistently shown positive trends, and despite this, the domestic
indus try has not changed its behaviour to avert losses. This indicates losses are driven by
internal competition among domestic producers rather than import s from Vietnam.
vii. The petition does not demonstrate significant price depression. There is no data showing
domesti c prices fell during the injury period, and no evidence that domestic producers
attempted to raise prices but were prevented from doing so by im ports.
viii. The petition itself states that PUC forms only a miniscule share of cost for downstream
plastics p roducts and that polymer/resin costs are dominant determinants of pricing. The
stability or modest increases in domestic prices aligned with input cost trends cannot
constitute price depression.
ix. Price suppression cannot be established without showing that domesti c prices would have
increased “but for” imports. The petition provides no such counterfactual analysis.
x. The petition fails to show a direct or consistent correlation between import prices a nd
domestic pricing behaviour. The petition itself acknowled ges sub stantial influence of raw
material price fluctuations, including resin and calcium carbonate inputs, on costs during
the injury period, and these factors are independent of imports and must be excluded from
injury attribution.
xi. The petition does not establi sh displacement of domestic sales by imports from Vietnam.
The market for PUC has been expanding, providing room for both domestic producers
and imports.
xii. Annexure IV -A in the petition does not show a precipitous decline in output over the
years that would normally indicate injury caused by import surges. Many domestic
producers maintained or increased production levels.
xiii. Where imports rose, this coincided with increases in nationwide demand r ather than loss
of domestic market share. The petition itsel f refer s to operational constraints faced by
domestic producers, including the fragmented structure of the industry and shutdowns
during the COVID -19 period.
xiv. The imports are filling a supply gap that domestic producers could not meet, whether due
to capaci ty cons traints or commercial decisions, cannot constitute injury.
xv. The petition acknowledges imports under HS Code 3824 99 00 from other countries, but
attributes the alleged injury entirely t o Vietnamese imports. Without analysing the price
and volume effe cts of non-subject imports, the Authority cannot satisfy the non -
attribution requirement under Rule 13 of the CVD Rules and Article 15.5 of the SCM
Agreement .
xvi. The petition identifies certain non-import factors but does not analyse and exclude their
effects from t he injury narrative. The factors identified by interested parties included
internal competition among numerous domestic producers, pricing strategies adopted by
domestic firms, changes in demand patterns, variations in production efficiency,
downstr eam mar ket fluctuations, contraction in demand or changes in patterns of
consumption, developments in technology, export performance, and productivity.
xvii. The Indian market is fragmented with si gnificant inter se domestic competition, and that
aggressive pric e compe tition among domestic producers can influence pricing behaviour,
profitability, and capacity utilisation independent of imports.
xviii. The domestic producers operate with excess capacity and low-capacity utilisation,
creating oversupply and downward press ure on prices independent of imports.
xix. The product segmentation, including the price differential between calcium carbonate
masterbatch (PUC) and colour masterbatch, and higher margins in colour masterbatch,
can distort profitability and injury assessment i f not p roperly segregated.
xx. The smaller pro ducers, including MSMEs, are vulnerable to aggressive domestic
competition, and any financial strain may arise from these structural conditions rather
than from imports.
xxi. The petition shows price undercutting by sub ject im ports remained consistently positiv e
across all years, including during the POI, and that despite stable undercutting levels the
domestic industry allegedly reported increased losses during the POI. It was contended
that this disconnect indicates in jury is not attributable to Vietnamese imp orts.
xxii. Reliance was placed on WTO and domestic jurisprudence to submit that the Authority
must “separate and distinguish” the injurious effects of other known factors and quantify
or explain their nature and extent relativ e to subject imports.
xxiii. Even in the domestic industry’s own data, most injury parameters show improvement
from the base year and preceding years, and therefore the applicants have not established
injury.
xxiv. Based on the injury information, the domestic industr y’s capacity increased from 415,302
MT in the base year to 475,748 MT in the POI (annualised).
xxv. The production increased from 252,179 MT in the base year to 303,862 MT in the POI
(A), and that productivity also increased.
xxvi. capacity utilisation increas ed from 61% in the base year to 64% in the POI ( A).
xxvii. Domestic sales increased from 190,683 MT in the base year to 223,632 MT in the POI
(A).
xxviii. Domestic selling price per unit increased from an index of 100 in the base year to an
index of 112 in the PO I (A).
xxix. Where some factors may have declined, such declines cannot be attributed to imports
from Vietnam and are instead due to internal factors such as inefficiencies of domestic
producers and increased depreciation and interest costs.
xxx. The petition does no t provid e posit ive evidence of subsidisation in the subject country
and consequential injury to the domestic industry, and therefore no injury finding can be
made.
xxxi. The petitioner’s injury analysis is legally inadequate because it relies predominantly on
import vol ume tre nds without establishing the mandatory causal link between alleged
subsidisation and injury, contrary to the requirement to examine all relevant economic
factors.
xxxii. The import volumes may change for various commercial reasons not related to su bsidies,
includ ing buyer procurement strategies, inventory adjustments, seasonal or cyclical
demand, temporary domestic supply shortages, exchange rate movements affecting
landed price parity, shifts in demand for quality or cost -efficient imports, and dow nstream
demand fluctuations.
xxxiii. The petitioner has not provided transaction -level evidence showing that alleged
subsidies translated into lower export prices or any pass -through from subsidy to export
pricing.
xxxiv. One interested party submitted that its exports are too s mall to cause injury and claimed
that, even on the petitioner’s estimates, its exports represent 0.98% of India’s demand and
5.15% of Vietnam’s exports to India and therefore cannot materially affect a domestic
industry of the scale alleged in the petition .
xxxv. One interested party claimed that its export price to India is higher than its domestic price
and higher than its export prices to other destinations, indicating no price pressure on the
domestic i ndustry.
xxxvi. Due to incoherent, uneven, and allegedly non -compliant data and excessive
confidentiality claimed by the domestic industry, they are not in a position to offer
meaningful comments on injury and causal link at this stage. It was submitted that
mean ingful comments can be offered only after proper informat ion for the proper period
is provided in line with Trade Notices.
G.2. Submissions made by the domestic industry
159. The following submissions have been made by the domestic industry on the issue of
injury and causal link:
i. The domestic industry submitted th at the determination of injury and causal link in a
countervailing duty investigation is governed by Rule 13 read with Annexure I of the
CVD Rules, which requires an examination based on positive e vidence and an objective
evaluation of (a) the volume of su bsidise d imports and their effect on prices in the
domestic market for like products, and (b) the consequent impact of these imports on
domestic producers.
ii. The domestic industry provided the data on imports from the subject country, Indian
demand, Indian p roducti on, and import share .
iii. The domestic industry submitted that the data shows a consistent increase in imports from
the subject country in absolute terms and an increase in their share in the In dian market
both relative to demand and relative to Indian product ion.
iv. Imports increased from 48,155 MT in 2020 –21 to 63,043 MT in 2021 –22 and further to
1,00,122 MT in 2022 –23 and then increased to 2,20,912 MT during the POI. Indian
demand increased from 6,30,693 MT in 2020 –21 to 10,87,076 MT in the POI, but Indi an
production increased from 6,06,939 MT in 2020 –21 to 8,94,395 MT in the POI.
v. The growth in domestic production was low er than growth in demand, indicating
displacement by imports from the subject country.
vi. Subject imports’ share in demand increased from 8% to 2 0% and their share relative to
production increased from 8% to 25% over the injury period, reflecting increasing
penetration and replacement of domestic production .
vii. The volume effect is evident because incremental demand was increasingly captured by
import s from the subject country, limiting the domestic industry’s ability to supply Indian
consumers despite expanding demand .
viii. The domestic industry submitted the data show ing significant and positive undercutting
throughout the injury period and the POI , indic ating that landed prices of subject imports
undercut domestic selling prices .
ix. The domestic industry was forced to sell below cost of sales in all years, resulting in
losses throughout the injury period. The persistent gap between landed prices and
domestic selling prices, together with sales below cost, demonstrates price suppressio n
and price depression .
x. In accordance with Paragraph 7 of Trade Notice No. 09/2021 as amended by Trade
Notice No. 11/2021, the Authority selected the following entities as sample d domestic
producers for determination of injury margin:
(i) Soltex Petro Products Ltd.;
(ii) Alok Masterbatches Pvt. Ltd.;
(iii) Alok Industries; and
(iv) Kandui Industries Pvt. Ltd.
xi. The sampled domestic producers filed the information required for determination of
non-injurious price. It was submitted that the weighted average comb ined non -injurious
price for PCN A, PCN B and PCN C has been claimed to be in the range of 400 –550
USD/M T.
xii. The domestic industry expanded capacity to meet increasing demand from the pla stics
industry. During the POI, actual production and sales declined co mpared to the previous
year due to increased low -priced subsidised imports from the subject country.
xiii. The capacity utilisation fell in the POI and that despite increasing demand, a signi ficant
portion of capacity remained unused. Over the injury period the domestic industry
operated at around 60% –70% capacity.
xiv. The applicant domestic industry’s market share declined from 30% in the base year to
26% in the POI, while the subject country’s m arket s hare increased from 8% to 20%
over the same period .
xv. The imports from other countries were negligible, and the increase in import share was
mainly from the subject country. This increase is linked to the large volume of
subsidised imports from the su bject c ountry, which became more aggressive in the last
few years and during the POI .
xvi. The lost market share and could not sell at reasonable prices despite having sufficient
capacity to meet the entire demand in India.
xvii. The profit, cash profit and return on invest ment remained negative throughout the injury
period a nd losses increased with the highest losses in the POI. Losses increased sharply
due to aggressive subsidisation of subject imports.
xviii. The average inventory increased consistently over the injury pe riod an d rose sharply in
the POI.
xix. All volume parameters show negative growth in the POI, and all price parameters show
negative growth over the injury period and the POI. Increasing inventory and declining
market share show adverse impact of subsidised im ports.
xx. Although domestic industry expanded capacities, it is unable to utilise the existing
capacities and is incurring losses due to aggravated subsidisation. The industry is
therefore reluctant to make fresh investments in the subject goods unless existi ng
capacities are fully utilised.
xxi. Threat of material injury must be based on facts and not on allegation, conjecture, or
remote possibility, and reliance was placed on Article 15.7 of the SCM Agreement and
Clause (3) of Annexure I of the CVD Rules.
xxii. There a re spec ific facts indicating a threa t of material injury due to subsidies provided
by the Government of Vietnam to Vietnamese producers/exporters, including export
promotion schemes and policies that make raw materials (including limestone/calcium
carbonat e) avai lable at subsidised prices, a nd also include utilities at less than adequate
remuneration, tax incentives, cheaper land and electricity and similar support.
xxiii. These subsidies enable exports to India at subsidised prices, causing material injury and
threat of material injury to the domes tic industry in India.
xxiv. The domestic industry submitted that increasing export tax rates on limestone , reaching
30% from July 2024, indicate that the threat is likely to intensify.
xxv. The Master plan for development of Vietn am’s pl astic industry focus es on trade
promotion in export markets and adjustment of import tax rates to boost the plastics
industry indicates likelihood of increased subsidised exports to India, creating a
foreseeable and imminent threat of material injur y.
xxvi. The data shows a significant rate of year -on-year increase in subsidised imports from the
subject country during the injury period, indicating likelihood of substantially increased
importation in the future.
xxvii. Vietnamese manufacturers have production capa cities excee ding Vietnam’s domestic
demand and therefore surplus production is intended for export. These excess capacities
are far in excess of India’s total demand and create a likelihood of substantially
increased exports to India.
xxviii. India represents a si gnifica nt ma rket, and following are the installed capacities of major
Vietnamese producers:
a) European Plastics Joint Stock Company – 8,00,000 MT
b) US Masterbatch Joint Stock Company – 2,30,000 MT
c) Mega Plast Joint Stock Company – 1,40,000 MT
d) An tien Industries Indust ry Jo int Stock Company – 96,000 MT
e) Pha le Plastics Manufacturing – 4,50,000 MT
f) Vitaplas Joint Stock Company – 48,000 MT
xxix. These producers are likely to target India to utilise surplus capacity, and that the influx
of subsidised imports at suppressing /depres sing prices threatens the existence of the
domestic industry.
xxx. The domestic producers were forced to sell below cost and that domestic prices fell in
the POI as compared to the previous year on account of imports entering at un dercutting
prices . The trend o f landed prices vis -à-vis domestic prices and cost shows imports are
entering at prices with significant depressing/suppressing effect and therefore imports
are likely to increase further .
xxxi. The inventory levels of foreign produ cers are not publicly a vailabl e and requested that
the Authority verify exporters’ inventory levels based on questionnaire responses .
xxxii. The domestic industry undertook a structured analysis of other factors, including: (a)
volume and prices of non -subsidised imports; (b) contracti on in d emand or changes in
patterns of consumption; (c) competition between foreign and domestic producers; (d)
developments in technology; (e) export performance; and (f) productivity.
a) The imports from other countries did not cause injury because imports from th e subject
country account for about 99% of total imports into India and imports from other
countries constitute about 1%.
b) The demand increased over the injury period and therefore injury cannot be attributed to
demand co ntraction.
c) The customer negot iations are benchmarked to imported prices and domestic producers
are forced to match prices of subject imports; if exporters offer better prices, customers
shift to imports.
d) There is no injury due to technological changes.
e) Exports are insignificant compar ed to d omestic sales and export performance was not
considered in determining injury, and therefore injury cannot be attributed to exports.
f) The injury analysis pertains only to PUC and excludes profitability of othe r products,
and therefore injury cannot b e attri buted to performance of other products.
xxxiii. The injury is not due to other known factors and is caused by subsidised imports from
the subject country. Imposition of countervailing duty is necessary.
xxxiv. The contentio n that injury is attributable to inter se compet ition among domestic
producers is misplaced, and that fragmentation does not negate injury caused by
subsidised imports where the data shows significant increase in import volumes coupled
with adverse price e ffects.
xxxv. The increased import volume coinc ides wi th deterioration in key parameters including
market share, profitability, cash flows and inventories, establishing injury through
volume effect.
xxxvi. The contention that price undercutting is “stable” is misleadin g, as persistent and
significant undercut ting it self indicates price pressure, and injury is aggravated when
such undercutting operates over substantially increased volumes.
xxxvii. The price undercutting reached 25 –30% during the POI, which suppresses domestic
prices and prevents recovery of costs .
xxxviii. The argumen ts on unused capacity and low-capacity utilisation ignore displacement, and
the relevant issue is whether capacity could be utilised in the presence of subsidised
imports. It was submitted that inc remental demand was captured by low -priced imports,
prevent ing proportionate increase in production and utilisation.
xxxix. The objections on inability to comment due to confidentiality are unfounded, as
sufficient non -confidential information including indexed t rends and injury parameters
has been disclosed to en able re asonable understanding, confidentiality has been claimed
in accordance with Trade Notices and the CVD Rules, and the Authority has power to
verify confidential information. Confidentiality does not vitiate the injury analysis and
does not warrant re startin g investigation timelines.
G.3. Examination by the Authority
160. Rule 1 3 of the CVD Rules read with Annexure I to the CVD Rules provides that an injury
determination shall involve examination of factors that may indicate injury to the
domestic industr y,
“(1) In the case of imports from specified countries, the designated authority shall give
a further finding that the import of su ch article into India causes or threatens material
injury to any industry established in India, or materially retards the e stablis hment of an
industry in India.
(2) Except when a finding of injury is made under sub -rule (3), the designated authority
shall determine the injury, threat of injury, material retardation to the establishment of
an industry and the casual link betwe en the subsidised import and the injury, taking into
account inter alia, the principle laid down in Annexure I to the rule.
(3) The designated authority may, in exceptional cases, give a finding as to the existence
of injury even where a substantial porti on of t he domestic industry is not injured if - (i)
there is a concentration of subsidised imports into an isolated market, and (ii) the
subsidised imports are causing injury to the producers of almost all of the production
within such market. ”.
161. Further, in con sidering the effect of the subsidized imports on prices, it is considered
necessary to examine whether there has been a significant price undercutting by the
subsidized imports as compared with the price of the like article in India, or whether the
effect of such imports is otherwise to depres s prices to a significant degree or prevent
price increases, which otherwise would have occurred, to a significant degree. For the
examination of the impact of the subsidized imports on the domestic industry in India,
indices having a bearing on the state of the industry such as production, capacity
utilization, sales volume, inventory, profitability, net sales realization, return on
investment, the magnitude and margin of subsidization , etc. have been considered in
accordance with Annexure I of the CVD Rules.
162. The Authority has examined the arguments and counterarguments of the interested parties
with regard to injury to the domestic industry. The injury analysis made by the Authority
hereunder addresses the vari ous sub missions made by the interested partie s.
163. As regards the various arguments of other interested parties based on the statements and
data provided by the domestic industry, the Authority has relied upon the verified data of
the domestic industry for t he purp ose of the present final findings .
G.3.1. Volume effect of the subsidized imports
a) Assessment of demand/apparent consumption
164. For the purpose of injury analysis, the Authority has relied on the transaction wise import
data procured from DG Syste ms. For determination of demand/apparent consumption of
the product in India, the Authority has considered the sum of the domestic sales of the
applicants , other producers and imports from subject countr y and imports from other
countries. The demand/appare nt cons umption so calcula ted is as under:
SN Particulars Unit 2020 -21 2021 -22 2022 -23 POI (A)
1 Imports from Vietnam MT 48,182 62,228 94,458 1,81,824
2 Imports from other counties MT 207 27 969 5,702
3 Domestic Sales (Applicant) MT 1,90,683 2,40,084 2,32,183 2,23,632
4 Domestic Sales (Other producers
including supporters) MT 3,91,758 4,19,307 4,37,761 4,64,831
5 Indian Demand MT 6,30,830 7,21,645 7,65,372 8,75,988
165. It is seen that the demand of the PUC has increased significantly during injury period .
b) Import volume from the subject country relative to production and consumption in India
166. With regard to the volume of the subsidized imports, the Authority is required to consider
whether there has been a significant increase in the subsidized impor ts, eit her in absolute terms
or relative to production or consumption in India. The import volumes of the subject goods
from the subject co untry and share of subject imports during the injury investigation period are
as follows:
SN Particulars Unit 2020 -21 2021 -22 2022 -23 POI (A)
1 Imports from Vietnam MT 48,182 62,228 94,458 1,81,824
2 Imports from other countries MT 207 27 969 5,702
3 Indian Demand MT 6,30,830 7,21,645 7,65,372 8,75,988
4 Indian Production MT 6,06,939 6,78,391 6,96,823 7,15,516
5 Subject countr y import in relation
to -
A Indian Demand % 8% 9% 12% 21%
B Indian Production % 8% 9% 14% 25%
167. It is seen that imports of subject goods from Vietnam have increased in absolute terms
throughout the injury period while there are ne gligibl e imports from other countries. The
imports from Vietnam in terms of Indian demand and Indian production have also
consis tently increased during the injury period.
A.2 G.3.2. Price effect of the dumped imports
168. In terms of Annexure I (ii) of the Rules, with r egard to the effect of the subsidized imports
on prices, the Authority is required to consider whether there has been a significant price
undercutting by the subsidized imports as compared with the price of the like product in
India, or whether the effect of such imports is otherwise to depres s prices to a significant
degree or prevent price increases, which otherwise would have occurred, to a significant
degree.
a) Price undercutting
169. Price undercutting has been determined by comparing the net sales realiza tion of the
domestic industry with the landed price of the imports for the POI. The table below shows
the same -
Particular UOM POI (A)
Net Selling Realisation Rs. / MT ***
Landed Price Rs. / MT 25,760
Price Undercutting Rs. / MT ***
Price Underc utting % ***
Price Undercutting Range % 25-35%
170. The Authority notes that t he price undercutting is not only positive but also significant.
b) Price suppression/depression
171. In order to determine whether the effect of imports is to depress prices to a sig nifican t
degree or prevent price increases which otherwise would have occurred, the Authority has
compared the cost of sales & net sales realization of the domestic industry with the landed
price of subject goods .
172. The table below shows the cost of sales, selling price and the landed price of imports of
PUC -
Particulars Unit 2020 -21 2021 -22 2022 -23 POI (A)
Cost of Sales Rs/MT *** *** *** ***
Trend Indexe
d 100 117 119 113
Net sales
realization Rs/MT *** *** *** ***
Trend Indexe
d 100 115 115 109
Landed Price Rs/MT 23,92
6 29,80
8 29,69
5 25,76
Trend Indexe
d 100 125 124 108
173. It can be seen from the above table that the domestic industry has been selling PUC in the
domestic market below its cost of sales thereby incurring losses. The landed prices have
been below the domestic selling prices , and sales price is below the cost of sales which
exhibit ing that domestic industry has suffered price suppression.
G.3.3 Economic parameters of the domestic industry
174. Annexure I to the CVD Rules require that the deter minatio n of injury shall involve an
objective examination of the conseque nt impact of dumped imports on domestic producers
of such products. With regard to consequent impact of dumped imports on domestic
producers of such products, the Rules further provid e that the examination of the impact of
the dumped imports on the domesti c industry should include an objective evaluation of all
relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the industry,
including actual and potential decline in sales, profits, output, market share, productivity,
return on investment s or utilization of capacity; factors affecting domestic prices, the
magnitude of the margin of subsidization ; actual and potential negative effects on cash
flow, inventories, employm ent, wa ges, growth, ability to raise capital investments. The
various inj ury parameters relating to the domestic industry are discussed below.
a) Production, capacity, capacity utilization and sales volumes
175. Capacity, production, sales and capacity utilizati on of the domestic industry over the injury
period were as below:
Particulars Unit 2020 -21 2021 -22 2022 -23 POI (A)
Capacity MT *** *** *** ***
Production PUC MT *** *** *** ***
Capacity Utilization % *** *** *** ***
Domestic sales % 1,90,683 2,40,084 2,32,183 2,23,632
176. It is noted that the domestic industry expanded its capacities . There has been an increas e in
demand of the subject goods in India. The domestic industry increase d its capacity
utilization marginally in the POI when compared to base year . The domestic industry is
operating at ***% in the POI .
177. Further, the domestic sales and production level of the domestic industry have shown a n
improvement in the POI when compared to base year .
b) Market share
178. The market share of the domestic industry a nd of imports is shown in the table below:
Particulars U
nit 202
0-
21 202
1-
22 202
2-
23 POI
(A)
Share of Applicant Domestic
Industry % 30
% 33
% 30
% 26
%
Share of other Indian producers
including Supporters % 62
% 58
% 57
% 53
%
Share of subject country % 8% 9% 12
% 21
%
Share of Other Countries % 0.03
% 0.00
% 0.13
% 0.65
%
179. It can be seen from the above table that the market share of the domestic industry has
declined in the POI (A) as compared to base year, despite having the capacity to meet a
much higher share in the Indian demand. Furthermore, the share of other Indian producers
including the supporter has also declined throughout the injury period.
180. On the contrary, the market share of the subject countr y has been consistently increasing
throughout the injury p eriod. Further, it is also evident that the market share of imports
from other countries is insignificant.
c) Inventories
181. Inventory position of the domestic industry over the injury period is given i n the table
below:
Particulars Unit 2020 -21 2021 -22 2022 -23 POI (A)
Average MT *** *** *** ***
182. It can be seen that the average inventory of the domestic industry consistently increased
during the injury period.
d) Profitability, cash profits and return on capital employed
183. Profitability, return on investment a nd cash profits of the domestic industry over the injury
period are given in the table below:
Particulars Unit 2020 -
21 2021 -
22 2022 -
23 POI
(A)
Profit/ (loss) Rs.
Lacs *** *** *** ***
Trend Indexed -100 -260 -319 -306
Cash Profit Rs.
Lacs *** *** *** ***
Trend Indexed -100 -557 -718 -661
Return on
Capital
Employed % *** *** *** ***
Trend Indexed -100 -363 -402 -349
184. The profit, cash profits and ROI of the domestic industry have been consistently declining
throughout the injury period and the domesti c industry is suffering financial losses.
e) Employment, wages and productivity
185. Employment, wages and productivity of the domestic industry over the injury period are
given in the table below:
Particulars Unit 2020 -
21 2021 -
22 2022 -
23 POI
(A)
Employees Nos *** *** *** ***
Productivity per employee MT *** *** *** ***
Salaries and Wages Rs.
Lacs *** *** *** ***
186. The salary and wages paid by the domestic industry have increased over the injury period.
The productivity per employee has also declined in the POI.
f) Growth
187. All the price parameters of the domestic industry show negative growth over the injury
period and POI. The average inventory has also increased over the injury period . The
market share of the domestic industry also shows negative growth. The domestic industry
is in losses during the injury period .
g) Impact on the ability to raise capital inve stments
188. The Authority notes that, even though the domestic industry has made new investments to
increase its capacities to cater to the increasing demand for the PUC in India, it has been
unable to utilise its capacities and is facing losses due to subsidised impo rts. Thus, the
ability of the domestic industry to raise capital investments is significantly impaired.
h) Factors affecting prices
189. The Authority notes that the volume of imports during the POI was significant and such
imports were at prices significantly below the cost of sales of the domestic industry. Net
Sales Realisation of the domestic industry has been severely affected by the subject
imports . Thus, the landed value of the subject goods from the subject country is the main
factor affecting domestic p rices.
i) Margin of Subsidy
190. The margin of subsidy is an indicator of the extent to which the subsidized imports can
cause injury to the domestic industry. The Authority notes that the subsidy margin is
positive for Vietnam.
G.3.4 Threat of material injury
191. The Authority has examined the submissions made by various interested parties regarding
the scope of investigation concerning threat of materia l injury.
192. The Authority notes that Rule 1 3 of the CVD Rules provides that the Authority shall
determine whether subsidized imports have caused or are threatening to cause material
injury to the domestic industry.
193. The Authority observes that the initiati on notification stated that the investigation would
examine whether subsidized imports have caused or are threatening to cause material
injury to the domestic industry. The scope of investigation as defined in the in itiation
notification encompasses both m aterial injury and threat of material injury, and the
Authority is empowered to examine both aspects based on evidence that emerges during
the investigation.
194. The Authority observes that Para ( 3) of Annexure I to the CVD Rules requires that no
determinatio n of threat of material injury shall be made on the basis of mere allegation,
conjecture or remote possibility and that the change in circumstances which would create a
situation in which the subsidization would cause injury must be clearly foreseen and
imminent.
195. The Authority has examined the import data on record and notes that there has been a
consistent and significant increase in imports of the subject goods from Vietnam
throughout the inju ry period. The import volumes have more than tripled from the base
year to the POI, demonstrating a substantial rate of increase.
196. The data on record shows that Vietnamese producers have substantial production capacity
that exceeds domestic demand in Vietn am.
197. The Authority notes that the existence of surplus product ion capacity in Vietnam,
combined with the export orientation of Vietnamese producers as evidenced by increasing
exports to India, creates conditions conducive to further substantial increases i n exports to
the Indian market.
198. The Authority has also examin ed the price analysis on record and notes that the subject
imports have been entering the Indian market at prices that undercut domestic prices,
leading to price suppression in the domestic mark et.
199. The Authority observes that the combination of factors in cluding significant rate of
increase in imports, surplus production capacity in Vietnam, price undercutting and
suppression, and deteriorating performance of domestic industry creates conditions where
threat of material injury is clearly foreseen and immin ent.
H. NON -ATTRIBUTION ANALYSIS
200. Having examined the existence of injury, volume and price effects of dumped imports on
the prices of the domestic industry, the Authority has examined whether injury to the
domestic industry can be attributed to any factor, other than the dumped imports, as list ed
under the CVD Rules.
a. Volume and price of imports from third countries
201. The Authority notes that imports from non -subject countries are almost negligible.
Therefore, the injury is not attributable to imports from t hird countries.
b. Contraction of demand
202. The demand for the product under consideration has seen an increase. Ther efore, decline
in demand cannot be a cause of injury. Thus, the domestic industry has not suffered any
injury due to a possible contraction in demand.
c. Changes in pattern of consumption
203. There has been no known material change in the pattern of consumption of the product
under consideration.
d. Conditions of competition and trade restrictive practices
204. The sales of the subject goods are not restr icted in any manner and no restrictive practices
have been brought to the notice of the Authority.
e. Developments i n technology
205. The Authority notes that there has been no known material change in the technology for
the production of the product under consi deration.
f. Export performance
206. The Authority has considered the injury data for the domestic operations only for t he
injury analysis. Therefore, export performance is not the cause of injury to the domestic
industry.
g. Performance of other products
207. The Aut hority has only considered data relating only to the performance of the subject
goods. Therefore, the performance of other products produced and sold is not a possible
cause of injury to the domestic industry.
I. MAGNITUDE OF INJURY MARGIN
208. The non -injurio us price of the subject goods produced by the domestic industry as
determined by the Authority in terms of the CVD Rules has been compared with the
landed value of the exports from the subject country for determination of injury margin
during the period o f investigation and the injury margin so worked out is as under:
Injury Margin Table
S. No. Producer NIP Landed Price Injury Margin Injury Margin Injury Margin
USD/MT USD/MT USD/MT % Range %
1. European Plastic Joint
Stock Company
(“EuroP last”) *** *** *** *** 20-30
2. Yen Bai European
Plastic Joint Stock
Company (“Yenbai”) *** *** *** *** 20-30
3. Nghe An European
Plastic One Member
Limited Liability
Company (“Nghe”) *** *** *** *** 20-30
4. Polyfill joint stock
company (“Polyfill”) *** *** *** *** 20-30
5. ADC Plastic.,JSC *** *** *** *** 25-35
6. An Tien Industries
Joint Stock Company *** *** *** *** 20-30
7. Vitaplas Joint Stock
Company (Vitaplas) *** *** *** *** 25-35
8. Vietnam Industrial
Minerals International
Joint Stock Company *** *** *** *** 55-65
9 US Masterbatch Joint
Stock Company *** *** *** *** 10-20
10 US Masterbatch Joint
Stock Company –
Hung Yen Branch *** *** *** *** 10-20
11 Others *** *** *** *** 60-70
J. USER IMPACT ANALYSIS (INDIAN INDUSTRY’S INTEREST AND OTHER
ISSUES)
J.1 Submissions made by other interested parties
209. The other interested parties have made the following submissions regarding the public
interest / Interest of the Indian industry:
i. The levy of countervailing duty in the present investigation would be contrary to public
interest within the meaning of Article 19.2 of the SCM Agreement.
ii. Article 19.2 recognizes that the decision to impose countervailing duty, and the level at
which it is requested , is discretionary and must take into account representations made by
domestic interested parties, including consumers and industrial users, whose interests may
be adversely affected.
iii. The Authority has already recommended the imposition of ant i-dumping duty on imports of
Calcium Carbonate Filler Masterbatch originating in or exported from Vietnam with the
recommended duty ranging from 0 to 75 USD per MT.
iv. The imposition of countervailing duty in addition to the anti -dumping duty would result in a
cumulative and excessive trade -restrictive burden, far exceeding what is necessary to
address any alleged injury to the domestic industry.
v. Trade remedial measures are intended to remedy injury and not to provide over -protection
or double protection to t he domestic industry. The cumulative imposition of anti -dumping
duty and countervailing duty would substantially increase the landed cost of imports and
would artificially inflate domestic prices, reduce the availability of competitively priced raw
materia ls, and distort market competition to the detriment of downstream users. Such an
outcome would be inconsistent with the principles of proportionality and public interest
underlying trade remedy law.
vi. Calcium Carbonate Filler Masterbatch is a critical indust rial input used extensively across a
wide range of downstream industries, including plastic packaging (rigid and flexible),
woven sacks and packaging materials, consumer goods and household products, agricultural
films and pipes, automotive and electrical plastic components, and construction and
infrastructure -related plastic applications.
vii. The product is used to reduce raw material costs, improve processing efficiency, and
enhance physical properties of plastic products. Any increase in the cost of this input would
have a direct and immediate cascading impact across multiple sectors of the economy.
viii. The downstream industries in India are highly sensitive to input cost fluctuations.
Imposition of anti -dumping duty has already increased cost pressures on dow nstream users,
and that an additional countervailing duty would further increase production costs, reduce
the competitiveness of Indian manufacturers in both domestic and export markets, lead to
higher prices for end consumers, and potentially result in re duced production, layoffs, or
closure of businesses .
ix. Given the widespread use of the subject goods, the adverse effects would extend beyond the
domestic masterbatch producers and impact the broader manufacturing ecosystem.
x. The Indian market for PUC is highl y fragmented, with a large number of domestic
producers operating alongside imports. Imports play a crucial role in ensuring supply
stability, providing price discipline, and meeting specific quality and consistency
requiremen ts of downstream users. Excess ive trade remedial measures would restrict supply
options and undermine healthy competition in the market, which would be contrary to
public interest.
xi. Public interest analysis under trade remedy law requires a balancing of int erests between
domestic produc ers on the one hand and downstream industries, consumers, and the broader
economy on the other. In the present case, any marginal benefit accruing to the domestic
industry from the imposition of countervailing duty would be ou tweighed by the adverse
impact on downstream industries and consumers, and such additional costs would ultimately
be passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices.
xii. The imposition of countervailing duty would be disproportionate and excessive, result in an
undue cumulative burden when combined with the anti -dumping duty, and have a
significant adverse impact on downstream industries as well as on consumers.
xiii. Certain interested parties further contended that the claims made by the appl icant domestic
industry on issues relating to us er impact and public interest are based on assertions,
conjectures, and surmises without supporting evidence. No evidence has been provided by
the applicant to substantiate its submissions, and that such unsu bstantiated claims should not
be relied upon for adjudicating the merits of the case.
J.2 Submissions made by the domestic industry
210. The domestic industry has made the following submissions regarding the Public interest /
Interest of the Indian industry:
i. The objective of countervailing duty is to remov e injury caused by unfair subsidization
practices and to restore conditions of fair an d open competition in the Indian market, which
is in the overall interest of the country. The imposition of CVD is not intended to restrict
imports, but to neutralize the unfair advantage arising from subsidization.
ii. The imposition of CVD may have an impact on price levels, but it does not reduce
competition in the Indian market. On the contrary, CVD ensures that competition is based
on market forces rather than subsidizati on, prevents further decline of the domestic
industry, and helps maintain long -term av ailability and choice for consumers.
iii. Assessment of public interest requires the Authority to examine the impact of CVD on
availability of the goods, on downstream users, on the domestic industry, and on the
general public. Such an assessment must be based on evidence placed on record during the
investigation.
iv. As a matter of established practice, the Authority relies on information filed by interested
parties through User Q uestionnaires and Economic Interest Questionnaires (“EIQ”) to
assess downstream impact. Similar approaches are followed internationally, including in
the European Union, where user responses form the basis of the union interest analysis.
v. In the present inv estigation, the Authority issued User Questionnaires and EIQs and invited
participation from all interested parties, including users and consumers. However, no
downstream user has filed any response to the User Questionnaire or the EIQ.
vi. No downstream user has provided any quantified or verifiable information demonstrating
advers e impact of CVD on cost of production, pricing, employment, or competitiveness. In
the absence of such data, the submissions made by exporters and foreign producers on
alleged downst ream impact are speculative and unsupported.
vii. WTO jurisprudence recognizes the right of investigating authorities to impose strict
timelines and to disregard belated submissions. In the present case, no downstream user
has availed the opportunity provided d uring the investigation to place its concerns on
record, and any submissio ns made at a later stage should therefore be rejected.
viii. Downstream users of the subject goods are understood to be members of the All India
Plastics Manufacturers Association (AIPMA). However, no representation has been filed
by AIPMA or by any of its membe rs. The lack of participation indicates that the
submissions made by exporters are not representative of the interests of Indian downstream
users.
ix. The complete absence of responses t o the EIQ demonstrates that downstream users do not
consider the impositio n of CVD to have any material adverse impact on their operations.
No quantified information has been placed on record to show that CVD would render
downstream industries inefficient or uncompetitive.
x. The only quantified and verifiable impact assessment on record is the one provided by the
domestic industry itself, which shows that the impact of CVD on downstream users would
be minimal. The Authority was requested to rely on this evide nce.
xi. India has sufficient domestic capacity to meet the enti re demand for Calcium Carbonate
Filler Masterbatch. The total installed capacity of the Indian industry is estimated at
approximately 12 –15 lakh MT, while domestic production during the POI (A) wa s
7,15,516 MT, indicating significant underutilization of ca pacity.
xii. Given the availability of surplus domestic capacity, imports from the subject country are
not required to ensure supply stability. The contention that imposition of CVD would
restrict avai lability or disrupt supply is therefore factually incorrect.
xiii. It was submitted that public interest analysis must balance the interests of all domestic
stakeholders. The domestic industry is highly fragmented and predominantly composed of
MSMEs, which play a critical role in employment generation, regional developme nt, and
value -chain resilience in India.
xiv. The domestic industry submitted that continued subsidized imports threaten the survival of
MSME producers. Allowing such imports to erode domestic manufact uring capacity would
be contrary to India’s industrial and e conomic policy objectives and would adversely affect
public interest.
xv. Subsidized imports from Vietnam have already led to adverse structural changes in the
Indian market, with several domestic pro ducers either shutting down operations or being
compelled to act as white -label manufacturers/suppliers for Vietnamese producers, thereby
undermining domestic manufacturing capability.
xvi. Such developments result in long -term dependence on imports and defeat the objective of
fair competition and are contrary to public interest.
xvii. The subject goods constitute only a small proportion of the total cost of downstream plastic
products. No evidence has been placed on record to show that any increase in cost would
lead to inflationary pressure or consumer harm.
xviii. By restori ng fair competition and ensuring the viability of domestic producers, imposition
of CVD would promote long -term price stability and reliable availability of the product in
the Indian market.
xix. The imposit ion of countervailing duty would not be contrary to pu blic interest and is
necessary to safeguard domestic manufacturing (comprising primarily MSME producers),
employment, and long -term market stability.
J.3 Examination by the Authority
211. The Authority no tes that the submissions of certain producers/exporters have relied upon
Article 19.2 of the SCM Agreement to contend that the levy of countervailing duty would
be contrary to public interest, particularly in view of the anti -dumping duty already
recommend ed in the anti -dumping investigation concerning the same product from
Vietnam.
212. The Authority has examined the contention that the imposition of countervailing duty in
addition to anti -dumping duty would result in an excessive and disproportionate trade -
restrictive burden. In this regard, t he Authority notes that the trade remedial framework
applicable in India incorporates the principle of the lesser duty rule, which acts as an in -
built safeguard against excessive protection.
213. The Authority notes that, in accordance with the applicable rule s and consistent practice,
the quantum of duty recommended is restricted to the level necessary to remove the injury
suffered by the domestic industry. Accordingly, the cumulative impact of anti -dumping
duty and counterv ailing duty is capped by the injury margin determined for the domestic
industry and cannot exceed the level required to neutralize the injurious effect of dumping
and subsidization.
214. The Authority further observes that anti -dumping duty and countervailing duty address
distinct unfair trade p ractices, namely dumping and subsidization, respectively. However,
the application of the lesser duty rule ensures that the combined remedial effect does not
go beyond the injury margin established on the basis of verifi ed data. This mechanism
prevents ove r-compensation to the domestic industry and ensures proportionality in the
imposition of trade remedial measures.
215. The Authority considers that public interest/user impact analysis must be undertaken on
the basis of evid ence and information placed on recor d by domestic stakeholders whose
interests may be affected, including users/consumers/importers, and not on the basis of
broad assertions.
216. For this purpose, the Authority notes that, in the present investigation, User
Questionnaires and Economic Interest Questionnaires were issued, and the initiation
notification an opportunity to all interested parties, including downstream users and
consumers, to place relevant data on record regarding any adverse impact of duties on
their operations.
217. The Authority notes that no downstream user has filed any response to the User
Questionnaire or the Economic Interest Questionnaire. The Authority further notes that no
downstream user or user association has provided quantified informat ion regarding the
share of the subject goods in their cost structure, the expected impact of duties on cost of
production, pricing, employment, or competitiveness, or any other verifiable evidence to
substantiate the claim that the levy of countervailing d uty would cause mat erial adverse
impact.
218. In the absence of such quantified and verifiable information from users, the Authority
considers that the claims of injury to downstream industries remain unsubstantiated on the
record of the present investigation .
219. The domestic ind ustry provided a quantified impact analysis demonstrating that
imposition of countervailing duty would have a negligible impact on downstream users of
the product.
i. HDPE woven sack is one example where PUC is used.
ii. As per IS 11652:2017, the ash content in an HDPE woven sack (downstream product) is
5%, which indicates that the finished product has 5% calcium carbonate content.
iii. The PUC has approx. 75 -85% of the Calcium Carbonate.
iv. Therefore, a HDPE woven sack of 1 kg, will have 0.0625 kg ( 6.25%) of PUC.
v. Imposition of any countervailing duty will have negligible impact of 0.001% on the end
product .
220. The Authority notes the argument that duties may restrict availability and supply stability.
On this aspect, the Authority notes that the domes tic indus try has stated that total installed
capacity of the Indian industry is estimated at approximately 12 –15 lakh MT, while total
Indian production during the POI (A) is stated to be 7,15,516 MT, indicating
underutilization of capacity.
221. In the absenc e of quantified evidence from users demonstrating that imports from the
subject country are indispensable for supply stability, the Authority considers that the
contention of supply disruption due to CVD is not supported by evidence on record.
222. The Authori ty has noted the submissions that the subject goods are used across multiple
downstream applications and that any increase in input cost may be passed through to
consumers. However, the Authority also notes the domestic industry’s submission tha t the
subje ct goods constitute a small proportion of total cost of downstream plastic products,
and that no downstream user has placed evidence on record to demonstrate the likely cost
pass-through, inflationary impact, or loss of competitiveness attributa ble to coun tervailing
duty. In the absence of such evidence, the Authority considers that the claimed
downstream cost impact remains unquantified.
223. The Authority also notes the domestic industry’s submissions regarding the structure of
the Indian industry and the pot ential broader implications of continued subsidized
imports, including underutilization of capacity, stress on MSME producers, and allege d
structural changes such as closures or conversion to white -labelling. The Authority
considers that public interest an alysis requires balancing the interests of domestic
producers and domestic users, and that the interests of a fragmented domestic
manufac turing base, including MSMEs, are also relevant considerations where injury is
found due to subsidized imports.
224. The Au thority considers that the record indicates availability of domestic production and
capacity in India and that no downstream user has dem onstrated, with data, that
countervailing duty would cause material adverse impact on downstream industries or the
gene ral public. Accordingly, the Authority has not accept ed the request to refrain from
recommending countervailing duty solely on the basis of the public interest submissions
made by the producers/exporters.
225. The Authority notes the submission of the domestic industry that the Indian producers of
PUC are predominantly MSMEs. The Authority further notes that the fragmented
structure of the dome stic industry, with a large number of small and medium -scale
producers, has already been acknowledged in the initiation of the present investigation
and in the application of the procedural framework applicable to fragmented industries.
226. The Authority obse rves that MSME producers typically operate with limited financial
resilience, constrained access to capital, and lower ability to absorb sustained price
pressure arising from subsidized imports. Unlike large integrated producers, MSMEs are
particularly vul nerable to prolonged price undercutting and price suppression, as such
conditions directly affect their viability, cash flows, and ability to continue operations.
227. The Authority considers that protection of MSME producers is a relevant consideration in
public interest analysis, particularly where the domestic industry provides employment,
supports regional industrial devel opment, and contributes to value addition within the
country. The erosion of such an industry due to subsidized imports would have broade r
economic implications extending beyond the immediate product market.
228. The Authority observes that the submissions mad e by the producers/exporters have
primarily focused on alleged downstream impact, without addressing the consequences of
continued injury to the domestic MSME producers. Public interest analysis requires a
balanced assessment of the interests of all domest ic stakeholders, including the
sustainability of domestic manufacturing and employment.
229. In the absence of quantified evidence from downs tream users demonstrating material
adverse impact, and in view of the evidence on record regarding injury to an MSME -
dominated domestic industry, the Authority considers that recommendation of
countervailing duty is a necessary and proportionate measure to protect domestic MSME
producers from the injurious effects of subsidized imports and to restore conditions of fair
competition in the Indian market.
230. Accordingly, the Authority considers that, far from being contrary to public interest, the
imposition of countervailing duty serves the public interest by safeguarding domestic
MSME manufacturing capability, promoting fair c ompetition, and preventing long -term
dependence on subsidized imports.
231. The Authority has considered all submissions regarding public int erest and notes that the
fundamental purpose of countervailing duties is to eliminate injury caused to the domestic
industry by unfair trade practices so as to establish fair competition in the Indian market.
232. Quantification of duty impact analysis :
AMITABH KUMAR , Designated Authority
POST -DISCLOSURE COMMENTS
K.1 Submissions by the Government of Vietnam and Other Interested Parties
233. The Government of Vietnam, the participating producers/exporters and other interested
parties have, inter alia, made the following post -disclosure submissions:
i. The issuance of a revised Disclosure St atement, after the earlier disclosure dated 20
March 2026, was challenged as procedurally impermissible. It was submitted that the
Authority could not materially alter the disclosed methodology or margins without
disclosing the complete revised calculation s and granting sufficient time to comment.
ii. The time available for filing comments on the revised Disclosure Statement was stated
to be inadequate. Certain parties also objected to consideration of any fresh information
filed by the domestic industry after disclosure unless the same was placed in the public
file and an effective opportunity to rebut it was granted.
iii. The participating producers/exporters alleged excessive c onfidentiality in respect of the
domestic industry’s production, standing, sampling, inj ury data, non -injurious price,
benchmark data and subsidy calculations. It was contended that indexed or consolidated
disclosure did not permit an effective defence.
iv. The standing of the applicant associations and the applicant domestic producers was
disput ed. It was submitted that the Authority had not disclosed the production shares
necessary to establish compliance with Rule 6(3), and that the sampling of four domestic
producers was not shown to be representative.
v. The fifteen -month period of investigation was challenged as exceptional and
unsupported by adequate reasons. It was also alleged that the injury analysis could be
distorted because some sampled producers manuf acture products other than the product
under consideration.
vi. The interested parties did n ot seek any change to the product scope or the PCN
methodology; however, they maintained that all comparisons and margin determinations
must remain PCN -specific and bas ed on verified product -specific data.
vii. The substantial reduction in subsidy margins betwe en the earlier and revised disclosures
was relied upon to contend that the first disclosure was based on unreliable benchmarks
and assumptions. Certain exporters nevert heless submitted that the revised calculations
still did not disclose the complete worki ngs, denominator, allocation basis, exchange
rates and adjustments.
viii. With respect to Program 1, it was submitted that the export tax on limestone is a general
fiscal and resource -conservation measure and does not constitute entrustment or
direction of priva te suppliers within Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) of the SCM Agreement.
ix. The Government of Vietnam and the exporters submitted that the mere effect of an
export tax on domestic availability or price cannot establish a financial contribution. It
was argued that the Authority must identify an affirmative governmental act compelling
or authorising private bodies to provide limestone or calcium carbonate to the producers
of the subje ct goods.
x. The respondents contended that they procure calcium carbonate powder from
independent private suppliers on arm’s -length terms and do not purchase limestone from
the Government. Limestone and processed calcium carbonate were stated to be distinct
goods, falling under different tariff headings and having different physical
characteris tics and processing costs.
xi. It was argued that no pass -through or company -specific benefit analysis was carried out.
According to the exporters, any upstream effect on l imestone cannot be attributed to a
downstream purchaser of processed calcium carbonate u nless the Authority establishes,
on verified transaction -specific evidence, that the alleged benefit passed through to that
purchaser.
xii. Specificity under Program 1 was d isputed on the ground that limestone and calcium
carbonate are used across numerous sect ors. The respondents submitted that a widely
available input or a generally applicable export -tax measure cannot be treated as specific
merely because producers of the subject goods use the input.
xiii. The use of Malaysian export prices of calcium carbonate as an external benchmark was
challenged. The respondents questioned comparability in terms of whether the traded
material was ground or precipitated calcium carbonate, tar iff classification, particle size,
purity, coating, whiteness, end use, quantity, level of trade and other commercial
conditions.
xiv. It was submitted that tariff item 28365000 may include chemically defined, precipitated,
coated or refined calcium carbonate, whereas several Vietnamese producers use ground
calcium carbonate or stone powder. The b enchmark was therefore alleged to be product -
mismatched and inflated.
xv. An Tien, US Masterbatch and Vitaplas requested adoption of Egypt as the benchmark
source. They sub mitted that Egypt is a major producer and exporter of calcium
carbonate, represents an a rm's-length and undistorted market, and supplies calcium
carbonate used by the Indian industry.
xvi. The respondents relied on the alleged shares of Vietnam, Egypt and Malay sia in Indian
imports of calcium carbonate during the POI, stated to be approximately 45 %, 37% and
13%, respectively. On that basis, Egypt was claimed to be substantially more
representative than Malaysia, which was characterised as a comparatively minor s ource.
xvii. It was further contended that the domestic industry had acknowledged in the conne cted
anti-dumping investigation that it procures calcium carbonate from Egypt, Vietnam and
India. The omission of Egypt from the proposed benchmark exercise was alleged to be
selective and intended to produce a higher subsidy margin.
xviii. Certain respondents st ated that the average purchase price of CaCO3 by Vietnamese
producers is USD 35 per MT. However, the applicant industry has proposed FOB
benchmark price of around USD 1 30 per MT. Benchmark Price both for Limestone
Lumps as well as CaCO3 which happens to be more than three times the purchase price
even though the extent of alleged subsidization in the form of export tax is a merely
30%. Even assuming but not accepting tha t the entire extent of export tax of 30% can be
considered as countervailable subsidy (w hich indeed would be in stark contradiction to
the established jurisprudence on the issue), the benchmarking price of more than 300%,
would be ex facie preposterous.
xix. The respondents submitted that Egyptian prices, when properly adjusted, demonstrate
absen ce of benefit. They proposed deductions from Egyptian CIF prices for ocean
freight, inland freight, port charges, insurance and trader margin, including indicative
adjustments of 3% for port charges, 0.05% for insurance and 3% for trader margin. In
support of their argument, vide their email dated 23.06.2026, they have submitted the
documentary evidence pertaining to ocean freight charges from Alexandria port in Egypt
to Nhava Sheva port in India . The o cean freight provided by them is in the range of 45-
55 USD/MT.
xx. It was argued that the benchmark country need not be geographically proximate and
should instead reflect a reliable international market price at a comparable level of trade.
Reliance was placed on the Authority's earlier determinations concerning Fiberboards,
Atrazine Technical and Saturated Fatty Alcohol, where international or third -country
price references were used.
xxi. The respondents also challenged the conve rsion of Malaysian CIF values to FOB. They
submitted that the difference between the Mal aysian CIF price and the alleged local
price largely represented freight, port, insurance and trading costs; that calcium
carbonate is a high -volume, low -value product; and that only actual, contemporaneous
and product -specific freight should be used.
xxii. With out prejudice, the Government of Vietnam and certain exporters requested reliance
on verified in -country Vietnamese prices. They submitted that recognition of Vietnam a s
a market economy and the existence of private transactions required the Authority to u se
domestic prices unless material distortion was established through positive evidence.
xxiii. With respect to Program 12, the respondents supported the Authority’s proposal not to
countervail electricity, natural gas or coal. It was submitted that the participa ting
producers did not use natural gas or coal and purchased electricity under ordinary
commercial arrangements at published tariff rates applicable to broad categories of
consumers.
xxiv. The respondents submitted that differences in electricity tariffs based o n voltage, time of
use or consumer category are normal utility -pricing features and do not establish
specificity or a preferential benefit to producers of the subject g oods.
xxv. With respect to Program 13, the exporters submitted that they acquired or sub -leased
land-use rights from industrial park developers on commercial terms and, in some cases,
paid amounts above provincial base rates. It was argued that a sub -lease from a private
entity does not constitute government provision of land.
xxvi. The respondents disp uted the specificity of land incentives, submitting that exemptions
and reductions are based on objective regional -development criteria and are available to
all eligibl e enterprises located in designated areas. ADC Plastic further claimed that its
land pri ce was approximately 45% above the relevant benchmark and that no land or
water -rent concession was received.
xxvii. The use of Thailand Board of Investment data or built -factory/warehouse rental rates
was opposed as non -comparable. One respondent submitted, with out prejudice, that if a
Thailand benchmark were used, an industrial -estate land rate rather than a factory -rental
rate should be adopted.
xxviii. With respect to Program 3, the respondents submitted that corporate income tax
incentives form part of a general fisc al regime based on objective statutory criteria. It
was argued that the incentives are neither export -contingent nor limited to the plastics
industry and a re therefore not specific.
xxix. ADC Plastic acknowledged a limited tax exemption during part of the POI bu t argued
that any benefit was minimal and de minimis. The respondents also requested that the
benefit be confined to the actual period of exemption and cal culated against the
company -specific taxable income and normal statutory liability.
xxx. With respect to P rogram 4 and Programs 2 and 6, the participating exporters stated that
they had not availed any import -duty exemption, Master Plan assistance or export -
promotion benefit. They submitted that the legal existence or potential availability of a
programme cann ot support a margin in the absence of verified receipt of a benefit.
xxxi. With respect to Programs 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11, the respondents submitted that their l oans
were obtained from private commercial banks or on market terms. They disputed
treating every sta te-owned bank as a public body and requested that any benefit be tested
against comparable loans in the same currency, with due regard to maturity, securit y,
creditworthiness and borrower -specific conditions.
xxxii. An Tien and other parties submitted that actual rates charged by private foreign banks in
Vietnam should be preferred over the indicative rates of Bank of India, Vietnam Branch.
They further submitted t hat foreign -currency loans linked to international benchmarks
require separate treatment.
xxxiii. US Masterba tch Joint Stock Company and its Hung Yen Branch submitted that they had
filed the relevant programme information in their original responses and were corre ctly
granted an individual margin in the revised disclosure. Other parties sought company -
specific tr eatment based on the degree of cooperation and verified data.
xxxiv. VMI contended that its injury margin range was materially higher than those of other
particip ating exporters despite a similar subsidy -margin range. It requested re -
examination of the PCN -wise l anded value, NIP comparison and weighted -average
methodology.
xxxv. The respondents disputed the findings on material injury, threat and causal link. They
relied on demand growth, capacity additions, internal competition, raw -material costs,
product mix, fragmen ted industry structure and other factors as possible causes of the
domestic industry’s performance.
xxxvi. The interested parties submitted that any countervailin g duty must be limited to the
lesser of the subsidy margin and injury margin. In view of the existing anti-dumping
duty on the same product from Vietnam, they requested protection against double
remedies and, in some submissions, contended that the combine d incidence of anti -
dumping and countervailing duties should not exceed the injury margin.
xxxvii. The users and exporters submitted that the subject goods are an important input for
plastic products and that additional duty would increase downstream costs. They
requested termination of the investigation or, alternatively, a narrowly calibrated duty
that would no t disrupt supplies or downstream competitiveness.
K.2 Submissions by the Domestic Industry
234. The domestic industry has, inter alia, made the following post -disclosure submissions:
i. The revised Disclosure Statement was stated to be procedurally unwarranted
insofar as it materially reduced the subsidy margins disclosed earlier. The domestic
industry requested restoration of the earlier margins or complete disc losure of the
revised benchmark values, adjustments, calculations and reasons for the change.
ii. The dom estic industry submitted that it was effectively allowed only three working
days to respond and that requests for disclosure of the revised calculation she ets
and benchmark adjustments were not fully accepted. It nevertheless placed
additional supporting m aterial on record within the permitted time.
iii. The domestic industry supported the product scope and PCN methodology adopted
by the Authority, which are iden tical to those finalised in the related anti -dumping
investigation concerning the same product from V ietnam.
iv. The application and standing were stated to satisfy the CVD Rules and Trade
Notice No. 09/2021. Twelve applicant producers furnished the prescribed
information and twenty -one additional producers expressly supported the
application.
v. Sampling of fou r domestic producers was defended as valid and representative of a
fragmented, predominantly MSME industry. The sampled producers were stated to
be among t he larger producers and to reflect geographical and operational diversity.
vi. The fifteen -month POI was defended as legally permissible and appropriate in the
circumstances of a fragmented industry. The domestic industry also submitted that
all injury and cost data relied upon by the Authority are specific to the product
under consideration.
vii. The confidential ity claims were stated to be justified because disclosure of
producer -wise sales value, profitability, cost, finance cost, depreciation, plant data,
capacity utilisation and consumption norms would cause commercial harm.
Indexed and consolidated trends wer e said to provide a reasonable understanding.
viii. The domestic industry supported the finding that the Vietnamese
producers/exporters received countervailab le subsidies above de minimis levels,
but strongly objected to the substantial reduction in the margins of almost all
participating producers and the residual category.
ix. With respect to Program 1, the domestic industry supported the finding of
countervailab ility. It submitted that limestone is the principal upstream raw
material for ground calcium carbonate a nd that calcium carbonate is the major input
for the subject goods; the effect of measures retaining and depressing the price of
limestone is therefore transmitted to limestone -derived calcium carbonate.
x. The domestic industry submitted that the programme i s not confined to producers
directly purchasing limestone lumps. Where a producer purchases calcium
carbonate powder, the relevant comparison is with a comparable calcium -carbonate
benchmark; where it consumes limestone lumps, the benchmark must correspond to
limestone. The form of the immediate purchase does not sever the identified
mineral value chain.
xi. The UAE limestone benchmark was stated to be unsuit able because the underlying
transactions predominantly concerned steel, cement and metallurgical -flux
applications, including flux -grade material, and were not comparable with the input
used in filler masterbatch.
xii. Malaysia was stated to be the appropriate external source because the calcium
carbonate exported from Malaysia to India was commercially comparabl e in
particle size, purity, whiteness and industrial characteristics and because a
consistent POI price series was available at the product -specific tar iff level.
xiii. The domestic industry clarified that its benchmark evidence was not confined to a
four-digit heterogeneous basket. It relied on HS 283650 data, corresponding Indian
tariff item 28365000 data, Trade Map information, TradeStat data, purchase
recor ds and material from the connected anti -dumping investigation.
xiv. The domestic industry accepted conversion of Malaysian CIF import data to FOB
only if freight and insurance are removed on the basis of actual calcium -carbonate
freight. It filed POI invoices, bills of entry, purchase registers, accounting extracts
and third -party supplier freight evidence and su bmitted that these corroborated the
FOB series earlier placed on record. The domestic industry vide its mail dated
23.06.2026 has provided the document ary evidence pertaining to the ocean freight
charges from Malaysia to India of the subject goods.
xv. The do mestic industry further submitted that freight data for a dissimilar product or
period could not override contemporaneous calcium -carbonate freight evid ence. It
requested disclosure of the CIF base price and adjustments and restoration of the
Program 1 mar gin after using verified, product -specific freight and insurance.
xvi. The domestic industry requested countervailing of Program 12. It submitted that
electr icity prices in Vietnam are centrally regulated through the Ministry of
Industry and Trade and EVN, that tariff differentiation favours manufacturing
users, and that the benefit is sector -specific.
xvii. With respect to Program 13, the domestic industry supporte d the findings on
financial contribution and specificity but requested use of an external market
benchma rk, including comparable Thailand industrial land data, rather than
Vietnamese rates stated to be distorted by the government -administered land
regime.
xviii. The domestic industry supported countervailing Program 3. It submitted that the
normal statutory CIT rat e of 20% is the appropriate benchmark and that the benefit
is the difference between the verified normal tax liability and the tax actually paid
during the POI.
xix. The domestic industry requested countervailing of import -duty exemptions
wherever a participati ng exporter received a specific exemption or excess
remission. It accepted that quantification must be based on the verified amount of
revenue foregone during the POI.
xx. The domestic industry supported countervailing preferential lending by VDB and
state-owned or government -directed banks. It submitted that the benefit should be
measured against comparable private commercial lending rates in Vietnam.
xxi. Progra ms 2 and 6 were stated to be sector -specific or export -contingent by design.
The domestic industry submi tted that claims of non -availment must be tested
against verified records and government disbursement information.
xxii. The domestic industry objected to gra nt of an individual margin to US Masterbatch
Joint Stock Company and its Hung Yen Branch and requested a pplication of the
non-cooperative residual rate, alleging material deficiencies in the responses and
absence of complete programme information.
xxiii. The dome stic industry supported the Authority’s injury findings. It submitted that
subsidised imports increased significantly, captured market share, undercut and
suppressed domestic prices and caused deterioration in profits, cash flow and return
on capital emplo yed.
xxiv. The domestic industry submitted that the injury analysis is based on verified PUC -
specific records of the sampled producers and that no substantiated alternative
cause severed the causal link between subsidised imports and injury.
xxv. The domestic industr y supported application of the lesser -duty rule and submitted
that the duty should be the lower of the s ubsidy margin and the injury margin for
each producer/exporter. It also requested appropriate treatment of overlap with the
anti-dumping measure in acco rdance with the Act and the Rules.
xxvi. The domestic industry submitted that countervailing duty would restor e fair
competition rather than restrict imports. The impact on downstream products was
stated to be limited, while non -imposition would perpetuate injur y to a large
fragmented domestic industry.
K.3 Examination by the Authority
I. Procedural and Prelimin ary Issues
235. The Authority examined the post -disclosure submissions of the Government of Vietnam,
participating producers/exporters, the domestic industry and other interested parties.
Repetitive submissions which have already been dealt with in the revised Disclosure
Statement were not reproduced; only new issues, alleged computational errors and matters
requiring clarification were examined.
236. Rule 18 of the CVD Rules requires disclosure of the essential facts under consideration
before final findings and a meaningful opportunity to defend interests. A disclosure
statement is not a final determination and does not create a vested right in a provisional
benchmark, calculation or margin. The Authority may reconsider comments, correct errors
and refine the meth odology to be used in working of the relevant calculations .
237. The revised Disclosure Statement dated 16 June 2026 superseded the earlier disclosure
dated 20 March 2026 after reconsideration of countervailability, benchmark selection,
specificity, company -specific benefit and cooperation . Comments filed within time we re
considered on merits, while fresh information was used only where it was capable of
verification .
238. The product scope and PCN methodology based on calcium -carbonate content w as retained.
The s tanding of the domestic industry was also confirmed: the appli cation was filed by two
associations on behalf of twelve producers and was supported by twenty -one additional
producers. Sampling of four representative producers was considered justified in vie w of the
fragmented structure of the industry. The Authority r elied on verified PUC -specific cost,
production, sales and profitability data.
239. The fifteen -month POI was found consistent with the Rules and suitable for representative
analysis. Confidentialit y claims were examined under Rule 8. Commercially sensitive da ta
such as raw -material purchase prices, tax records, loan terms, land agreements, production
costs and producer -wise profitability were protected, while non -confidential summaries,
indexed tren ds and ranges were disclosed wherever practicable.
II. Subsid y Methodology
240. The change in subsidy margins between the earlier and revised disclosures arose from
programme -wise re -examination, use of more product -specific benchmarks, correction of
certain p rogramme treatments and examination of company -specific inform ation. A changed
margin is not evidence of arbitrariness; it reflects the working of the disclosure process.
241. Under Rule 12, the countervailable amount is the benefit conferred on the recipient during
the POI. Accordingly, only verified recipient -specific benefits were quantified. Benefits
were allocated to the subject goods using appropriate verified turnover or sales
denominators. No benefit was attributed merely because a programme existed in law.
III. Program 1 - Supply of Limestone/Calcium Carbonate a t Less Than Adequate
Remuneration
242. The Authority re -examined Program 1 with reference to the distinct requirements of
financial contribution, benefit , specificity and countervailability . The dete rmination is not
based merely on Vietnam’s export tax on limestone or on a difference between domestic and
external prices. It is based on the cumulative design and operation of Vietnam’s mineral -
policy framework governing extraction, export retention and domestic availability of
limestone and limestone -derived calcium carbonate.
243. Under Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) of the SCM Agreement, a financial contribution may arise where
the government entrusts or directs private bodies to provide goods. Such entrustment or
direction cannot be inferred from price effects alone. In the present case, the Authority
considered the legal framework, export -tax treatment, policy objective of retaining minerals
for domestic downstream use and the conduct of suppliers, and found that these factors,
taken together, went beyond an incidental market response.
244. Verified purchases / consumption of limestone / calcium carbonate powder were compared
with a calcium -carbonate benchmark. Since the investigated producers were the direct
purchaser s or consumers of the input, no separate pass-through test was required. The
benefit was determined by comparing the price actually paid with an appropriate benchmark
reflecting prevailing market conditions, including quality, availability, transportation and
other conditions of purchase or sale.
245. The import data pertaining to imports of Calcium Carbonate into India was extracted from
website of Ministry of Commerce & Industry, and it was noted that the imports of Calcium
Carbonate into India were highest f rom Vietnam (44%), followed by Egypt (37% ) and
Malaysia (12%) during the period of investigation. Since, this investigation is being
undertaken against the alleged subsidy programmes of Vietnam and the related issues of
alleged price distortion therein, th erefore, the import prices from Vietnam t o India cannot be
adopted as an appropriate benchmark. Further, it was noted that the import prices of next
largest exporters of Calcium Carbonate to India, that is, Egypt and Malaysia when combined
together accoun ted for 49% of total imports into India a nd was found to be considered as a
representative sample for adopting the same as a benchmark for this programme. Therefore,
the possibility of considering the import prices of both Egypt and Malaysia into India
together in the form of weighted average, h as been examined and was found to be suitable
for considering it as an appropriate benchmark for this subsidy programme.
246. The Authority specifically examined competing claims regarding consideration of Egypt
and Ma laysia for benchmark . The participating p roducers / e xporters relied on Egypt's
substantial production and exports, its significant share in Indian imports, the domestic
industry's own procurement from Egypt and the commercial relevance of Egyptian prices.
The domestic industry relied on the product -specific and reconcilable Malaysian data under
tariff item 28365000. Upon reconsideration, the Authority found that both countries
supplied relevant calcium carbon ate to India during the POI and that neither sou rce should
be discarded merely because the other had a larger volume or more detailed transaction data.
247. The Authority has re -examined the benchmark for calcium carbonate strictly in accordance
with Rule 12(2 )(d), Annexure IV and Article 14(d) of the SCM A greement, which require
adequacy of remuneration to be assessed against prevailing market conditions, including
price, quality, availability, marketability, transportation and other conditions of sale.
Benchm ark selection is therefore not governed by the l owest price, the nearest source, the
largest supplier or the outcome most favourable to either side. The controlling test is
whether the benchmark is reliable, representative, comparable and capable of measur ing the
benefit on a like -for-like basis
248. Egypt represented the materially larger import volume into India of CaCO 3 and its use by
the domestic industry confirmed commercial availability for industrial use. Malaysia,
however, offered a more detailed produc t-specific transaction data and useful evidence on
descriptions, price dispersion and shipment conditions. The Authority has , therefore,
considered the weighted average CIF prices of both the sources duly adjusted to FOB level ,
that is, import prices of Egypt as well as Malaysia to India as extracted fr om website of
Ministry of Commerce & Industry , as an appropriate external benchmark, for the purpose of
programme no. 1. The Authority has relied on actual 8 digit level HSN code imports into
India from Egy pt and Malaysia in POI at CIF level, as extracted from website of Ministry of
Commerce & Industry, which has been duly adjusted to FOB level .
249. The benchmark shall be calculated by weighting each country’s adjusted price by its
corresponding eligible impor t quantity. This methodology is not an equitable c ompromise
between competing claims; it is the most representative and legally defensible measure of
prevailing market remuneration available on the record. It recognises Egypt’s greater
commercial presence, preserves the reliability of the Malaysian produc t-specific data,
minimises source -specific distortion and provides a balanced, objective and robust basis for
the final recipient -specific benefit and subsidy margin calculations. Objections concerning
grade, particle size, purity, coating, whiteness, proc essing route, end use and tariff
classification were duly examined for both countries.
250. It is noted that Malaysian CIF prices have been converted to a FOB -equivalent basis by
deducting the verified freight and insurance prices as provided by the domestic i ndustry,
whereas the Egyptian CIF prices have been converted to a FOB -equivalent basis b y
deducting the verified freight and insurance prices provided by the respondents or producer -
exporters. This ensures that the benchmark reflects the value of the input itself and is not
distorted by differences in product characteristics, shipment terms o r level of trade.
251. The composite benchmark is considered more objective and representative than exclusive
use of either country. Exclusive reliance on Egypt would disr egard the detailed Malaysian
transaction evidence, while exclusive reliance on Malaysia would understate the
significance of the larger volume of comparable imports from Egypt. The combined series,
after harmonisation of product scope and commercial terms, better reflects prevailing
market conditions.
252. The legal basis of this methodology is r epresentativeness, comparability and prevailing
market conditions under Rule 12 and Article 14(d). Although it incidentally balances the
competing concerns of exporters and the domestic industry, it is adopted because it provides
a broader and more reliabl e external market reference based benchmark.
253. The weighted benchmark is applied only to producers that purchased or consumed calcium
carbonate during the POI. It is com pared with each cooperating producer's verified purchase
price on a like -for-like basis, with adjustments for freight, insurance, port handling, trading
level and other conditions of purchase. The company -specific benefit calculations are
contained in the confidential calculation sheets.
254. Specificity was confirmed because the identified miner al-input framework benefits a limited
group of downstream enterprises dependent on the affected limestone and limestone -derived
input. The fact that these minerals may have other uses does not negate specificity where the
design and operation of the progra mme and the benefit to investigated producers are
established.
255. Accordingly, Program 1 remains countervailable. For calcium -carbonate purchases, the final
producer -specific subsidy calculations shall use the quantity -weighted average of adjusted
comparable POI import prices from Egypt and Malaysia. Consequential revisions shall be
made to the subsidy margins .
IV. Other Subsidy Programmes
256. The Authority examined Program 12 concerning the alleged provision of natural gas,
electricity and coal at less than adequate remuneration. The participating producers did not
establish use of natural gas or coal in the production of the subject goods duri ng the POI. As
regards electric ity, the tariff differences were found to arise from ordinary commercial
factors such as voltage level, consumption category, time of use and supply conditions. No
evidence showed that producers of the subject goods received electricity on preferential
terms compared with similarly situated industrial consumers. Accordingly, no
countervailable benefit was determined under this programme.
257. Under Program 13, the Authority examined land -use rights, lease and sub -lease agreements,
payment records, investment ce rtificates and relevant provincial instruments. A benefit was
not presumed merely because a producer was located in an industrial park or investment
zone. It was quantified only where verified records established that the pro ducer received
land-use rights, or an exemption or reduction in land or water rent, on terms more
favourable than those normally applicable in Vietnam.
258. For determining the benefit under Program 13, the Authority compared the rent actually
paid by the prod ucer with the normal rate appli cable in Vietnam in the absence of the
concession. The proposed use of rental prices of factories or industrial properties in
Thailand was rejected because such prices were not sufficiently comparable in terms of
location, te nure, legal framework and natur e of the property. A countervailable benefit was
therefore determined only for producers that received a verified land -related concession
during the POI.
259. Under Program 3, exemptions or reductions in corporate income tax were treated as
government revenue foregone. The normal statutory corporate income -tax rate of 20% was
used as the benchmark. The benefit was determined as the difference between the tax that
would ordinarily have been payable and the tax actually payable afte r availing the
concession. The calculation was confined to the verified period and amount of tax relief.
260. The corporate income -tax programme was considered specific where eligibility was
restricted to enterprises located in specified regions or industrial zones, or to enterprises
undert aking identified categories of investment. Accordingly, a countervailable benefit was
determined only to the extent of the verified tax relief received by the concerned producer
during the POI.
261. Under Program 4, the Authority examined whether the participa ting producers had actually
availed exemptions from customs duty on imports of raw materials, machinery or
equipment. The mere existence of such an exemption under Vietnamese law was not
considered sufficient. In the absence of verified company -specific av ailment and a
corresponding amount of duty foregone during the POI, no separate subsidy margin was
assigned under this programme.
262. With respect to preferential lending, export credit and loan guarantees under Programs 5, 7,
8, 9, 10 and 11, the Authority d id not presume that every loan granted by a state -owned
bank constituted a subsidy. Each loan was examined with reference to the lender, currency,
tenure, security, interest rate and other borrowing terms. A benefit was deter mined only
where the verified t erms were more favourable than those available under a comparable
commercial loan. Where a participating producer had obtained a comparable arm’s -length
loan from a private commercial bank in the same currency and on similar terms, that loan
has been used as the benchmark.
263. Under Programs 2 and 6, relating to the Master Plan for Development of the Plastics
Industry and the Export Promotion Program, no verified financial contribution or benefit
was found to have been received by the participating producers d uring the POI. The
existence of a government policy or programme was not considered sufficient in the absence
of actual receipt of a measurable benefit. Accordingly, no subsidy margin was assigned
under these programmes.
V. Cooperation, Injury, Lesser -Duty Rule and Conclusi on
264. US Masterbatch and its Hung Yen branch were granted individual treatment because their
responses contained the material information required for the programmes ultimately
countervailed and were capable of verification. Entities that failed to furnish c omplete POI
information remained subject to the residual or facts -available approach.
265. The Authority reaffirmed material injury and causal link after examining import volumes,
market share, PCN -wise price undercutting, suppression and de pression, and the d omestic
industry's production, sales, profitability, cash flow and return on capital employed. Other
factors such as demand movement, capacity additions, raw -material prices, product mix and
competition among domestic producers were exam ined and were not f ound to sever the
causal link.
266. The NIP was determined from verified costs of sampled domestic producers after prescribed
adjustments and a reasonable return. Exporter -specific injury margins were based on PCN -
wise comparison of NIP with landed value and c ould differ because of product mix,
transaction prices, freight and export quantities.
267. The lesser -duty rule was applied. The recommended countervailing duty for each
producer/exporter cannot exceed the lower of the positive subsidy marg in and injury
margin. The existence of an anti -dumping duty does not bar a countervailing measure, but
the recommendation must avoid double counteraction of the same export -subsidy benefit.
268. The Authority concluded that the interests of users and importers were adequate ly
considered. A calibrated duty is intended to neutralise injurious subsidisation, not to restrict
fair imports. The final recommendation therefore confirms the essential approach of the
revised Disclosure Statement, with the principal modif ication that t he calcium -carbonate
benchmark under Program 1 shall be the quantity -weighted average of the adjusted,
comparable POI import prices from Egypt and Malaysia into India. The post -disclosure
comments do not justify termination of the investigati on.
L. CONCLUSIO NS
269. After examining the submissions made by all interested parties and issues raised therein
and the facts available on record, the Authority comes to the following conclusions:
a) The product under consideration in the present investigation i s Calcium Carb onate Filler
Masterbatch having CaCO3 as major constituent i.e., more than 50% in content .
b) The subject goods exported from the subject country and the article manufactured by the
domestic industry are ‘like article’ to each other in terms of CVD Rules, 199 5.
c) The applicant domestic producers constitute domestic industry within the CVD Rules,
1995.
d) The domestic industry has suffered material injury as a result of the subsidized imports.
The injury margin is significant.
e) Governments of Vietnam i s providing subsidies to the producers of the PUC in the form
of tax benefits, interest concession s, land rebates and provisions of goods and services at
less than adequate remuneration.
270. The imposition of countervailing duty is in public interest. This i s evident from the
following:
i. The impact of duties on the cost of the user industry is not expected to be significant.
ii. The trade remedial measures do not prohibit imports into the country , but ensures a level
playing field between imports and domestic ma nufactur ing. A viable domestic industry
ensures that the user industry is not fully dependent on the imports.
iii. The imposition of countervailing duty would only be to the extent of the injury caused to
the domestic industry. Therefore, the imposition of dut ies does not provide any extra
protection but only offsets the injury caused by unfair trade practices.
M. RECO MMENDATIONS
271. The Authority notes that the investigation was initiated and notified to all the interested
parties and adequate opportunity was giv en to the domestic industry, the governments of
the exporting countr y, exporters, the importers, the users and the other interested parties
to provide information on the aspects of subsidization, injury and causal link.
272. Having concluded that there is posi tive evidence of subsidization, injury and causal link
between them, the Authority is of the view that a counte rvailing duty is required to be
imposed on the PUC from the subject count ry. Therefore, the Authority considers it
necessary to recommend imposit ion of definitive countervailing duty on the imports of
the subject goods from the subject countr y in the form and manner described hereunder.
The Authority has recommended imposition of the anti -dumping duties in the
investigation concerning the subject g oods vide its Final Findings F. No. 6/38/2024 -
DGTR dated 2 7.09.202 5.
273. Having regard to the lesser duty rule, the Authority recommends imposition of definitive
countervailing duty less than or equal to the lesser of margin of subsidy and margin of
injury t o remove the injury to the domestic industry. The Authority has noted t he fact that
the PUC is already attracting anti -dumping duty.
274. Accordingly, definitive countervailing duty as mentioned in Col No. 7 of the duty table is
recommended to be imposed for five (5) years from the date of notification to be issued in
this regar d by the Central Government on all imports of the subject goods from the
subject countr y.
DUTY TABLE
S.
No Heading/Sub
heading/
Tariff item Description
of
Goods Country
of Origin Country of
Export Producer Amount Unit Currency
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1 3824 99 00 Calcium
carbonate
filler
masterbatch Vietnam Any country
including
Vietnam European Plastic Joint
Stock Company
(“EuroPlast”) 15.16
MT USD
2 -do- -do- Vietnam Any country
including
Vietnam Yen Bai European
Plastic Joint Stock
Company (“Yenbai”) 15.16
MT USD
3 -do- -do- Vietnam Any country
including
Vietnam Nghe An European
Plastic One Member
Limited Liability
Company (“Nghe”) 15.16
MT USD
4 -do- -do- Vietnam Any country
including
Vietnam Polyfill joint stock
company
(“Polyfill”)(collectively
referred to as
“Europlast Group”) 15.16
MT USD
5 -do- -do- Vietnam Any country
including
Vietnam ADC Plastic. ,
JSC 14.20
MT USD
6 -do- -do- Vietnam Any country
including
Vietnam An Tien Industries
Joint Stock
Company 13.42
MT USD
7 -do- -do- Vietnam Any country
including
Vietnam Vitaplas Joint Stock
Company (Vitaplas) 9.11
MT USD
8 -do- -do- Vietnam Any country
including
Vietnam Vietnam
Industrial
Minerals International
Joint Stock
Company 16.03
MT USD
9 -do- -do- Vietnam Any country
including
Vietnam US
Masterbatch
Joint Stock
Company 22.52 MT USD
10 -do- -do- Vietnam Any country
including
Vietnam US
Masterbatch
Joint Stock
Company –
Hung Yen
Branch 22.52 MT USD
11 -do- -do- Vietnam Any country
including
Vietnam Any Producer 69.19 MT USD
12 -do- -do- Any
country
other
than
Vietnam Vietnam Any Producer 69.19 MT USD
(a) For serial no. 1 to 8, and 11, 12, since the sum of countervailing duty mentioned above and
the anti -dumping duty imposed vide Customs notification no. 37/2025 -Customs (ADD) dated
24th December, 2025 for the subject goods, does not exceed the respective injury margin of the
producers, therefore, the counter vailing duty m entioned in Column no. 7 of the above duty table
shall be collected.
(b) For serial no. 9 and 10, since the sum of countervailing duty mentioned above and the anti -
dumping duty imposed ‘under residual category’ vide Customs notification no. 37/2025 -
Custom s (ADD) dated 24th December, 2025 for the subject goods, exceeds the respective injury
margin of the producers, therefore, the countervailing duty mentioned in Column no. 7 of the
above duty table shall not be collected.
Note - The application of the indi vidual duty rates specified for the companies mentioned in the
above shall be conditional upon presentation to customs authorities of a valid commercial
invoice, on which shall appear a declaration dated and signed by an o fficial of the entity issuing
such invoice, identified by his/her name and function, drafted as follows:
“I, the undersigned, certify that the (volume) of (product concerned) sold for export to
India covered by this invoice was manufactured by (producer name and address) in the
(name of country). I declare that the information provided in this invoice is complete and
correct.’ If no such invoice is presented, the duty applicable to all other producers shall
apply. This requirement is without prejudice to the verification procedures
indepe ndently undertaken by the Customs authorities under the applicable customs law
and regulations.”
N. Further procedure
275. An appeal against the determination/review of the Designated Authority in this final finding
shall lie before the Customs, Excise and Ser vice Tax Appellate Tribunal in accordance with the
relevant provisions of the Act.
AMITABH KUMAR , Designated Authority
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